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Abstract
Compromising Emissions from a High Speed Cryptographic
Embedded System
Damien O’Rourke, B.Eng., MIEEE
Specific hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms have been subject to 
a number of “side channel” attacks of late. A side channel is any information bearing 
emission that results from the physical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. 
Smartcard realisations have been shown to be particularly vulnerable to these attacks. 
Other more complex embedded cryptographic systems may also be vulnerable, and 
each new design needs to be tested.
The vulnerability of a recently developed high speed cryptographic accelerator is ex­
amined. The purpose of this examination is not only to verify the integrity of the de­
vice, but also to allow its designers to make a determination of its level of conformance 
with any standard that they may wish to comply with.
A number of attacks were reviewed initially and two were chosen for examination and 
implementation - Power Analysis and Electromagnetic Analysis. These particular at­
tacks appeared to offer the greatest threat to this particular system. Experimental tech­
niques were devised to implement these attacks and a simulation and micrcontroller 
emulation were setup to ensure these techniques were sound.
Each experimental setup was successful in attacking the simulated data and the micr­
controller circuit. The significance of this was twofold in that it verified the integrity 
of the setup and proved that a real threat existed. However, the attacks on the crypto­
graphic accelerator failed in all cases to reveal any significant information. Although 
this is considered a positive result, it does not prove the integrity of the device as it 
may be possible for an adversary with more resources to successfully attack the board. 
It does however increase the level of confidence in this particular product and acts as a 
stepping stone towards conformance of cryptographic standards.
The experimental procedures developed can also be used by designers wishing to test 
the vulnerability of their own products to these attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The idea of communications interception is not new. For as long as human beings have 
been communicating, some unintended recipient has been listening. With the advent 
of technology, communication methods have improved dramatically, and ways have 
been devised to make it increasingly difficult for unauthorised parties to intercept and 
analyse the information communicated. Unfortunately, using the same technology, the 
methods of interception have also greatly improved.
Secure communications can be achieved to an extent using a technique known as Cryp­
tography - the art of secret writing. Cryptography has been around for centuries in one 
form or another and has received new life with the extraordinary computing power 
available in todays microprocessors. During the two world wars, cryptography was 
a highly classified subject and little was known about it in the public domain. With 
the advancement of technology however, public domain research flourished, and the 
first public algorithms were developed. Not surprisingly, with these algorithms came 
reported attacks on them.
Until recently most of the attacks were aimed at the algorithm itself. Mathematical 
weakness’s were exploited to allow the secret information to be revealed. However 
as the theoretical integrity of the algorithms evolved, direct attacks became much less 
effective. Attackers looked for alternative ways to compromise the security of these 
algorithms and inevitably found them - the so called side channels.
Chapter 1 Introduction
A “side channel” is any information bearing emission1 that results from the physical 
implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. Due to the fact that these emissions are 
information bearing, they are referred to as compromising emissions.
This thesis aims to test the vulnerability of a certain high speed cryptographic device to 
some of these compromising emissions (specifically the first and last attacks outlined 
in section 4.11 of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, “Security 
Requirements For Cryptographic Modules” [1]). A cryptographic device (also known 
as a cryptoprocessor) is any electronic or mechanical2 device that is used to keep in­
formation secure. Published research would suggest that side channels have been used 
primarily to attack smart cards and other low power, minimal circuitry devices. The 
high speed cryptographic device tested here (herein referred to as the Device Under 
Test or DUT) is far more complicated than any smart card. It has it’s own purpose built 
Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), and also contains at least one coun­
termeasure to these attacks. It will be seen that the attacks were far more difficult to 
implement in this case.
1.1 Cryptography
The idea of cryptography is to convert information to a form that will be unintelligi­
ble to an unintended recipient. It accomplishes this using a cryptographic algorithm 
known as a cipher, and an object known as a cryptographic key. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 
show examples of the two classes of cryptographic systems in use today. The infor­
mation to be converted is known as plaintext and the converted information is known 
as ciphertext. The process of converting plaintext to ciphertext is known as encryption 
and the process of converting back from ciphertext to plaintext is known as decryption.
!The US military refers to it as an “emanation” however the two words will be used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis.
2Today they are built for practical applications using electronics only, however during World War II, 
they were entirely mechanical.
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The cryptographic key may (figure 1.1) or may not (figure 1.2) be the same for both 
encryption and decryption depending on the type of algorithm used. A dedicated cir­
cuit board used to perform encryption and decryption is known as a cryptoprocessor 
which can be part of an overall system known as a cryptosystem*.
There are two main types of cryptography in use today - symmetric or secret key cryp­
tography and asymmetric or public key cryptography. Symmetric key cryptography 
is the oldest type whereas asymmetric cryptography is only being used publicly since 
the late 1970’s4. Asymmetric cryptography was a major milestone in the search for a 
perfect encryption scheme.
1.1.1 Secret Key Cryptography
As mentioned, secret key cryptography is by far the oldest of the two types and goes 
back to Egyptian times. It involves the use of only one key which is used for both 
encryption and decryption (hence the name symmetric key cryptography). Figure 1.1 
depicts this idea. It is necessary for security purposes that the secret key never be 
revealed.
Secret Key (K ) Secret Key (K )
Figure 1.1: Secret key encryption.
To accomplish encryption, most secret key algorithms use two main techniques known
3 Sometimes the two terms are used interchangeably.
4It is claimed by some that government agencies knew about asymmetric cryptography before this.
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as substitution and permutation. Substitution is simply a mapping of one value to 
another whereas permutation is a reordering of the bit positions for each of the inputs. 
These techniques are used a number of times in iterations called rounds. Generally, 
the more rounds there are, the more secure the algorithm. A non-linearity is also 
introduced into the encryption so that decryption will be computationally infeasible5 
without the secret key. This is achieved with the use of S-boxes which are basically 
non-linear substitution tables where either the output is smaller than the input or vice 
versa. See [2] for more details.
For the past 25 years, the main standard for encrypting data was a symmetric algorithm 
known as the Data Encryption Standard (DES)6. DES is a 64 bit block cipher which 
means that it encrypts data 64 bits at a time. This is contrasted to a stream cipher 
in which only one bit at a time (or sometimes small groups of bits such as a byte) is 
encrypted.
DES was the result of a research project set up by International Business Machines 
(IBM) corporation in the late 1960’s which resulted in a cipher known as LUCIFER. In 
the early 1970’s it was decided to commercialise LUCIFER and a number of significant 
changes were introduced. IBM was not the only one involved in these changes as they 
sought technical advice from the National Security Agency (NSA) [3] (other outside 
consultants were involved but it is likely that the NSA were the major contributors 
from a technical point of view). The altered version of LUCIFER was put forward as 
a proposal for the new national encryption standard requested by the National Bureau 
of Standards (NBS)7. It was finally adopted in 1977 as the Data Encryption Standard - 
DES.
Some of the changes made to LUCIFER have been the subject of much controversy
5This means that it costs more to implement the attack than the information is worth.
6This is now being replaced by a new standard known as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
7Now known as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
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even to the present day. The most notable of these was the key size. LUCIFER used 
a key size of 128 bits however this was reduced to 56 bits for DES. Even though DES 
actually accepts a 64 bit key as input, the remaining eight bits are used for parity 
checking and have no effect on DES’s security. Outsiders were convinced that the 56 
bit key was an easy target for a brute force8 attack due to its extremely small size. The 
need for the parity checking scheme was also questioned without satisfying answers.
Another controversial issue was that the S-boxes used were designed under classified 
conditions and no reasons for their particular design were ever given. This led people 
to assume that the NSA had introduced a “trapdoor” through which they could decrypt 
any data encrypted by DES even without knowledge of the key. One startling discovery 
was that the S-boxes appeared to be secure against an attack known as Differential 
Cryptanalysis [4] which was only publicly discovered by Biham and Shamir in 1990. 
This suggests that the NSA were aware of this attack in 1977; 13 years earlier! A 
detailed description of DES is given in appendix A and is required for an understanding 
of the next chapter.
DES of course isn’t the only symmetric cipher. There are many others, each with 
varying levels of complexity. Such ciphers include: IDEA, RC4, RC5, RC6 and the 
new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) known as Rijndael. These ciphers are of 
no concern in this thesis as the DUT wasn’t running them. However AES has been 
under intense scrutiny with regard to side channel attacks because it must be able to 
withstand them if it is to be the next cryptographic standard. For more information on 
the first three of these ciphers, the interested reader is referred to [2] and for Rijndael 
see [5].
One of the main problems with secret key cryptography is key distribution. For this 
form of cryptography to work, both parties must have a copy of the secret key. This
8 See section 1.2
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would have to be communicated over some secure channel which, unfortunately, is 
not that easy to achieve. As will be seen in the next section however, public key 
cryptography provides a solution to this.
1.1.2 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography was considered a major achievement in the field, as it offered 
an excellent solution for the old time problem of key distribution. It was invented by 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Heilman in 19769 and was such a milestone, that the term 
modern cryptography is often used to refer to cryptography after this date.
Diffie and Heilman produced the first public key algorithm [6]. Unfortunately, it was 
only useful for key distribution. An algorithm was needed that would allow both en­
cryption and digital signatures. In 1977, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adle- 
man fulfilled this requirement with the algorithm known as RSA (an anagram of the 
first letters from each of the inventors surnames), the first fully fledged public key 
algorithm. It was, and is still is, the most popular public key algorithm available.
Public key cryptography uses a different technique than secret key cryptography. In­
stead of using only one cryptographic key, it uses two keys - a private key10 and a pub­
lic key. The private key is kept private and the public key is kept in a public database 
where anyone can access it. To accomplish this, a variation of a function known as 
a one-way function is used. This is a function that is easy to calculate one way, but 
extremely difficult (ideally impossible) to reverse. Encryption using such a function 
would be easy, but decryption would be impossible. Of course an ideal one-way func­
tion is of no use because this would then mean that the intended recipient would be 
unable to decipher the message. Instead, the variation used, allows decryption only if a
°It was also independently invented by Ralph Merkle [2].
10The term “private key” is generally used instead of “secret key” to distinguish it from the key 
used in symmetric key cryptography (of which there is only one). Both the secret key in symmetric 
cryptography and the private key in asymmetric cryptography must not be revealed to anyone however.
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certain parameter is known (i.e. the private key). This is known as a trapdoor one-way 
function. See [2,7,8] for more details.
A secure communication or transaction takes place by encrypting intended data with 
the public key and then transferring the information to the intended recipient. The 
recipient will then decrypt the data with the private key that is paired with public key. 
This idea is depicted in figure 1.2 where the public key is given the symbol K u and the 
private key K r. The keys always come in pairs and are thus referred to as a key pair.
Public Key (K u) Private Key (K r)
Plaintext (P)
Figure 1.2: Public key encryption.
There have been quite a few algorithms proposed to implement the public key scheme. 
However, due to either insecurities or impracticalities, most have been rejected. Of the 
ones that have been accepted, most are good for either encryption or digital signatures, 
but not both. Only three are considered to work well for both methods and only one 
of these three has been widely excepted. The three are RSA, ElGamal and Rabin, with 
RSA being the most widely accepted. RSA has not yet been proven to be secure, how­
ever it gets it’s wide acceptance from the fact that nobody has succeeded in breaking 
it. Details on all three ciphers can be found in [2] and an overview of RSA is given in 
appendix C.
A lot of public key algorithms (including RSA) use concepts from an area of mathe­
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matics known as Number Theory11. One of the main ideas in number theory is modular 
arithmetic and specifically, modular exponentiation. Modular exponentiation is used 
by many public key algorithms to perform encryption and decryption. It is similar to 
ordinary exponentiation except that the result is not the value of the exponentiation 
itself, but of the remainder when this value is divided by a number called the modulus.
Considering RSA specifically, the equation to calculate the ciphertext from the plain­
text is
C = Me mod n (1.1)
where C is the ciphertext, M is the plaintext and the set {e, n) constitute the public
key, Ku.
The original message M can be reconstructed by decryption which is of a similar form,
Cd mod n = Med mod n = M  mod n (1.2)
where the set {d, n} constitute the private key Kr, and the other variables are as before.
It might appear rather strange that Med mod n =  M  mod n however, there are strict 
rules that govern the choice of e, d and n which must be adhered to in order for this 
equality to be true (an explanation is given in appendix C where an overview of RSA 
is given).
The problem with modular exponentiation is that it is computationally intensive and 
can severely affect the performance of modem e-commerce servers. A solution to the 
problem is to assign the encryption to a dedicated high speed cryptoprocessor such as 
the one being reviewed here.
11 An overview of number theory is given in appendix B.
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1.2 Security of cryptosystems
The following is taken from [9]:
“A secure coprocessor is a general-purpose computing environment that 
withstands physical attacks and logical attacks. The device must run the 
programs that it is supposed to, unaltered. You must be able to (remotely) 
distinguish between the real device and application, and a clever imper­
sonator. The coprocessor must remain secure even if adversaries carry out 
destructive analysis of one or more devices ...  You need a device you can 
trust even though you can’t control its environment.”
Traditionally, cryptographic systems have been represented only as mathematical mod­
els. Figure 1.3 shows an example of one of these models. In this scenario, an encrypted 
communication takes place by encrypting some plaintext with a particular cipher, and 
transferring it through and insecure channel to which some intruder may be connected. 
On receiving this information, the recipient decrypts it in the usual manner. It is as­
sumed in this case that the security of the entire cryptosystem rests with the particular 
algorithm used, and that the eavesdropper will only have some plaintext-ciphertext 
pairs to work with12.
Algorithms in cryptography are designed to keep information secure. An algorithm is 
considered secure if there is no attack that can reveal the secret information with less 
than 2n tries where N  is the number of bits in the cryptographic key (in other words, 
the security of a cryptosystem should depend on the cryptographic key used and not 
on the algorithm itself).
An attack where every possible key is tried until the correct one is found is known as a 
Brute force attack. As there are 2N possible values (known as the key space) for an N
12 A knowledge of the particular algorithm is always assumed. This is known as Kerckhoff’s law.
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Source Destination
Figure 1.3: Classical model of a cryptographic communication system.
bit number, then generally a brute force attack will take 2N attempts to find the key13. 
A cryptographic cipher is said to have been broken if it is vulnerable to attacks with 
less effort than a brute force attack (even if the attack is not practical).
There is only one algorithm that has been proven to be completely secure14 (if used 
correctly) and is known as the one time pad. This is a symmetric cipher where there 
are as many key bits as plaintext bits. It uses a different key for every encryption and 
the key set is truly random15
Each bit of the plaintext is encrypted with each bit of the key using the exclusive-OR 
operation (©). As the key is truly random, this means that the ciphertext produced 
will also be truly random and is therefore equally likely to correspond to any plaintext 
message of the same size as the original. It’s security rests on the fact that these random 
keys are never used more than once. Of course, the person decrypting the message 
would need to know the keys, and the problem of how best to provide a copy of them 
is still an issue today. This is the case even with public key cryptography as if this 
is used to transfer the keys, then the one time pad is only as strong as the public key 
system used. The one time pad is not a very practical system and is rarely used in real 
world applications.
13On average however, it will only take half this or 2N~1 tries.
14Even against brute force attacks.
15This basically means that there is no way of knowing one key from any combination of the others.
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Despite the fact that all practical ciphers are theoretically vulnerable to a brute force 
attack, it is generally impossible to successfully implement brute force attacks due to 
the sheer size of the keys. Other attacks which aim to reduce this level of difficulty, 
by manipulating vulnerabilities in the algorithm itself, generally come up against the 
problem that most of the algorithms have a very strong theoretical base. However, 
researchers have demonstrated ways in which a cryptosystem can be compromised 
without having to attack the algorithm itself [10,11].
Every cryptographic cipher has to be implemented in one form or another in hardware. 
Due to the fundamental laws of physics governing this hardware, emissions will be 
produced that may or may not reveal information about the operations it is running. 
These emissions can take different forms such as electromagnetic radiation, power 
fluctuations or timing fluctuations. Some can even be induced by an attacker using a 
technique known as fault induction. As stated already, any emission that can be used 
to reveal secret information is known as a compromising emission. These emissions 
have proven to be a serious threat to the security of cryptosystems and are discussed in 
more detail next.
1 .2.1 Compromising Emissions
Compromising Emissions are normally referred to as Compromising Emanations in 
military and NSA documents. One definition is as follows and is taken from [12]:
“Compromising Emanations: Unintentional signals that, if intercepted 
and analyzed,would disclose the information transmitted, received, han­
dled, or otherwise processed by information systems equipment”.
These signals can be conducted, radiated, reactively coupled, exposed through power 
and timing fluctuations or even acoustically transmitted. In fact, any way a signal
11
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can be intercepted beyond its intended channels would be considered compromising 
(assuming that the information is of a sensitive nature).
Power and timing fluctuations are different from the rest in the sense that power and 
time are resources required by the implementation circuitry to perform its functions. 
The others are only by-products of its actual operation, and are not required resources. 
For example, it is not necessary that the device emit electromagnetic radiation in order 
to operate (assuming it does not use some form of wireless communication) however, 
it is necessary that the device receive varying amounts of power and time. Reduction 
of the radiated emissions will not hinder the device in any way, and may even improve 
it’s operation in some instances. On the other hand, reduction of power consumption 
below its required level will ultimately make the device inoperable.
Whether the signal is a “by-product” emission or a power fluctuation, it is necessary 
to know how the signal can move from one point to another within a system or be­
tween two systems. There are three main physical mechanisms by which a signal can 
propagate from its original source. These may act together or they may act indepen­
dently and their effects will be different depending on the systems themselves and on 
the distance from the source.
1. Conduction- Conducted propagations are generated by actual physical connec­
tions either within a system or from one system to another or to its power supply. 
These are most effective at frequencies below 30 MHz. Above this frequency 
substantial attenuation takes place and it becomes the least dominant mecha­
nism.
2. Reactive Coupling- This can exist within a single system or between two sys­
tems. There are a number of factors which affect the amount of reactive coupling 
and these include, orientation of the systems or subsystems, distance, earthing
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etc. Reactive coupling comes in the form of either capacitive or inductive cou­
pling. The fact that high voltages (or high impedances) give rise to a large elec­
tric (E) field accounts for the capacitive coupling between wires, whereas high 
currents (or low impedances) will give rise to large magnetic (H) fields which 
account for inductive coupling. This latter statement can be seen from Faraday’s 
law:
e -  - N f  <u>
where it can be seen that the EMF (£) induced in a coil is proportional to the 
negative of the time rate of change of the magnetic flux cutting the coil (</>#). 
This changing magnetic flux would generally be set up by current fluctuations in 
a nearby circuit/system.
3. Radiation- Most electronic devices will have some part of their circuit forming a 
loop or a dipole, and it is configurations such as this that will cause the radiation 
of electromagnetic energy. As was mentioned, conductive emissions tend to be 
substantial below 30 MHz. Above this frequency these emissions become less 
noticeable in relation to the radiated emissions which become dominant.
The problem of compromising radiation is not improving with technology but 
is actually getting worse. As more and more manufacturers begin to use wire­
less technology and the frequency of processors in personal computers (PC’s) 
increase, the level of radiation emanating from a system will also increase. If 
some of the information signal being processed by the system happens to get 
coupled onto a loop or dipole type arrangement in the circuit, there is a good 
chance that it will modulate the radiated signal. This can sometimes be demod­
ulated with something as simple as an average AM radio receiver [13]. This 
problem will be studied in more detail in chapter 3.
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These are all methods which can be fatal to a systems security. It is necessary when 
designing secure systems that each of these mechanisms be reduced as much as possi-
Another mechanism by which information can be obtained is through a technique 
known as fault induction. If one can induce faults into a system, then these faults 
may leak information. For example, a system might only send ciphertext depending 
on whether or not a certain bit in a register is set or clear. If the bit is set, then the 
system might encrypt the data, however if it is clear then it might send the plaintext in 
an ordinary manner. If an attacker could find a way of changing the value of this bit, 
then the system could be easily compromised. This is a fairly simple example but it 
demonstrates the idea.
Having discussed some of the physical mechanisms through which information can 
leak from a system, it is clear that the traditional model of figure 1.3 needs to be 
reviewed. Figure 1.4 shows an updated version which incorporates the above side 
channels. The emission “other” might include sound or light (e.g. diodes flashing on 
and off) but also incorporates emissions that have yet to be identified. In fact, there 
appears to be another form which has not yet been disclosed by the US government. 
This can be seen in [14] under the section ‘Introduction to TEMPEST’ where a list of 
compromising emanations is given with one item redacted and replaced by x’s. This 
may be something to bear in mind for designers of cryptosystems. It is also stated 
in the same document that the majority of compromising emanations are generated 
in electromagnetic field form which is probably the reason the US Government has 
directed considerable resources into the classified TEMPEST program.
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Power Other Power Other
Figure 1.4: Updated model of a cryptographic communication system incorporating side 
channel emissions. K s may or may not equal K p  depending on the cryptographic scheme 
used.
1.2.2 Tamper Resistance
Tamper resistance is the name given to any mechanism which aims to prevent secret in­
formation within a physical device from being compromised whilst inside that device. 
Tamper resistance has been in use for centuries [15]. Techniques such as weighted 
naval code books (that would sink if required), codes printed in water-soluble ink, and 
Russian one-time pads printed on cellulose nitrate (this has an explosive flammability 
and would destroy the pads within seconds if lit) have all been used. Even with these 
methods in place, a lot of systems have been compromised simply due to the fact that 
the operators were not vigilant enough. As a result, most modem tamper resistance 
techniques rely on technology and not on the operator. For example, tamper sensing 
meshes are placed within the casing of cryptographic devices to detect if an intruder is 
attempting to drill a hole and enter the system. Building a perfectly tamper resistant 
device seems like an elusive goal but it is an active area of research at present [16-18].
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1.3 FIPS Standards
The main motivation for this thesis is a standard taken from a set of US government 
standards known as FIPS. The FIPS must be complied with by all US federal gov­
ernment agencies and government contractors processing sensitive but non-classified 
information. As mentioned already, FIPS is an anagram for Federal Information Pro­
cessing Standards. The specific standard of concern for this thesis is FIPS 140-2 - 
“Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules”. The FIPS 140-2 outlines the 
security requirements that all federal government owned cryptographic modules, pro­
cessing sensitive data, should comply with. It is a revision of the FIPS 140-1 and 
supersedes it as of May 2002. However, the FIPS 140-1 still remains valid but no 
devices have been tested against it since this date.
It might prove useful to have a brief look at the revisions FIPS 140-2 makes reference 
to [19]:
•  Allow separation of plain text from other types of input or output through phys­
ically and logically separate ports.
•  Strengthen authentication mechanisms and address minimum probabilities for 
guessing, false acceptance error rates and restrictions on feedback to users.
•  Replace the old trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria with Common Cri­
teria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
• Add requirements for over-the-air re-keying for radio cryptographic modules
• Require four statistical random-number generator tests during self-testing in­
stead of one, with higher statistical limits for random-number generation
• Cover new types of cryptographic attacks that use power or timing analysis or 
fault induction.
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It is the last item on this list that is of concern here. These “new” attacks also cover the 
area of TEMPEST as mentioned, and all will be discussed in different levels of detail 
throughout this thesis.
The FIPS 140 set of standards defines 4 different security levels, each more stringent 
than the preceding one. Level 1 is the lowest and level 4 the highest. Generally the 
requirements of each level are supersets of each of the levels below it. It is possible for 
a cryptographic module to meet different levels for different operations, however the 
overall certified level is taken as the lowest one the module complies with.
The program that validates modules to these cryptographic standards is the Crypto­
graphic Module Validation Program (CMVP) and the laboratories that carry out this 
validation have to be National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) 
accredited. A list of accredited laboratories can be found at [20].
The specific section of this standard under review in this thesis is section 4.11 and 
is entitled “Mitigation of other attacks”. This is a completely new section and pro­
vides information about several new types of attacks (each of which has already been 
discussed). It was developed as a direct result of numerous public comments which 
suggested that they should be included in the revised standard (i.e. FIPS 140-2). The 
attacks were included following these comments, however no test procedures were 
given and in fact are not tested against in the general case. If the vendor of a cryp­
tographic module states in it’s security policy that mitigation techniques have been 
implemented, then the NVLAP laboratory has to test that claim [21]:
“An additional area concerned with the mitigation of other attacks is cur­
rently not tested but the vendor is required to document implemented con­
trols (e.g., differential power analysis, and TEMPEST).”
This research aims to determine the vulnerability of the DUT to these attacks so that
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pending tests (of which there are guaranteed to be a few) can be approached with a 
certain degree of confidence.
1.4 Motivation and thesis aims
In the past decade research on side channel attacks has increased dramatically. Most 
of the results provided have turned out to be worrying for designers of systems such 
as smart cards. These are low power, minimal circuitry devices containing a micropro­
cessor and some memory for storage of items such as cryptographic keys and personal 
information. Smartcards may not be the only devices at risk and it must be considered 
also that more complex cryptographic systems may also be vulnerable.
The aim of this thesis is to test the vulnerability of a recently developed high speed 
embedded cryptographic processor to certain side channel attacks. A number of side 
channel attacks exist but only two were chosen as they appeared to offer the most 
threat to the current system. With the knowledge gained from these tests, the designers 
will have an increased understanding of the devices immunity level when attempting 
to comply with modem cryptographic standards such as the FIPS. Along with an indi­
cation of the vulnerability of the device, current countermeasures will also be briefly 
discussed. The experimental techniques developed can be used as templates for de­
signers wishing to test the vulnerability of their own designs to these attacks.
1.5 Thesis Organisation
This chapter has introduced the concepts that will appear throughout the thesis, and has 
given an overview of cryptography and compromising emissions. Chapter 2 discusses 
in detail the area of power analysis. This is vital for an understanding of the experimen­
tal results given later. Following this, chapter 3 will discuss Electromagnetic Analysis 
(EMA) which can also be used to compromise the security of a cryptographic system.
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It will be seen in this chapter that some of the attack methods are very similar to that of 
chapter 2. Chapter 4 discusses the experimental setup, problems encountered and re­
sults taken. It will be seen here that the attacks were not completely successful against 
the DUT but did work against a software simulation and a PIC microcontroller imple­
mentation. Chapter 5 briefly discusses some proposed countermeasures for mitigating 
compromising emanations. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the board’s security and 
comments given on whether or not extra action needs to be taken.
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Power Analysis
Power Analysis is a relatively new concept but has proven to be quite effective in at­
tacking smartcards and similar devices1. It was first demonstrated by Ernst Bovelander 
in 1997 but a specific attack strategy was not given [22]. A year later it was brought to 
the general public’s attention by Paul Kocher and the Cryptographic Research team in 
San Francisco [23]. Kocher et al. provided an attack strategy that would recover the 
secret key from cryptographic systems running the DES algorithm. This caused great 
concern amongst the smartcard community and a search for an effective countermea­
sure began. To date a limited number of countermeasures have been proposed and none 
are fully effective. The attacks work equally well on other cryptographic algorithms 
as shown by Thomas Messerges et al. who presented a great deal of supplementary 
research on the subject [24-27].
Power analysis involves an analysis of the pattern of power consumed by a crypto­
graphic module as it performs its operations. The purpose of this pattern analysis 
is to acquire knowledge about causal operations that is not readily available through 
other sources. The power consumption will generally be different for each operation 
performed (and even for the same operations with different data values). One of the 
causes of these variations is the transistor technology used to implement the module. 
The transistors act as voltage controlled switches, and the power they consume varies
!The smartcard is very susceptible to this form of attack mainly because it applies little or no power 
filtering due to its small size.
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with the type of instructions being processed. For example, a conditional branch in­
struction appears to cause a lot of noticeable fluctuations according to [1 0 ], and should 
therefore be avoided if possible where secret keys are concerned.
This chapter outlines the theoretical aspects of a power attack (details of a practical 
implementation will be reserved for chapter 4). Although the ideas are the same, the 
attacks against secret key algorithms and public key algorithms are slightly different. 
The first section will look at power analysis on symmetric ciphers and an explana­
tion will be given with reference to DES. Following this, the idea will be expanded to 
include asymmetric ciphers. Specifically, it will look at ciphers that use modular ex­
ponentiation (the mathematical operation running on the DUT). Such ciphers include 
RSA, Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and ElGamal. An understanding of each cipher 
is not necessary as long as the idea of modular exponentiation and its implementa­
tion is understood. The appendices contain material that can be used to assist in this 
understanding and will be referred to in the appropriate sections.
Power analysis generally refers to attacks carried out using physical connections to the 
cryptographic modules in order to measure the power fluctuations. However, alternate 
versions of this attack using electromagnetic radiation can be found in [11,28]. It is 
claimed in [28] that these alternate attacks are as good as, if not better, than ordinary 
power attacks (such as those described in this chapter). This is especially so, if a guess 
at the key is mistaken. Chapter 3 discusses this in a lot more detail.
Before taking a look at the specific power attacks, it will be instructive to examine the 
cause of these power fluctuations in a bit more detail. A brief outline is presented here 
but the reader is referred to [29-31] for more information and a more mathematical 
treatment of the subject.
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2.1 Theoretical foundations of power fluctuations in digital cir­
cuitry
The main technology used today to implement digital circuitry, is known as Comple­
mentary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology. CMOS devices are con­
structed using two complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Tran­
sistors (MOSFETs) - an N-channel MOSFET (NMOS) and a P-channel MOSFET 
(PMOS). Both transistors can be used separately in digital circuitry fabrication and of­
fer higher packing densities (more transistors per chip) than CMOS. However, CMOS 
has two main advantages. It offers higher speeds than both PMOS and NMOS and 
has a very low static power dissipation (lower than the other MOS families) which 
makes it very attractive in the continuing efforts of power conservation. Unfortunately 
however, the power dissipation is really only negligible under static conditions (i.e 
when the input voltage is unchanging). Once transitions occur from one logic level 
to another, transient currents exist. These transient currents have been proven to be 
enough to assist adversaries in gaining knowledge about the secret parameters residing 
on cryptosystems.
Figure 2.1 shows a simple CMOS inverter. It is constructed with a PMOS transistor 
(upper) and an NMOS transistor (lower). Each transistor consists of a Gate (G), Drain 
(D) and Source (S). The gates of the two devices are connected together and are there­
fore a common input. The drains of the two are also tied together and are a common 
output. The source of the PMOS device is connected to the positive supply voltage 
( V d d )  whereas the source of the NMOS device is connected to ground (V5 5 ).
When Vin is HIGH (Vin = Vdd) the PMOS transistor will be switched off and the 
NMOS transistor will be switched on. The output voltage Vout is then LOW (i.e Vout = 
010 when Vin is HIGH (hence the title “inverter”), In this static condition, very little 
current flows. The undesirable current that does flow is known as leakage current and
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Figure 2.1 : CMOS Logic Inverter.
constitutes a small Gaussian noise source (approximately) as far as power analysis is 
concerned [32]. When Vin is LOW, each of these values is reversed and again only the 
minute “leakage current” flows.
The problem arises when the gates are switched from one logic level to another. As 
an example, assume that Vin is switching from LOW to HIGH. Assume also that the 
transition is perfectly linear. This will produce the trapezoidal waveform shown in 
the upper graph of figure 2.2 (adapted from [29]) which has a finite risetime (rr) and 
falltime (ry). Once Vin reaches a certain threshold voltage (VTn), the NMOS transistor 
which was initially off, will begin to turn on. As this happens it’s very high equivalent 
resistance will gradually drop to much lower levels. This will allow a transient current 
to flow2 which will increase as Vin rises towards half of another threshold voltage 
Vdd +  Vtp, where VTp = —Vrn in perfectly symmetric cases. Once the voltage gets 
beyond this halfway point, the current will begin to drop off again due to the increasing 
resistance of the PMOS transistor. At the threshold value of Vdd + Vtp> the current will 
be back to it’s static conditions. This transient current occurs every time the inverter is
2The PMOS transistor will already be on at this stage so it won’t be causing much resistance to the 
current. It’s equivalent resistance however will begin to increase.
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toggled (i.e on both rise and fall sections of Vin). The current pulses on the rising and 
falling edges of Vin both have exactly the same height and shape as can be seen.
Figure 2.2: Current behaviour of inverter without load.
Figure 2.3 shows a PSpice simulation of the circuit in figure 2.1. The upper graph 
shows the input voltage Vin whereas the lower graph shows the current I  entering the 
NMOS transistor. It can be seen again that I  is exactly the same on both the rising and 
falling edges (as is to be expected from figure 2 .2 ) and would therefore be of no use to 
an attacker - this however is an ideal situation.
In reality, a CMOS device almost always has some sort of capacitive load connected 
at it’s output and the ideal situation of figure 2 .2  and 2 .3  does not exist in reality. 
Examples of this capacitive load might be the input to some other digital logic or to 
some sort of data bus (generally it is an unintentional capacitance however). It might 
not have been considered before that a data bus is a form of capacitance but in fact 
it is and very much so. As well as it’s own capacitance, the bus generally has other 
devices attached to it. The bus capacitance thus represents the cumulative effect of all 
the parasitic capacitances of the different inputs and outputs that are connected it. For 
simplification, the total capacitance the CMOS logic experiences at it’s output can be
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Figure 2.3: PSpice analysis of CMOS logic inverter without load.
represented as a load capacitance Cl . Figure 2.1 can therefore be modified to include 
this capacitance as shown in figure 2.4.
V  —v in
+VdjD
H P
J p
<vco u t
=!=
Figure 2.4: CMOS Logic Inverter with capacitive load.
From basic circuit theory, it is known that if the voltage across a capacitor changes, 
then the current must flow to charge or discharge the capacitor. This is represented by 
equation 2.1.
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(2.1)
The current I  in figures 2.1 and 2.4 will therefore form only part of the total current 
I tot that is drawn from the supply:
This leads to two separate forms of power dissipation - Dynamic Dissipation and Short- 
circuit dissipation.
Dynamic power dissipation is due to the charging and discharging of the capacitive 
load. It is given by the equation
It is the more dominant of the two forms and as can be seen, is directly proportional to 
the switching frequency. It is independent of the parameters of the transistors.
Short circuit dissipation is due to a short circuit path being created when both the 
PMOS and NMOS transistors are switched on. It can be represented by
where I m e a n  depends on the switching frequency and parameters of the transistor such 
as the rise and fall time.
Attackers can use these currents to attack systems as follows. Assume a LOW is ini­
tially applied to the input of the logic gate (Vin = Vss = 010 of figure 2.4 for a 
long period of time. The output voltage Voui will therefore be at the supply poten-
ho t  — I  +  IcL • (2.2)
Pd = V 2fC L. (2.3)
Ps =  VI,m e a n (2.4)
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tial and the capacitor will be fully charged. Once a HIGH is applied to the input (i.e 
Vin = Vdd = 5 VO, the output will begin to drop to a LOW and the transient current 
produced would cause the capacitance to discharge through the NMOS capacitor. As 
a result, more short circuit current would flow than the case where the logic gate had 
no load attached (figure 2.1). If the input to the logic gate is now switched back to a 
LOW value, the output will jump from a LOW value to a HIGH value and the capacitor 
would charge up again. This would cause less short circuit current to flow than for the 
previous case (due to dynamic power dissipation). The difference in this current level 
could be used to determine the different logic levels being used and can thus reveal 
secret parameters stored on the DUT.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show two more PSpice simulations but this time with a capacitive 
load attached to the output of the inverter. The first capacitive load is .lpF whereas the 
second one is 10 times this or lpF. It can be seen that the larger the load capacitance the 
more the current transients differ due to the larger charge required to keep the output 
voltage at the same levels. It is prudent therefore to try to keep the load capacitance to 
a minimum.
Sws «»>-> pa*
Tin*
Figure 2.5: PSpice analysis of CMOS logic inverter with .lpF load.
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Figure 2.6: PSpice analysis of CMOS logic inverter with lpF load.
The next section describes in detail how the difference in these transient currents can 
be used to attack physical implementations of cryptosystems and to learn about the 
operations they are running.
2.2 Overview of Power Attacks
Power analysis attacks can be divided up as follows:
1. Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
2. Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
Single bit DPA
Multiple bit DPA
High Order DPA
Inferential Power Analysis (IPA)
SPA attacks are the easiest to implement and take the order of seconds to minutes 
(once certain characterisation tests have been carried out [24]) to perform however,
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a cryptosystem will generally not be directly compromised by these attacks. DPA 
attacks on the other hand, can take hours to days3 to perform but will generally reveal 
a great deal more information than an SPA attack and can ultimately compromise a 
cryptosystem. Both attacks will generally be used together as will be seen in chapter
2.3 Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
Simple Power Analysis involves measuring the power fluctuations of a cryptosystem 
using some form of digitising oscilloscope, and using visual inspection to try to deter­
mine information about that system. There would be little or no formal mathematical 
analysis performed on this data however. The amount of information attainable de­
pends in part upon the implementation of the algorithm being attacked.
For smartcards and similar devices, the power can be measured across a 10 — 50Q 
resistor4 in series with the power or ground line of the specific device. However, it is 
not so simple on a complex cryptographic processor which probably draws its power 
from the peripheral component interconnect (PCI) backplane of a computer.
Ideally, the attacker would wish to get as close as possible to the actual chip performing 
the operations if a high signal to noise ration (SNR) is to be obtained. This might be 
more difficult than it first appears as information on which of the boards numerous 
chips is actually running the algorithm may not be readily available. Even if it were, the 
power pin of the chip would have to be physically separated from the board to perform 
the attack and then reattached once complete (if the attack were to go unnoticed). Most 
tamper resistance devices would not permit this from happening. The method used in
3The length of time will be determined by (amongst other things) the speed of the particular DUT, 
the size of the cryptographic key, and the measurement instrumentation used to capture the waveforms. 
It could take weeks if extremely large quantities of data are to be processed.
4The resistor should be small enough so as not to interfere with the operation of the circuit itself, but 
large enough to give easily observable voltage fluctuations.
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this research is given in chapter 4, and it will be seen that it allows a non-destructive 
way of getting quite close to the area of interest (even if it is not at the particular chip 
itself).
If DES is poorly implemented it can be quite vulnerable to SPA attacks [24]. These can 
be used to view operations such as individual DES rounds and even actual micropro­
cessor instructions [10,33]. For example, it might be possible to tell whether or not a 
jump instruction has been performed5. This information can then be used to determine 
the secret information within a system.
The main information that can be retrieved using SPA is the overall structure of the 
cryptographic code. It would be very easy to tell how long it takes the cryptoprocessor 
to complete one full encryption. It will also be quite easy to see events that are repeated 
such as the rounds of DES or each exponent bit operation in a public key system. Other 
timing values can be gained from these which can be used to improve the efficiency of 
the more complex DPA attack.
Two other forms of possible information leakage using SPA are Hamming Weight 
Leakage and Transition Count Leakage [24] and they are discussed next.
2.3.1 Hamming Weight Leakage
The Hamming Weight of any code vector is defined as the number of nonzero elements 
in the vector. This is a general definition where the alphabet6 may contain more than 
two values. For binary, this simply means the number of l ’s in a word of data.
If the Hamming Weight of the secret key is known, a brute force attack might be a lot 
easier as the key space needed to be searched is reduced in size. In [26], Messerges et 
al. prove that the key search space is reduced from 2nk down to
sThis may be true for low speed, minimal circuitry devices such as smarteards but its likelihood 
decreases with more complex, high speed cryptoprocessors.
6The symbols used in a particular system such as 1 and 0 in a binary system.
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where n is the number of bits in a word of data, k is the number of words, and m  is the 
Hamming weight value.
For example, consider the byte of data 101IOIOO2 and assume that it is a secret key. 
The Hamming weight of this key is 4 as there are 4 nonzero elements. Generally, it 
would take an attacker 28 =  256 tries7 before the secret key is found. However, if 
the Hamming weight is known, then by equation 2.5, it can be seen that this value is 
reduced down to 50.27 keys (or an equivalent key size of 5.65 bits). A more practical 
example of it’s threat is given in [26] where it is shown that the key search space for 
the DES algorithm is reduced from 256 down to about 240; this is quite a significant 
reduction.
Knowing the Hamming weight of a key really offers no significant advantages over 
much larger key sizes (such as the 2,176 bits used in the DUT here). In this case, 
the key search space with known Hamming weight, would still be far to large to be 
searched by any computing power available today, in any reasonable amount of time. 
However, Messerges et al. claim that if the key is rotated once each round (as it is in 
DES see appendix A), then enough information can be obtained to completely uncover 
the secret key [24]. It is claimed then, that even larger key sizes may be vulnerable 
to attack in this case. As will be seen though, asymmetric algorithms would not be 
vulnerable to this attack as there is no key rotation involved.
2.3.2 Transition Count Leakage
Transition Count is the Hamming weight of the difference (also known as the Hamming 
distance) between the Hamming weight of the data on the bus at one point and that of
7Again, on average, only half this value would need to be searched.
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the data following it.
When the information on the data bus changes state, a large number of logic gates 
will conduct current. The greater the Hamming distance between the word of data 
being placed on the bus, and the one already there, the greater the power dissipated. 
This power can be recorded and measured as usual. It’s usefulness in an attack stems 
from the fact that at certain times, the contents of the bus might be known to the 
attacker (it might be some regularly accessed address or opcode). If this is the case, 
the attacker would then be able to use a power trace obtained with known bus contents, 
and compare them to another trace obtained with unknown contents (such as parts of 
the secret key). The difference would give an idea as to what the unknown contents 
might be. This could be improved by comparing a number of traces where the contents 
are known to the one trace where the contents are unknown. The combined results 
could then be used to reveal the entire subkey under attack.
Transition count leakage has a more limited application than Hamming Weight leak­
age. It may be more difficult to implement, due to the fact that the attacker would need 
to know the contents of the data bus, either before or after the attack. If the source 
code was not readily available, then the attacker might have to micro-probe the device 
in order to obtain this information. Again, tamper resistance devices may not permit 
this from happening.
From the explanation of power analysis and transient switching, it would seem that 
only transition count leakage might be observed by an attacker. According to [34] 
however, this is not the case due to the fact that the bus will conduct current when a 
word of data is placed on it. This current can be just as clearly visible to an attacker as 
the current increase produced by switching transistors.
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2.3.3 The Threat of SPA
Kocher et al. claim that SPA attacks are of little menace to the smartcard community 
and that they are easy enough to prevent. However, in [34], Rita Mayer-Sommer shows 
that this is not really the case. It is claimed that although SPA may not be as threatening 
as DPA (in the sense that less information is revealed), the fact that DPA is a lot more 
experimentally intensive means that relatively speaking, SPA is the more threating 
attack. A great deal of information can be gained from one power trace, whereas in 
DPA, hundreds, maybe even thousands of power traces may need to be collected.
The experiments in [34] were carried out on a low power, low frequency, PIC8 micro­
controller. The specific chip used was the PIC 16C84 which was run at 4MHz and 
4.5V. One of the claims made in this paper was that it is not necessary to average noise 
out of the consumption characteristics provided the device is run at a low enough fre­
quency and high enough supply voltage. This would seem to suggest that SPA attacks 
on complex high speed cryptographic devices might be much more difficult.
Although SPA attacks may not reveal the cryptographic key in more complex sys­
tems (including systems with larger key sizes), it should not be dismissed as being a 
harmless attack. There is a great deal o f  knowledge that an attacker can gain using 
SPA alone such as the tim ing inform ation discussed above. A gain, actual results are 
presented in chapter 4.
2.4 Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
Differential power analysis is a much more powerful attack than simple power analy­
sis, and can reveal a lot more information. The extra price for this information comes 
from the fact that it’s implementation requires a great deal more knowledge and skill. 
This knowledge can range from transistor design up to the specific cryptographic algo­
8 Apparently this is not an anagram.
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rithms used, and the attacker needs to be quite competent in such areas as electronics, 
statistics, cryptography and programming.
If SPA was used on a smartcard device, it would only be possible to see the combined 
power consumption of every circuit element on the card. However, fluctuations caused 
by individual switching transistors would be impossible to see. Using DPA, the statisti­
cal methods utilised make it possible to observe these minute fluctuations - although it 
becomes increasingly difficult as the system becomes more complex (this is especially 
true for systems with highly parallel architectures).
A DPA attack is relatively cheap to implement and can be automated once an under­
standing of a device has been achieved. According to Kocher [10], one of the main 
reasons systems are vulnerable to these form of attacks is because designers of the dif­
ferent system levels do not interact with each other. As a result, assumptions are made 
about the security effectiveness of the rest of the design. This problem would certainly 
need to be addressed by companies developing cryptosystems if any progress is to be 
made in mitigating these attacks.
To implement DPA, quite a few encryption transactions need to be executed, and the 
resulting power traces recorded. Certain bits of the key will be guessed, and correlation 
techniques in the form of a differential trace will be used to determine whether or not 
this guess is correct. If it is, small peaks will be seen in the differential trace at each 
instant a target bit was manipulated. However, if it is not, the trace will tend to zero or 
some steady value9.
The traces must contain as many sample points as is practical. The more samples 
obtained within a fixed time period, the higher the probability of success (to a limit 
of course). This will lead to greater processing times however. The specifics of the
qThis may not entirely be true as there may be statistical biases within the algorithm itself that will 
cause small peaks in traces with incorrect guesses. However these peaks will be a lot smaller than those 
within the trace of a correct guess, and should not cause a problem for the attacker.
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acquisition system (memory, speed etc.) will determine both of these parameters and 
a compromise must be made (i.e. more sample points and slower processing times or 
vice versa?).
Details of the attack will now be outlined with reference to the symmetric algorithm 
DES, and then expanded to include asymmetric algorithms in the section that follows. 
It will be seen that there are many similarities between the two, but also a number of 
distinct differences. Although the following explanation is with reference to a spe­
cific symmetric algorithm, it can easily be modified to attack other similar types of 
algorithms.
2.4.1 DPA attacks on a symmetric key algorithm - DES
A DPA attack on DES can be carried out with either known plaintext or known cipher­
text. If the plaintext is known, the attack would concentrate on the DES’s first round10 
but if the ciphertext is known, then it’s last round would be attacked. The reasons for 
this will become clear once this section is understood. For the following explanation, 
a known ciphertext attack will be examined but the same methods are also applicable 
to a known plaintext attack.
As shown in the list at the beginning of the chapter, DPA can be split into single bit 
DPA, multiple bit DPA, High-order DPA and IPA. DPA will initially be explained with 
reference to single bit DPA. This is then expanded for improved results using multiple 
bit DPA and high-order DPA. IPA is an attack developed independently of the other 
three and appears to have advantages over normal DPA however, it’s relative success 
level is unclear at present. It is included here for completeness.
10 See appendix A of details of DES and it’s “rounds”.
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2.4.1.1 Single Bit DPA
In order to carry out a DPA attack, a method must be devised to produce a random set 
of J  plaintext inputs that can be sent to the cryptosystem for encryption11. On receiving 
these plaintext inputs, pij, 1 < j  < J, the board will begin to run its algorithm and 
draw varying amounts of power. These power fluctuations can be sampled using a 
digital sampling oscilloscope which should be capable of sampling at about 20-30 
times the clock frequency being used12. This can amount to extremely high sampling 
rates for high speed cryptographic processors as will be seen in chapter 4.
The waveforms observed for each pij can be represented as a matrix wfjk13, where 
1 < k < K . A second column matrix, coj, can also be used to represent the ciphertext 
output. In practice, each row of wfjk would probably be stored as a separate file for 
ease of processing. Considering the plaintext inputs as a column matrix also, the three 
can be brought together in tabular format for reference:
Input Sampled Waveform Output
m Wf11 Wf 12 Wfi(K-l) wflK CO\
m W/21 Wf22 w h ( K - l ) wf2K co2
m Wf31 Wfz2 wf3(K-l) WfsK co3; : :
P^(J—2) Wf(J-2)1 ™}{J-2)2 ••• ™}{J-2)K C 0 ( J - 2)
Pi(J-l) w f( j-1)1 W f(j-1)2 • • • W f ( j - 1 ) K C O ( j - 1)Pij w fji WfJ2 W f j ( K - l ) WfjK C O j
Table 2.1: The cryptosystem accepts a plaintext input (pij) and produces both a power wave­
form (wfjk) and a ciphertext output (coj). Sometimes only the ciphertext is available to the 
attacker.
Having captured each power waveform and ciphertext output, a function known as a 
partitioning function, D(.), must now be defined. This function will allow division
11 This method must be automated as the number of random plaintext inputs will be quite large.
12This is not a theoretical limit as in Shannon’s sampling theorem but it is recommended for a suc­
cessful attack.
13The subscripts j and k are used to identify the plaintext number causing the waveform and the time 
sample point within that particular waveform, respectively.
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of the matrix wfjk into two sub-matrices wfOpk and w f lqk containing P  and Q rows 
respectively, with 1 <  p < P  and 1 <  q < Q where P  + Q = J. Provided that the 
inputs pij were randomly produced, then P  = Q = J /2  as J  —> oo (i.e. the waveforms 
will be divided equally between the two sets).
No dependable variables are explicitly stated for the partitioning function here as they 
may vary slightly from algorithm to algorithm (and indeed from one partitioning func­
tion to another within the same algorithm). It must however depend on some part of 
the key14, as this is the information sought.
The partitioning function allows the division of wfjk because it calculates the value of 
a particular bit, at particular times, during the operation of the algorithm. If the value 
of this bit is known, then it will also be known whether or not a power bias should 
have occurred in the captured waveform. For a 1, a bias should occur, and for a 0 it 
shouldn’t. Separating the waveforms into two separate matrices (one in which the bias 
occurred and another in which it didn’t) will allow averaging to reduce the noise and 
enhance the bias (if it occurred). For randomly chosen plaintexts, the output of the D(.) 
function will equal either a 1 or 0 with probability \  (this is just another statement of 
the fact that P  = Q = J /2  as J  —► oo).
Messerges et al. give an example of a partitioning function in [24,26] as
D (CUC6, K 16) =  Cx © S B O X l(C e  © K 16) (2.6)
where SBOXl(.) is a function that outputs the target bit of S-box 1 in the last round of 
DES (in this case it’s the first bit), C\ is the one bit of coj that is exclusive OR’ed with 
this bit, Cq is the 6 bits of coj that is exclusive OR’ed with the last rounds subkey and
14No variable representing the key is given within the parenthesis here as this might imply dependence 
on the entire key. This however will never be the case, as this would then be no different from a brute 
force attack as will be seen.
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K i6 is the 6 bits of the last round’s subkey that is input into S-box 1.
The value of this partitioning function must be calculated at some point throughout 
the algorithm. So, if the values Cu C6 and K i6 can be determined, it will be known 
whether or not a power bias occurred in each waveform. The values C\ and Cq can 
be determined from each ciphertext in table 2.1. The value of the subkey Kie is the 
information sought. To find this, an exhaustive search needs to be carried out. As it is 6 
bits long, a total of 26 =  64 subkeys will need to be tested. The right one will produce 
the correct value of the partitioning bit for every plaintext input. However, the incorrect 
one will only produce the correct result with probability In this case, the two sets 
w/Opfc and w f lqk will contain a randomly15 distributed collection of waveforms which 
will average out to the same result. The differential trace (discussed below) will thus 
show a power bias for the correct key only. Of course it means that 64 differential 
traces are needed but this is a vast improvement over a brute force search of the entire 
56 bit key.
Mathematically, the partitioning of wfjk can be represented as
wfOpk = {wfjk \D(.) = 0} (2.7)
and
wflqk =  {w f j k \D(.)  =  1}  (2.8)
Once the matrices wfOpk and w f lqk have been set up, the average of each is then taken 
producing two waveforms awf 0k and awf l k both consisting of K samples. By taking 
the averages of each, the noise gets reduced to very small levels but the power spikes 
in w flpk will be reinforced. However, averaging will not reduce any periodic noise
15 Provided the plaintext inputs are randomly chosen.
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contained within the power waveforms and inherent to the operations on the crypto­
graphic board. This can largely be eliminated by subtracting awfOpk from awf l qk (this 
can be thought of as demodulating a modulated signal to reveal the “baseband”, where 
the periodic noise is the “carrier”). The only waveform remaining will be the one with 
a number of bias points identifying the positions where the target bit was manipulated. 
This trace is known as a differential trace, A D k.
Again, in mathematical terms, the above can be stated as
1 1 P
w o *  =  p  w h k  =  p  5 2  w f Q p k  ( 2 9 >
w fj k e w f i  p = i
and
1 1 Q
a w f l k =  -  w f i k = Q J 2 w f 1 i k (21°)
w fj h e w fO  q = l
The differential trace A Dk is then obtained as
A D k = awf l k -  awfOk (2.11)
The last five equations can now be condensed into one [10],
AD = s t i P Q f e  _ z L a  -  DUWik (2.i2)
Z L  D(.) E f =1(l -  D(.))
As a side point, it is very important that each acquisition of the power trace be started
at the exact same point, and sampled at the same rate. If this is not the case, averaging 
will not work, and will in fact decrease any desirable fluctuations that may be present. 
Simple Power Analysis can be used initially to identify the structure of the waveforms, 
and to offer some idea as to where to start sampling. Once this is done, precise trig-
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gering and trigger delay16 options must be used to capture the waveform over the time 
period of interest. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
As J  —> oo, the power biases will average out to a value e which will occur at times 
ko  - each time the target bit D was manipulated. In this limit, the averages awf Ok and 
a w flk will tend toward the expectation E {w f  0*;} and E {w f  1^}, and equations 2.11 
and 2.12 will converge to
E { w f\k )  -  E{wfOk} = €, at times k = ko (2.13)
and
E { w f lk} -  E{wfOk} = 0, at times k ^  kD (2.14)
Therefore, at times k =  ko, there will be a power bias e visible in the differential trace.
At all other times, the power will be independent of the target bit and the differential
trace will tend towards 0.
The above will only work if the subkey guess was correct. For all other guesses the 
partitioning function will separate the waveforms randomly, and equations 2.13 and 
2.14 will condense to
E { w flk} -  E{wfOk} = 0, VA; (2.15)
As mentioned above, 64 differential traces are needed to determine which key is the 
correct one. Theoretically, the one containing bias spikes will allow determination of 
the correct key however, in reality the other waveforms will contain small spikes due to 
factors such as non-random choices of plaintext inputs, statistical biases in the S-boxes
,6This is the length of time the oscilloscope waits to start sampling after receiving a valid trigger.
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and a non-infinite number of waveforms collected. Generally however, the correct key 
will show the largest bias spikes and can still be determined quite easily.
The other 42 bits from the last round’s subkey can be determined by applying the same 
method to the other 7 S-boxes17. A brute force search can then be used to obtain the 
remaining 8 bits of the 56 bit key.
2.4.1.2 Multiple Bit DPA
The last section looked at single bit DPA in which the output of the D function was 
one of 4 bits. The idea of attacking more than one of these bits at a time was briefly 
mentioned by Kocher et al. in [10] however no experimental procedure was given. 
Goubin et al. [35] discuss the idea in a bit more detail but Messerges et al. give a 
complete analysis of the procedure and provide some nomenclature - Multiple bit DPA. 
This attack is really just an extension of single bit DPA but increases the height of the 
bias spikes in the differential trace.
For Multiple bit DPA , instead of guessing what the 1 st bit of the output of S-box 1 
might be, a guess might be made at the entire 4 bit output18. If the answer is correct, 
then the bias signal will be 4 times greater than that in single bit DPA. So, assuming 
that the mean value of the bias spike was e, the bias spike for multiple bit DPA will 
be 4e. This makes sense because when 4 bits change, the cryptoprocessor will draw 4 
times more current than when one bit changes. As will be seen however, Multiple bit 
DPA does not always improve the SNR of the differential signal for the same amount 
of collected waveforms.
Assuming the same D function is the same as that discussed above, one particular 
attack of this type is known as an “all or nothing” attack. Here, the waveforms are
17The same J power signals can be used for each S-box as the different D functions re-order them 
accordingly.
18It is not necessary to chose 4 bits and any number of bits may be guessed at.
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partitioned as follows:
wfOpk = {wfjk \D{.) = 0000}, (2.16)
w f lqk = {wfjk \D(.) = l lU }  (2.17)
and
wf2rk = {wfjk \D(.) ^  1111 or 0000}. (2.18)
where 1 <  r < R  and R is the number of rows in w f 2rk. This is known as an all or 
nothing attack due to the fact the entire output of the D function is guessed at. If the 
maximum output of the D function were 8 bits instead of 4 then the waveforms above 
would be partitioned in accordance with D(.) =  00000000 and Z>(.) =  11111111.
The matrix w f 2rk is discarded and only wf0pk and w f l qk are used to form the differ­
ential average trace as before. This is the downfall of this particular attack as it means 
not all the power signals will be usable. Although the bias spike is approximately 4 
times that of a single bit attack, the attacker may need to collect a greater amount of 
power signals to provide the same SNR as a single bit attack (see table 2.2 below).
It is not necessary of course to attack all the bits output from the D function - any
number of them may be attacked. A more general partitioning scheme is given in [26] 
where it is also shown that the average fraction of power signals that are usable in this 
general d-bit DPA attack (d being the number of bits attacked) is
[ a E L , © ] / *  if <*>? (2.19)
1 if 0 < d < §
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where n is the word size of the processor (must be even).
Table 2.2 (also taken from [26]) shows the number of waveforms required to keep the 
SNR equal to that of a one bit DPA attack. It can be seen that attacking between two 
and six bits of the output requires less power waveforms, and Multiple bit DPA has an 
advantage over single bit DPA. However for seven and eight bits, an increased number 
of waveforms are needed and this advantage is lost. The value N\ is the number of bits 
required for a one bit DPA attack.
d: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Nd: N x .5Ni .44Ni .5Ni .64Ni .88Ni L3Ni 2Ni
Table 2.2: Number of waveforms required in a multiple bit DPA attack to keep the SNR the 
same as a single bit DPA attack. N\ is the number of waveforms required for a one bit DPA 
attack.
2.4.1.3 High-Order DPA (HO-DPA)
High-Order Differential Power Analysis (HO-DPA) is slightly more complicated than 
ordinary Differential Power Analysis and is briefly mentioned by Kocher et al. in [36]. 
It involves getting signals from multiple sources in a system and/or using different 
measuring techniques to obtain these signals. It may also involve correlating multiple 
sub-operations within a single waveform. A system that is vulnerable to HO-DPA is 
also vulnerable to DPA. It is therefore not of much interest to most attackers as DPA 
is easier to implement. However, in developing mitigation techniques, both attacks 
should be considered. An example of a second order DPA attack is given in [25] 
where Messerges et al. use it to attack a software implementation that is resistant to 
DPA techniques. For this particular research it will be seen that it was necessary to 
implement some high-order techniques.
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2.4.1.4 Inferential Power Analysis (IPA)
IPA is a more recent form of power attack that was introduced by Paul Fahn and Peter 
Pearson [37] at the Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) confer­
ence in 1999. It is unclear how powerful a variant of DPA this attack is, as this is 
the only paper (to the author’s knowledge) that discusses IPA. However, it should be 
briefly mentioned for completeness. The discussion will be completely intuitive. A 
more mathematical approach can be obtained from their paper.
The attack involves two stages. The first consists of a profiling stage and the second 
a key extraction stage. The profiling stage is the most computationally intensive of 
the two but is only required once. Its purpose is to find where in time the algorithm 
actually handles the key bits being sought. Once this information is acquired, it can 
then be used to attack other devices with the same hardware and algorithmic structure 
using a lookup table constructed from the profiling stage.
The first step involves acquiring hundreds of traces using different plaintext values and 
a constant key (other variations are possible also and some are given in their paper). 
The traces are then averaged to reduce noise and data dependent fluctuations; so far 
this is similar to an ordinary DPA attack. Once the traces are averaged, a number of 
periodic sections will be noticed that will correspond to each of the “rounds”19 within 
the algorithm. Each of these rounds can then be extracted from the main waveform and 
averaged amongst themselves; this removes fluctuations caused by key values and is 
known as a super-average. The remaining fluctuations are then simply due to specific 
features of the code. This super-average, can then be subtracted from each of the 
extracted “rounds” leaving only the key dependent power fluctuations for each round. 
The resulting traces can then be squared and averaged to produce clean peaks at the
19In this case, “rounds” refers to some periodic repetition of a particular section of the code. For the 
attack to be successful, it is necessary that this periodic repetition exist.
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points where key bits were manipulated.
The second step is a lot less complicated and is used for all subsequent attacks. A 
table is constructed which lists the positions in each round where the fluctuations cor­
responding to the key bits are located and which particular bit each fluctuation cor­
responds to. By simply obtaining a single trace the key values can be read using the 
table.
A particular strength of IPA over DPA for symmetric algorithms is that it is capable 
of determining the bit’s of the secret key from any point in the entire algorithm. In 
DPA however, only the first or last round can be attacked. This is advantageous to 
the attacker as some of the methods employed as countermeasures rely on the fact that 
only the first or last round can be attacked using ordinary DPA.
2.5 Variations of the DPA attack for public key systems
Although DPA attacks on symmetric ciphers have been described, modem cryptogra­
phy20 makes use of both symmetric and asymmetric systems for encryption. The DUT 
was capable of encryption using both types of algorithms however access to the sym­
metric encryption facility was not provided. As a result the main attacks carried out 
on the board were against the asymmetric methods employed. This section describes 
these attacks and supplements the knowledge obtained in the last section. The main 
body of work in this area is credited to Messerges et al. and is contained in [27].
2.5.1 Implementation of modular exponentiation
As mentioned in Chapter 1, most public key schemes use the process of modular ex­
ponentiation in one form or another. This is a computationally intensive operation and 
requires special techniques for it’s implementation. Two methods are generally used
20 As described in chapter 1 this is from about 1976 on.
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in conjunction with each other. The first carries out the actual exponentiation and is 
known as the square and multiply algorithm or binary method. It was proposed by 
the inventors of RSA as an efficient way to implement the exponentiation section of 
their algorithm. It is studied in a lot more detail by Knuth [38]. The second method 
was developed in 1983 by Peter L. Montgomery and is known as Montgomery reduc­
tion [39]. It provides an efficient method for the modular multiplication of two numbers 
by allowing the modular reduction to be carried out without division by the modulus 
m. Utilising Montgomery reduction within the binary method allows modular expo­
nentiation to be carried out very efficiently. A detailed explanation of Montgomery 
reduction (and the notation used to represent it) is described in appendix D.
The binary method calculates the value of 6e, where b is the base and e is the expo­
nent. There are two main versions of the algorithm which operate on the exponent in 
different ways. The first works from its most significant bit (MSB) down to its least 
significant bit (LSB) and is referred to as the left to right, square and multiply algo­
rithm. However, the second operates from its LSB to its MSB and is thus known as 
the right to left, square and multiply algorithm. Due to the requirement of storing an 
additional intermediate result, the second version is generally the least preferred of the 
two [40]. Despite this fact, it was this version used on the DUT.
Figure 2.7 shows two versions of the right to left square and multiply algorithm us­
ing Montgomery’s method. The function exp.cond_mul() only performs the mul-
M o n ttiplication (i.e. C_ans_res x Square) if a particular condition is satisfied. How­
ever, the function exp_always_mul() always performs it, regardless of this condi­
tion. The exp_cond_mul() is the more efficient method but, as will be seen later, 
exp_always_mul() is the best method for mitigating power attacks. The function 
exp_always_mul() is similar to the method utilised by the DUT.
The inputs and output are the same for both versions of the algorithm as would be
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exp_cond_mul(b, e, m, m', R)
M o n t  9b_res = b x (R m od m);
M o n t 0C_ans_res = 1 x (R2 m od m); 
Square = b_res; for (n = 0 to N -l){
if (e[n] =  1)
<
M o n t ^C_ansjres = C_ans_res x Square;
M o n tSquare = Square x Square;}
M o n tC_ans = 1 x C_ans_res;
Return C_ans;
exp_always_mul(b, e, m, m', R)
b_res = b x (R2 m od m );
M o n t  9C_ans_res = 1 x (R2 mod m); 
Square = b_res; for (n = 0 to N -l){ M o n tNext_ans= C_ans_res x Square;
M o n tSquare = Square x Square;
if (e[n] =  1){
C_ans _res = Next_ans;}
} M o n tC_ans = 1 x C_ans_res;
Return C_ans;
Figure 2.7: Two possible versions of the “right to left, square and multiply” algorithm. The 
function exp_always_mul() is more like the one implemented by the DUT and is more resistant 
to DPA attacks. Both versions use Montgomery’s method for modular reduction to increase 
efficiency.
expected. The main inputs are the base 6, the exponent e and the modulus m. The 
other inputs (m ' and R) are used for the Montgomery operations and are described 
in appendix D. The output is the value of be mod m. As can be seen, the algo­
rithm operates on each bit separately and enters a conditional statement depending 
on whether or not the current bit is a 1 or a 0. If the conditional statement is satisfied, 
exp_cond_mulO will perform a Montgomery multiplication as well as a register update 
however, exp_always_mulO will only perform a register update.
2.5.2 Explanation of compromising power fluctuations
The implemented version of the algorithm exp_always_mul() was slightly different 
from that given in figure 2.7. The main point to note is that it was implemented in 
hardware and not software. This allowed for a highly parallel approach which intro-
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duced a great deal more synchronous noise21 into the system and increased the level of 
difficulty of the attacks. The multiply operation was performed on every round regard­
less of the value of the exponent. This occurred in the same clock cycle as the square 
operation. The general attack on the square and multiply algorithm relies to an extent 
on the multiply only being performed in accordance with the value of each bit in the 
exponent. This is because a great deal more power is required for both the multiply and 
the register update, than that for only the register update. This will be clearly visible 
in a differential trace. Due to the fact the DUT didn’t implement it this way, it was 
expected that the attack would be a great deal more difficult than that reported in the 
research to date. This was found to be the case as shall be seen.
To assist in the understanding, a simple example is now given. Table 2.3 shows the op­
erations involved for an exponent of e =  1 0 1 1 2 (or l l i 0) using the exp_always_mul() 
function. The inputs are already assumed to be in residue form (i.e b bR mod 
m  = b_res and 1  rf f ^ e R  mod m  =  C_ans_res).
Next_ans Shift Decision - Ans C_ans_res Square
R bR
M o n tR  x bR =  bR e....ion2 Is eo =  1? - Yes Update —► bR b2R
M o n t  nbR x b2R  =  b3R e "ioi2 Is d  =  1  ? - Yes Update —> b3R bAR
_ M o n t .b3R  x b4R  =  b7R e....io2 Is e2 =  1? - No (No Update) b3R b8R
n M o n t  _b3R  x b8R  = bn R e-.l2 Is e3 =  1 ? - Yes Update -> bu R b16R
e " Final Ans - bl lR
Table 2.3: Example of modular exponentiation on the DUT with e = IOII2 (all values are 
modulo m). The final answer is converted back into the normal domain by perfoming a Mont­
gomery reduction on it: bn R  mod m red^ l on 511 moci m
The Square and Next_ans columns are implemented in every iteration regardless of
21 Signals that are in synchronisation with the clock but contain no information about the secret pa­
rameters and cannot be reduced by averaging.
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the value of the exponent. After each bit has been operated on, it is shifted out of 
the register holding it and discarded (hence the Shift column). Once the last bit has 
been processed, and the processor is aware that the only bits left are zeros (this is 
determined using an array of OR gates), an interrupt occurs and the processor gets 
ready for another operation. As can be seen from the table, an update occurs only if 
bit e[n] = 1 and nothing happens if e[n] =  0. The value of C_ans_res is stored in a 
register of some sort. If updating this register produces a noticeable power fluctuation, 
then the system could be compromised by an attacker.
As mentioned, the difficulty in attacking this particular implementation comes from the 
fact that the multiplication is carried out in every round regardless of the value of the 
exponent. Most smart cards do not implement it this way as it requires more process­
ing than necessary. However, due to parallelism, it does not have any adverse effects 
on the efficiency of the implementation studied here. If the multiplication was only 
conditionally executed (as in exp_cond_mul()), then the difference in power fluctua­
tions between a 1 and a 0 would be far easier to recognise than that of a simple register 
update. The latter will tend to draw a lot less power and therefore be much more dif­
ficult to see. In fact, one of the suggested countermeasures against these attacks is to 
implement this multiplication with every iteration22.
2.5.3 Points of occurrence of the fluctuations
To understand when these fluctuations should occur, either an SPA attack needs to be 
carried out or some extra information about the system be known. For this experiment, 
some extra information was known and as will be seen, was verified experimentally. 
The length used for the base and the modulus was N  =  2,174 bits and the key was 
2,176 bits. The update of C_ans_res occurred every 2x(AT +  2) +  l  =  2 x  2176 + 1  =
22This of course is not a perfect solution but it does create a lot more work for the attacker.
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4,353 clock cycles due to the way the Montgomery’s method was implemented23. The 
clock for this particular prototype ran at 60MHz which gave a minimum time between 
fluctuations as
1 x 4353 =  72.55/zs,60e6
depending on whether or not two ones occurred consecutively with each other. Other 
timing characteristics noticed were integer multiples of this base unit. This minimum 
time of occurrence gave a maximum fundamental frequency of /  =  ^  ~  13.8 kHz 
(again depending on the key). It might be considered that in order to see these fluctua­
tions the power need only have been sampled at a little over twice this maximum (due 
to the Nyquist theorem). However, this was not the case. The operation of updating 
the C_ans_res with Next_ans_res occurred within one clock cycle. This means that the 
fluctuation lasted approximately
16.7ns.60e6
It was initially thought that a sampling period of half this value would completely ac­
quire the signal however this was not the case due to excessive noise and the fact that 
the averaged waveforms were very prone to misalignment (as a result of unstable trig­
gering etc.). If only two samples were taken per clock cycle then a slight misalignment 
of the waveforms would produce incorrect results in the averaging. The sample rate 
used was therefore 2GSs-1 which gave about 33 samples per clock cycle.
It is generally accepted that the sample rate be at least 20 times the clock frequency. 
One report [34] in which an SPA attack was carried out on a PIC microcontroller 
(similar to the devices used in some smart cards) running at a frequency of 4 MHz, used 
a sampling rate of 200MSs_1. This corresponded to 50 sample points per clock cycle
23 Although the update time appears to have been dependent on the key, it in fact wasn’t. If the key 
was three bits long the operations still took 4,353 clock cycles to complete.
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which was more than adequate for that particular situation. Although the results were 
quite impressive, the operations running on the smartcard were minimal which reduced 
noise to a very manageable level. This would not be the case on a fully functional high 
speed cryptosystem such as the one being tested here. This particular board generally 
has 10 operations running at once on 10 different ALUs!
The next section looks at one of three attacks which can be used to exploit these power 
fluctuations. The particular attack examined in fact uses more than just the single 
power fluctuation to compromise a system but in fact exploits the fact that intermediate 
values for two different keys will be different also. This gives this particular attack 
more power than one that would exploit only the outcome of the conditional statement.
2.5.4 Attacking the exponentiation implementation
There are three main attacks on public key systems described in the literature and are
1. Single-Exponent, Multiple-Data (SEMD)
2. Multiple-Exponent, Single-Data (MESD)
3. Zero-Exponent, Multiple-Data (ZEMD)
The names of each describe the information available to the attacker. To implement the 
SEMD attack, the attacker needs to be able to run the encryption algorithm on a random 
number of plaintexts where only one known exponent is required. To implement the 
MESD attack, the attacker needs to have the ability to encrypt a single piece of data 
with the key being attacked and another chosen key. The ZEMD requires only that the 
attacker encrypt a random set of data values.
The SEMD and the ZEMD attack will not be described here as they were unable to 
be implemented in this particular research due to the access that was given to the
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cryptographic board (more will be said about this in chapter 4). However, it must be 
pointed out that the research to date shows that the SEMD attack is the least powerful 
of the three and it is highly unlikely that the cryptosystem under review would be 
vulnerable to this attack due the extremely large amount of power waveforms needed 
to attack the exponent. The MESD attack was the only attack performed on in this 
instance due to restriction with the setup. It will therefore be described next.
2.5.4.1 Multiple-Exponent, Single-Data (MESD) attack
It might be expected that all an adversary has to do to attack the algorithm of figure
2.7 is to subtract an averaged power waveform obtained using an unknown exponent, 
from one obtained using a known exponent, such as one where every bit is a one. This 
should then leave no bias spikes where the conditional statement was executed and bias 
spikes where it wasn’t; fortunately for the cryptosystem, it is not as straightforward as 
this. The intermediate results would generally be different for each key, and would 
cause such widely varying power fluctuations that it would be impossible to pick out 
the bias spike(s) of the signal of interest. However, if two exponents are exactly the 
same up to a certain bit position, then for a particular base 6, the intermediate value 
C_ans_res of each, will be the exact same up to that point. The MESD attack exploits 
this fact to allow an attacker to determine a private exponent from a known exponent.
The attack begins by attacking the LSB of the unknown exponent and works it’s way 
up to the MSB one bit at a time. To attack each bit, a chosen value b is exponentiated 
J  times with the unknown exponent eu. The averaged power waveform aw fuk  is 
then calculated. Next, a random guess eg of this exponent is taken and is used to 
exponentiate 6, J  times as before. Depending on whether the bit of eg being attacked 
is a 1 or a 0 will determine whether the averaged waveform is a w f  1  ^or a w f  0*.
The attacker then computes the differential traces A D lk and A D 0k
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A D lk =  a w fu k — a w flk  (2.20)
AD0fc =  a w fu k -  awfOk. (2.21)
Initially the LSB is attacked as mentioned. Assuming this is the same for both eg and 
eu, then the intermediate calculated values should remain the same up to the condi­
tional statement in the second iteration of the FOR loop. The power fluctuations will 
therefore be the exact same also and the differential trace should be 0 up to that point. 
After this point, widely varying fluctuations should appear. If however, the LSB of eg 
and eu are not the same, the intermediate values will be different and the differential 
trace will not be zero for any particular length of time at the beginning.
Once the LSB is known, the same technique can be used to attack the remaining bits 
of the exponent. To attack the nth bit, the section of the key discovered by previous 
runs of the attack are now used as the first n -  1 bits of eg. By obtaining the average 
waveforms a w f  1 and a w f  0 (in which the nth bit is guessed to be either a 1 or a 0 as 
before), the differential traces ADI* and A D 0k can be obtained. As before, the values 
of the intermediate results up to the conditional statement of the nth loop should be the 
exact same (assuming the key was guessed correctly up to this point). The differential
trace should therefore equal zero up to this point and then widely varying fluctuations
from there on.
This attack has been shown in [27] to succeed against smart cards with as little as 100 
exponentiations per bit. This is certainly not the case for the DUT here as will be seen.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced a very powerful side channel attack known as power analysis. 
It has been an active area of research since it’s introduction in 1998 by Paul Kocher 
et al. Smart card vendors have been particularly worried as numerous smart cards 
have been found to be highly susceptible to it. The initial area looked at was Simple 
Power Analysis (SPA). This involves gaining knowledge about the cryptosystem and 
it’s algorithm by visually analysing a single power waveform. Although generally not 
a direct threat, it can offer assistance in other attacks.
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) was then discussed in detail. This attack begins by 
capturing a large number of power waveforms. These waveforms are then partitioned 
into two sets according to the output of a partitioning function that is dependent on a 
number of values, one of which is a subset of the key. The other values are known to the 
attacker and the subkey is guessed at. Each partition is then averaged to reduce noise 
and the averages subtracted to produce a differential trace. This procedure is repeated 
until every possible value of the key has been guessed at. For DES the particular 
subkey attacked is only six bits long so this implies there will be 26 =  64 differential 
traces. The one showing the largest bias spikes is more than likely the trace produced 
by the correct guess at the subkey. The remaining subkeys can then be revealed by 
attacking the other s-boxes and the final eight bits by an exhaustive search.
Improvements of the basic differential power attack were then discussed and included 
muliple-bit DPA and high order DPA. This then led onto attacks on public key systems 
and specifically, modular exponentiation. The main attack discussed was the Multiple 
Exponent Single Data attack (MESD) developed by Messerges et al. This is a very 
powerful attack an was the one used to attack the DUT in this research. It begins 
by taking a guess at the first bit of the key and measuring multiple power waveforms 
for both the unknown and guessed keys. Each set of waveforms is averaged and the
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resulting two waveform subtracted as in normal DPA. If the guess was correct then the 
differential trace produced should show a value of zero up to the point where the next 
bit is manipulated. However, if it was incorrect then the trace should not go to zero. 
This technique is then repeated for each bit until the entire key is found.
Power attacks are very well understood and mitigation techniques are constantly being 
devised to protect cryptographic devices against them. One idea is to provide some 
sort of tamper resistance facility that will detect any physical attempt at accessing the 
device. Using these and other techniques, risks of power analysis attacks may be re­
duced significantly. The attacker may then try to find some other way to gain secret 
information without making any physical contact with the cryptosystem itself This 
will then render the tamper sensing circuitry useless. It has been discovered that this 
can be achieved with the use of antennae to capture the electromagnetic radiation be­
ing emitted from the device. The name given to this attack is Electromagnetic Analysis 
(EMA) and has been known about in military circles for quite some time. The US 
Government has developed the TEMPEST program to try and deal with these com­
promising emanations. Both EMA and and TEMPEST will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
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Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA)
The last chapter looked at the ways in which the power consumed by a device can be 
used to extract information about the operations it is running. This power results from 
the voltage and current that the device uses to operate. If the voltage is considered con­
stant (as a result of regulation) then the current will fluctuate in direct proportion to the 
power1. This fluctuating current will generate a sympathetically fluctuating magnetic 
field in it’s vicinity which in turn will create a sympathetically fluctuating electric field. 
If these fields can be captured using an antenna of some sort, then it is very likely that 
techniques similar to those in the last chapter can be used to extract secret information. 
The name given to this form of attack is Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) [41].
Governments and military organisations have been aware of the problem of compro­
mising radiated emissions for quite some time and a program known as TEMPEST has 
been set up to try to deal with it2. Millions of dollars have been directed at the TEM­
PEST program and nearly all of its findings have been classified. As a result there is 
little information in the public domain. Fortunately, academic research in this area has 
been on the increase in the last couple of years and a number of papers can be found 
(some examples being [42,43]).
It is the aim of this research to determine whether a certain cryptographic accelerator is
’This is an over simplification of the problem but serves for the purposes of an introduction.
2A number of sources state that TEMPEST deals with the reduction of all forms of compromising 
emissions and not just those that are radiated. It has generally been used in the public domain to refer to 
radiated emissions only, and for the purpose of this thesis will refer only to this form of emission also.
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vulnerable to EMA and power analysis and to allow designers of cryptosystems in gen­
eral to use the setup here to test their own products for vulnerabilities. It is important 
therefore to understand the theory behind the generation and capture of electromag­
netic radiation. This chapter will therefore begin by discussing some of this theory 
which although not exhaustive, should act as good introduction. Models will be pre­
sented that allow an estimation of the level of radiation emanating from a circuit which 
can then be used to determine the locations and frequencies that are most compromis­
ing. Following this, a brief discussion of the TEMPEST program will be given. The 
techniques used here to test the DUT are not claimed to be the same ones used by pro­
fessional TEMPEST engineers when testing equipment, but they do act as a starting 
point for designers wishing to test their systems against these attacks. A literary survey 
of all the relevant publications on the subject of EMA will then be reviewed and it will 
be seen that a lot of work still remains to be done in this area.
3.1 Electromagnetic Radiation of Electronic Systems
In EMC it is taught that for interference to be a problem, three components are re­
quired: An emitter, a coupling channel and a receiver. This idea can be interpreted 
to include an EMA attack where the receiver is the antenna of the adversary, and the 
emitter is the cryptosystem under attack. Elimination of any one of the above ele­
ments will eliminate the compromising emissions. This can mean a (re)design of the 
cryptosystem for minimum emissions. Generally nothing can be done about the re­
ceiver, however the coupling channel can be reduced as much as possible to stop it 
from picking up the emissions.
Any setup within the cryptosystem that acts as an efficient radiator of electromagnetic 
energy needs to be restructured3. As well as this, any coupling channel within the
3 Generally it will not be possible to eliminate the radiation altogether.
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device must somehow be severed or blocked [44]. For radiated emissions the obvious 
choice would seem to be that of shielding, however this is more of a remedy than a 
cure and other strategies should be considered initially. It must be kept in mind that 
the sensitive information may travel to another part of the circuit by conduction and 
re-radiate at unexpected locations. As a result, shielding in one location may not offer 
as much protection as might be expected.
To reduce the radiation properties of a system it is necessary to understand the charac­
teristics that cause it to radiate. These same principles can be used to understand what 
is required to capture this radiation and will assist in testing for vulnerabilities. With 
the knowledge gained from the theory and the testing, mitigation techniques can be 
deployed to reduce potential threats.
3.1.1 Basic Concepts
Radiation from electronic systems is generally classified under two headings: differen­
tial mode radiation and common mode radiation. Differential mode radiation is due to 
the currents that are setup as a result of normal circuit operation. These currents flow 
around the loop enclosed by the signal wires and are in opposite directions to each 
other. Differential mode radiation is the easiest to eliminate as it can be controlled by 
careful layout of the components making up the circuit.
Common mode radiation on the other hand would not be part of the circuit design 
and is due to grounded sections of the circuit being at a potential different from true 
ground. This is usually to do with unintentional impedances of the Printed Circuit 
Board (PCB) traces which cause undesired voltage drops. The radiation problem then 
occurs when (for example) a cable of some sort is connected to the PCB. The shield 
of the cable will be conncctcd to the “ground” of the circuit which may not be at true 
ground. The current flowing through the impedance from the “ground” connection
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to true ground may fluctuate in accordance with the operations on the board4. The 
fluctuating voltage created across the impedance will cause the shield of the cable to 
fluctuate in a similar manner. The cable being quite long will act as a fairly efficient 
radiator of electromagnetic energy and transmit the compromising information.
To understand the radiation effects more clearly, it is necessary to have some sort of 
a model that can be used to describe and calculate the radiation being emitted from 
a circuit. Maxwell’s equations are normally used to solve problems involving elec­
tromagnetic quantities however the complexity of the circuits involved make this an 
extremely difficult (if not impossible) task. With some simplifications it is possible to 
develop a model that will give an order of magnitude of the radiated emissions. This 
can be used to determine the emission levels for a certain device. It is generally the 
worst case scenario that is taken for each situation encountered. An attacker may use 
this strategy to determine the strongest radiating component of a device and use it to 
reduce the length of time necessary for an attack.
3.1.2 Modeling radiation from circuits
Each radiation mode can be modeled separately. Differential mode radiation can ini­
tially be thought of as being emitted from an ideal zero impedance loop. However, 
common mode radiation is generally modeled as a high impedance straight wire (i.e. a 
monopole antenna). For both cases, the fields generated are dependent on the charac­
teristic impedance of the source, the media surrounding it and the observation distance. 
Although alternating electric and magnetic fields cannot exist independently of each 
other, the nature of these fields and the relationship they have with each other, changes 
significantly as the distance from the source is increased. As a result, the area around
4This is similar to the idea of placing a small resistance in series with the power or ground line in 
order to measure the power fluctuations (see section 2.3).
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the source is generally split into the following sections5 (found using Maxwell’s equa­
tions):
•  The Near Field - this extends from the source to about r =  A/27T (A is the 
wavelength of the source voltage/current).
•  The Transition Region - this is the area around r = X/2tt and extends to about
r =  1.6A.
• The Far Field - this technically begins at r = \ /2 i r but is not completely in effect 
until about r =  1.6A.
In the near field, the fields are predominantly reactive and are therefore known as 
reactive fields. These can be either inductive (if due to a low impedance, high current 
structure) or capacitive (if due to a high impedance, low current structure). In the 
far field however, the fields are predominantly radiated and are therefore known as 
radiated fields6. The waves are considered plane waves at this point and beyond and 
are only inversely proportional to the distance from the device, i.e. a  1 /r as opposed 
to oc 1 /r3 (which is the case for the inductive field as shown in table 3.1 below). In the 
transition region the non-radiated (reactive) fields begin to drop off and the radiated 
field begins to dominate, however a combination of both still exist.
Taking measurements in each of these regions will have different consequences. If an 
antenna is used to measure the energy in the near field, then its presence will affect 
the measurement. This is due to the fact that the fields at this point are reactive and 
are storing energy which under normal circuit operation is fully returned to the source 
on each half cycle. However, an antenna placed in the reactive field will absorb some
5 It must be pointed out that the definitions given assume that the distance r from the radiated body 
is large compared to it’s dimensions. If it is not then other effects must be taken into consideration.
6There is a common misconception that the reactive field is also radiated - this is not the case. 
The ambiguity probably stems from the fact that both terms are sub-headings under the more general 
“radiated emissions” section of EMC terminology.
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of this stored energy and prevent it from returning to it’s source. This causes energy 
losses in the originating circuit and affects the measurement (a similar problem exists 
when connecting a finite impedance scope probe to a node in the circuit). If the antenna 
absorbs too much energy it can end up loading the source. In the far field, the field is 
not reactive and the energy is not stored but is propagating away from the source. Any 
measurement of the radiated field will have no effect on the source as this energy will 
not be returned anyway. These points need to be considered when testing systems for 
vulnerabilities to EMA.
As mentioned already, the equations used to describe these fields can become quite 
complicated and the fact that the characteristics of the fields themselves change only 
increases the complexity of the situation. However with some simplifications, a good 
estimation of the field levels can be achieved. For the loop and the wire model, the 
following is therefore assumed:
• The current I is uniform in the loop or length of wire.
• The circumference of the loop and the length of the wire are A and r  (the 
wavelength and point of measurement).
• Both are in free space and are not close to a conducting surface.
• The loop has no impedance other than it’s own reactance.
Using these assumptions, the field equations can be greatly simplified. These equations 
are developed in [45] and are summarised in table 3.1 where the worst case values are 
given. The “ratio” column shows the ratio of the electric field to the magnetic field 
(i.e. E/H). This is known as the wave impedance and in the far field is equal to the 
impedance of the medium through which the energy is traveling7. For free space this
7 For the purposes of this discussion the medium will be free space.
61
Chapter 3 Electromagnetic Analysis
is given by
Z o  =  \  =  1207T »  377 Q . (3.1)V £ o
where fi0 ~  47T x 10-7 m_1 is the permeability o f free space, eD =  1/367T x 109 Fm-1 
is the permittivity o f free space and ZQ is the free space impedance. The other values 
shown are as follows:
• I  is the peak-to-peak loop current (A)
• A  is the area of the loop (m2)
• A is the wavelength (m)
• r  is the observation distance (m)
• Z0 is the free space impedance (Q)
Configuration Region Electric Field
(E V/m)
Magnetic Ratio E/H
(ft)
Loop
Near Field Z0I A /2 \ r 2 IA /A n r3 Z0(2 n r /\)
Far Field Z0IA i:/X 2r I A n / \ 2r Zo
Straight Wire
Near Field Z0Il\/87T2r 3 Il/A irr2 Z0(X/2nr)
Far Field Z 0Il/2X r Il/2X r Zo
Table 3.1: Equations for the fields produced by an ideal loop and wire structure in both the 
near and far field. The ratio E/H is known as the wave impedance and is equal to the free space 
impedance in the far field.
A number of points should be noted with regard to table 3.1.
1. The magnetic field of the loop in the near field is dominant when r  is small and A 
is large. The opposite is true for the straight wire antenna where the electric field
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dominates. This is generally why the loop antenna is associated with magnetic 
fields and the monopole with electric fields. It does not mean that the other field 
is not produced but only that it is the least dominant of the two.
2. For the same reasons the wave impedance is small for the loop antenna and large 
for the monopole antenna. It should be noted then that the wave impedance in 
the near field is related to the source that produced it.
3. The magnetic field of the loop in the near field is proportional to 1 /r3 whereas 
the electric field is proportional to 1/r2. The opposite is true for the straight wire 
antenna. Separation of a receiver from the source in the near field has more of 
an effect than in the far field (where the fields are proportional to 1/r).
4. In the far field the electric field is always larger than the magnetic field by a factor 
of ZQ =  377Q which is the impedance of free space. Knowing one therefore 
allows calculation of the other.
5. The magnitude of the radiation from the loop is always dependent on it’s area A. 
This is a very important point as it shows that the loop area of a circuit should 
be kept as small as possible (for example by keeping signal leads as close as 
possible to their returns).
6. Ott shows the equation for the electric field from loop antenna as being equal 
to [46]
E  =  131.6 x 10- ie{ f2A I){ -)s in 6  (3.2)r
in free space, far from a conduction surface (such as a ground plane) and
E  - 2 6 3  x W ~16( f 2 A I)(- )s in 8  (3.3)r
when placed over a ground place. This is a 6dB increase in emission levels
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(again a worst case result) and must be taken into account when trying to reduce 
radiated emissions. Equation 3.2 is the exact same as that shown in table 3.1 for 
the electric field of a loop antenna measured in the far field8. This equation and 
that of a straight wire should therefore be doubled when in proximity to a ground 
plane. The latter will therefore be
^  2Z0Il  12.6 x 10~7f l lE  = ------- « ------------------—2A r r (3.4)
Unfortunately, the ideal loop and wire are not always the best models from a practical 
point of view and a modification needs to be taken into account. This more practical 
circuit is shown in figure 3.1 where I is it’s length and w is it’s width. The equations 
used for this model are determined by the total circuit impedance (Ztotai = Zwire +  
Zioad)• If this impedance is less than 7.9 x r x F  (where r  is in meters and F  is 
in megahertz) then the ideal loop formulas are used. However, if it is greater than 
this value then a modified straight wire model is used. A summary of the resulting 
equations (developed in [45]) is given in table 3.2.
Figure 3.1: More practical model of a radiating circuit. The total impedance of the circuit 
is Ztotai =  Zwire +  Zioad where Zwire is the impedance of the wire and Zioad is the total 
impedance of any loads driven by the voltage.
8This can be seen by substituting Za = 377i2, A = c /f  (where c « 3 x  108) and setting 0 = 7r/2 
(worst case).
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The voltage (V) is used instead of a current due to the fact that the former is more easily 
determined. The units used are different in order to produce more practical results and 
are as follows:
• V  is the peak-to-peak driving voltage (V)
• A  is the area of the circuit (cm2)
• F  is the frequency (MHz)
• r  is the observation distance (m)
It can be seen from these equations that the magnitude of the radiation in all cases is 
proportional to the area of the circuit. Also, the radiated field is proportional to the 
square of the frequency (for differential mode signals) and the frequency (for common 
mode signals)9 which is why higher clock frequencies are a major problem in both 
EMC and security applications.
Zc Electric Field
(E^V/m)
Magnetic
(H ^/m)
Near Field
< 7.9 x r x F 63IA F /r2 7.96IA/r3
> 7.9 x r x F 7.9 6VA/r3 7.9 6 M /r3
Far Field - l.SVAF2/r Z c 1.3 VAF2/r Z 0Z c
Table 3.2: Equations for the fields produced by the more practical model in both the near and 
far field. For the near field, the equations are dependent on the impedance of the circuit.
9 Although the practical model implies that it is proportional to the square of the frequency for both 
cases this is dependent on a number of factors and common mode radiation is more generally propor­
tional to the frequency (see [45] for more details).
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3.1.3 Spectral content of signals
The equations shown in tables 3.1 and 3.2 were developed for waveforms of a single 
frequency (i.e. sinusoidal waveforms). It is rare that any signal (even intended ones) 
will be purely sinusoidal and most signals will be some combination of sinusoidal 
frequencies. It is therefore necessary to determine the spectral content of a signal in 
order to know how it will radiate. Most of the time this is an extremely complicated 
task and often a number of simplifications can be made.
As a practical example of a waveform consider the clock signal of a digital system. 
This signal is not a perfect square wave but is in fact a trapezoidal waveform and has 
finite rise and fall times (denoted by tr and t /  respectively). It is also possible that the 
signal may not have a 50% duty cycle. A diagram of a typical digital signal is shown 
in figure 3.2.
Rise Time (tr) Fall Time (if)
PubeWkÉ
Period |T)
Figure 3.2: Trapezoidal waveform with finite rise (tr ) and fall ( i /)  times, pulse width r  and 
period T. The duty cycle is d =  r/T.
It is shown in [46] that the harmonic content of this signal is given by
In = 21 d sin(n^d) sin(nirtr/T)mrd mrtr/T (3.5)
where In is the nth harmonic, I is the peak to peak amplitude of the current, d is the
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duty cycle, tr is the rise time (the smaller of the two if the rise and fall times aren’t 
equal) and T  is the period.
Figure 3.3 shows the value of the first 20 harmonics for a 50% duty cycle and 2ns 
rise time. As can be seen, only the odd harmonics are present and the fundamental 
frequency is 64% of the signal current. If the duty cycle is not 50% however, then 
even harmonics will also be present. In the case of an 80% duty cycle for example, 
the fundamental frequency will only be 37% of the signal and the second harmonic 
(which isn’t present for a 50% duty cycle) contains 30% of the signal content. This 
can be seen in figure 3.4.
Figure 3.3: First 20 harmonics present in a square wave with 2ns rise time and 50% duty 
cycle. The fundamental frequency is .64 times the peak amplitude of the current.
It would be fairly tedious if every harmonic had to be calculated for every signal en­
countered. Luckily there is another method that is generally used. It is known as the 
envelope method and it shows the envelope of the peak values of the spectrum of the 
signal. It can used to estimate the level of radiation at a certain frequency.
Figure 3.5 shows the envelope of the square wave described by equation 3.5. As can 
be seen from this figure, the harmonics are constant up to the comer frequency
AbfckJt« Value of 1 Hmmomc AneKude
I
(3.6)
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Figure 3.4: First 20 harmonics present in a square wave with 2ns rise time and 80% duty 
cycle. The fundamental frequency is now only .37 times the peak amplitude of the current and 
even harmonics are present. Every multiple of the 5th harmonic is zero however.
where r  is the pulse width of the waveform. From this point on, they drop off at 20dB 
per decade up to next comer frequency
where tr is the rise time. After this point they drop of at a rate of 40 dB per decade. It 
can be seen therefore that the shorter the rise time, the higher the spectral occupancy.
As technology improves and rise times get shorter, the energy of the higher harmon­
ics will increase. Because far field radiation increases as the square of the frequency 
(for differential mode signals) and frequency (for common mode signals), the fields 
emanating from a device will occupy increased levels of bandwidth. This holds con­
sequences for information security as well as EMC even though the signal of interest 
to an attacker will generally be at lower frequencies than the clock harmonics. If this 
signal happens to modulate the harmonics of the clock then it will have a method by 
which to radiate with increased intensity. A number of researchers have shown this 
to be a problem (as shown later) and in particular Agrawal et al. present two graphs 
showing the modulated signal (which clearly shows increased levels of compromising
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activity) and it’s demodulated baseband [32]. Modulated signals are a very attractive 
source of information as they allow lower frequency signals to propagate far from the 
source.
Figure 3.5: Envelope of the spectrum of the trapezoidal wave shown in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.5 shows the envelope of the spectrum of a trapezoidal waveform. It can be 
seen that the fundamental frequency / i  is greater than the comer frequency f c\. Be­
cause of this, the harmonics start decreasing at a rate of 20dB per decade. However,
this may not always be the case. If the fundamental falls below /cl then they will
remain constant up to that point. The fundamental frequency will equal / ci if
/1 m / Cl
T  (3.8)
T  =  —
7T
which implies that the fundamental frequency will fall below the first comer frequency
-  > r  >  0 (3.9)
7T
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and will fall above it if
— < t  < T. (3.10)
7T
Each situation will produce a slightly different envelope.
As mentioned on a number of occasions, the radiated emissions from a circuit is pro­
portional to the square of the frequency for differential mode signals and to the fre­
quency for common mode signals . This is equivalent to saying that the emissions 
increase at a rate of 40dB/decade and 20dB/decade respectively. However, the ampli­
tude of the harmonics of the signal in figure 3.2 decrease at a rate of 20dB/decade up 
to f c2 and at a rate of 40dB/decade from then on. As a result, the radiated portion of 
the differential mode signal will be constant up to / c2 and will decrease at a rate of 
20dB/decade from this point on. For the common mode signal it will be constant up to 
f C2 and will decrease at 20dB/decade from then on. This is depicted in figures 3.6 and
3.7 respectively10.
k
* + ✓✓*>
*«1I4cif
»
} Frequency (f)f <2 ~ —
Figure 3.6: Differential mode radiated signal.
Having looked at some of the radiation properties of circuits, the next step is to de-
,0For simplicity each of these graphs assume that ^  < r  < T.
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Frequency (f)
Figure 3.7: Common mode radiated signal.
termine the state of the art in using these emissions for attacks. TEMPEST being the 
oldest body of knowledge will be discussed first. As mentioned already, information 
on TEMPEST is extremely scarce and most of it is pure conjecture due to the fact that 
it is classified. However, it is interesting to have a brief look at what is available. Fol­
lowing this the publicly available literature will be discussed. As mentioned, this area 
is still quite new and a lot more research needs to be conducted.
3.2 TEM PEST
Phrases like “TEMPEST attacks” are commonly found in literature to refer to the use 
of electromagnetic analysis in attacking information systems. However, TEMPEST 
is not an actual attack itself. According to the available literature, TEMPEST is an 
unclassified word for a classified program. It has been run by the United States gov­
ernment11 since around the late 50’s early 60’s12, although the idea of compromising
11 From here on in the term “Government” will be used to refer to the United States government unless 
otherwise stated.
12This is speculation of course but it is the most generally accepted time period available from public 
sources.
71
Chapter 3 Electromagnetic Analysis
radiation was known long before this date (a time-line of TEMPEST can be found 
at [47]). There are a number of suggested meanings for this word in the public do­
main including the suggestion that it is an anagram and stands for (to mention the 
more popular of a number of variants) - Transient ElectroMagnetic Pulse Emanation 
STandard13. It is more likely however, that TEMPEST is not an anagram, but is simply 
a word used to refer to the area of research that deals with protecting equipment pro­
cessing sensitive information from being extracted through radiated emissions. This 
radiation may be produced without any outside interference (i.e. a passive attack) or 
may be generated by external means such as shining a threat frequency onto a device 
in order to cause the circuit to resonate thus emitting stronger radiation (i.e. an active 
attack).
Bruce Gabrielson attempts to explain what TEMPEST is in [48] where he provides his 
own definition of the word. From his paper (and other publicly available sources), it 
is likely that TEMPEST deals with the other forms of compromising emanations but 
this is unclear. This can be seen from the following four definitions of TEMPEST each 
taken from a different source. Definitions one and two differ slightly from three and 
four:
1. “TEMPEST: Military code-name for activities related to van Eck monitoring14, 
and technology to defend against such monitoring”. [49]
2. “TEMPEST is a U.S. government code word that identifies a classified set 
of standards for limiting electric or electromagnetic radiation emanations from 
electronic equipment”. [50]
3. “TEMPEST: (a). [A] Short name referring to investigation, study, and control 
of compromising emanations from information systems (IS) equipment, (b). To
13This probably stems from the fact that EMP is an anagram for Electromagnetic Pulse.
14See section 3.3.
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shield against compromising emanations”. [12]
4. “TEM PEST: An Unclassified short name referring to investigations and studies 
of compromising emanations. It is sometimes used synonymously for the term 
‘compromising emanations’: For example, TEMPEST tests, TEMPEST inspec­
tion”. [51]
From these definitions it appears that TEMPEST is not the proper name of the program 
run by the Government and probably reveals no information about it (due to the fact 
that it’s unclassified).
There are a number of documents available to the public which have been released 
as a result of the Freedom O f Information Act (FOIA). A lot of these can be found 
at [52] and are a good starting point for developing an understanding of the TEMPEST 
program and it’s findings. It must be said however that the documents found here are 
highly redacted, especially in the areas of interest. A good example of this can be seen 
in [53] which states three areas of risk for cryptosystems - low, medium and high - but 
the definitions for these have been almost completely replaced by x’s. Some interesting 
but non-technical documents can be found at [50,54] and some slightly more technical 
ones at [55-57].
It is explicitly stated in more than one of these documents that facilities processing 
unclassified information will not have TEMPEST countermeasures applied to them. 
This would suggest mainly that TEMPEST countermeasures are costly and/or time- 
consuming. Potts confirms this in [58]:
“Commercially there is little need for equipment to be shielded to military 
TEMPEST standards, both from the point of view of cost as well as level 
of attenuation. TEMPEST standards effectively provide full shielding and 
are commercial overkill in this area”.
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As a result of this high cost, a system must first go through an inspection of a minimum 
of six key areas before mitigation techniques are implemented. These are (a more 
detailed description can be found in [53]):
1. Location
2. Volume of Information Processed
3. Sensitivity of Information Processed
4. Perishability of Information Processed
5. Physical Control
6. TEMPEST Profile of Equipment
On completion of these tests, the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA)15 
decides whether or not the equipment needs TEMPEST protection and if so to what 
level. Devices that are fully approved under the TEMPEST standard are placed on the 
Preferred Products List (PPL). This document lists all approved TEMPEST equipment, 
consultants, test houses and shielding devices and is maintained by the Government 
administrator of the Industrial TEMPEST Program (ITP) [59]. Any product on this 
list will have met the NACSIM 5100A specification (the NATO equivalent of this test 
standard is the AMSG 720B). This is a classified document and is unfortunately not 
available for public viewing.
To ensure that protected equipment are not effected in any way by unprotected equip­
ment through coupling etc., two general equipment categories have been identified16: 
RED and BLACK. The following definition [12] gives a general idea of what these 
terms mean:
15This is a Government employee that is experienced and technically qualified in the area of TEM­
PEST.
16This terminology can be used for systems at any level of abstraction.
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“RED/BLACK concept: [The] Separation of electrical and electronic cir­
cuits, components, equipment, and systems that handle national security 
information (RED), in electrical form, from those that handle non-national 
security information (BLACK) in the same form”.
It is clear from this that the processing of classified and non-classified signals in the 
same system/area is not an option under the TEMPEST program. This way radiation 
given off by a RED system will not be coupled onto a BLACK system. This is clearly a 
standard practice and should be a consideration of the designers of cryptosystems. The 
three mechanisms outlined in section 1.2.1 (i.e. conducted, radiated and reactive cou­
pling) are justification enough for the Government to physically and electrically isolate 
equipment and to classify different systems into their RED and BLACK categories.
3.3 Literary Review
Although the idea of compromising radiated emissions has been known by Govern­
ment and military officials for almost 90 years17, the general public were not aware of 
it until around 1985. It was at this time that the Dutch engineer Wim van Eck published 
a paper reporting an experiment that used unintended radiated emissions to reconstruct 
potentially sensitive data. His results caused quite a stir throughout the security com­
munity.
Van Eck’s paper [60] discusses the idea that electromagnetic radiation emitted from the 
Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) of a Visual Display Unit (VDU) can be used to reconstruct 
the screen’s contents. Although van Eck claims it is possible to reconstruct a signal 
up to a distance of 1km (or more) this is debatable18. It is clear however that success 
at relatively large distances can be achieved due to the fact that the video signals are
17 According to [47] the first account of radiated emissions being used in this way was in 1914.
18 Having said that, some good arguments are presented which may make it plausible.
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amplified from Transistor-Transistor Logic (TTL) levels up to several hundred volts. 
The radiated signals can be collected and reconstructed with minimal, “off the sh e lf’ 
equipment. In fact, van Eck used an ordinary television receiver to demodulate and 
display the captured information. The television o f course had to be modified slightly 
to allow the synchronisation signals (which control the scanning electron beam) to 
be adjusted to the correct value (i.e. those used by the VDU being attacked) but this 
didn’t appear to cause any great problems. As a result o f  van Eck’s work, the public 
domain term for monitoring radiated emissions became known as van Eck monitoring. 
It became clear that a way was needed to predict the radiation not only in terms o f 
EMC but also in terms o f security. Ward discusses a number o f options available to the 
designer for the prediction o f radiated emissions in terms o f security [61].
It is interesting to note that due to the furore caused by van Eck’s paper, all subse­
quent research was classified by the management o f van Eck’s funding company [62]. 
However, the idea had already begun to spread throughout the research community and 
since then a number o f papers have been published all o f which verify the integrity of 
van Eck’s work [57,63-70]. Although these papers are all very interesting, they do not 
answer the question o f whether or not cryptographic systems such as smart cards and 
high speed cryptographic systems are at risk from the same form of eavesdropping. 
Initially it might appear not to be a problem as these devices use only a fraction of 
the voltage levels used by VDUs however the current research would seem to suggest 
otherwise.
Daneffel published a paper three years after van Eck stating that ISDN lines were also 
vulnerable to electromagnetic eavesdropping [71]. It was now clear that high voltage 
VDUs weren’t the only systems at risk. The results showed that it was possible to 
reconstruct data with common loop and biconical antennas placed 10cm and lm  from 
the source, respectively. It is well known in the EMC community that one o f the
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strongest radiated signals in a digital system is that o f the clock. Daneffel realised that 
there was a possibility that the clock signal could be modulated with the data:
“However, clock signals may also be emitted via the [ISDN] lines... Due 
to nonlinear components, it is conceivable that these HF or VHF signals 
might be modulated by audio, video or digital signals in the ISDN ter­
minals. Such information may be picked up and demodulated by special 
receivers, and the original information can be recovered”.
This was a fairly significant result as it meant that lower frequency signals could be 
efficiently radiated by modulating the higher frequency clock signal. Using this idea, 
Daneffel tried a number o f demodulators in an attempt to reconstruct the signal. Al­
though it was not stated whether or not all o f them worked, it was reported that the FM 
demodulator gave the best results. This suggested that the data signal could somehow 
change frequency o f the clock signal although no explanation was given.
Results similar to Daneffels were reported in 1990 by Peter Smulders where he showed 
that RS-232 cables were also vulnerable to “van Eck monitoring” (as it was now 
known) [13]. Smulders claimed that the data could be picked up with the aid o f a 
simple radio receiver. This was possible because the bit rates o f the data signals were 
low compared with the Nyquist rate o f the receiver. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show some of 
the results reported by Smulders.
Figure 3.8 shows data that was sent down an RS-232 cable and that picked up by a radio 
receiver placed 7m away. The receiver was tuned to 16MHz and it’s AM detector was 
used to reconstruct the data. The complete pulses are not visible in the received signal 
which (according to Smulders) is due to the AM envelope detection process. Figure 
3.9 (also taken from [13]) shows the same data signal picked up with the receiver tuned 
to 98MHz using an FM detector. It can be seen in this case that the signal is almost
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Figure 3.8: Graph presented by Smulders that compares the original data on an RS-232 cable 
with the intercepted data. All that was used was a simple pocket radio tuned to 16MHz and 
placed 7m from the source. At this frequency the receiver uses an AM detector which results 
in loss of the signs of the transitions.
perfectly reconstructed. This can be compared with Daneifels results (described above) 
where it was claimed that the FM demodulator produced the best results.
t*rm I 1
Figure 3.9: As with figure 3.8 a radio receiver placed at 7m from the source was used. This 
time however it was tuned to 98MHz and FM demodulation was used. The full signal is present 
as can be seen.
As with the VDU case, Daneifels and Smulders papers don’t fully answer the question 
about the level o f vulnerability o f a modem day high speed cryptographic processors 
although they do suggest that a problem may exist. In the case o f a cryptoprocessor 
there are other factors to consider which complicates the attack. For example, the data 
in the cryptoprocessor is not transferred between subsystems in serial format. As a
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result, a lot o f different bit changes would be picked up at once increasing the level 
o f difficulty o f the attack. Also due to it's highly parallel architecture, a lot o f other 
operations occur at the same time as those o f the key operations and hence cause a 
lot o f noise on the waveforms detected. Using power analysis techniques however, it 
should be possible to reduce these complications considerably19.
In 2000 Jean-Jacques Quisquater and David Samyde took Smulders and Danfelles re­
search a step further and applied the idea to cryptographic smartcards. They presented 
their results at [11] where it was shown that the techniques used by Kocher in [10] 
could be modified to include van Eck monitoring. These modified attacks were re­
ferred to as Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA) and Differential Electromag­
netic Analysis (DEMA) and collectively as Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA). These 
names are obviously variants o f simple power analysis, differential power analysis and 
power analysis respectively.
The ideas presented at [11] were then later expanded upon in [72]. The ability of the 
SEMA method to determine the Hamming weight o f a word o f data was explored and 
was found to be possible. As before, this may lead to the possibility o f a decreased 
effort brute force attack. It was also pointed out that even though smartcards are pro­
tected against many attacks using methods such as tamper resistance it is not possible 
to detect an EMA attack in this way.
Although Quisquater and Samyde showed that it was possible to pick up these radiated 
emissions, they did not produce any results o f an actual attack. However, in 2001 at the 
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) conference in Paris, France, 
Gandolfi et al. provided some “concrete results” o f an actual attack [28]. The attacks 
were carried out on three different cryptographic implementations. The algorithms at­
tacked were DES, an alleged COMP 128 (see [73]) and RSA. The EM radiation was
19This does not guarantee success however as will be seen in the next chapter.
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picked up with the homemade coil shown in figure 3.10 (taken from [28]) which ap­
parently produced the best results out o f a number o f antennas tested.
Figure 3.10: Coil used by Gandolfi et al. to carry out EMA attacks on a number of smartcards.
Although it is reported that the key was successfully recovered from each o f the imple­
mentations, very little information is given about the attack on RSA and it is unclear 
how the key was obtained in this case. As mentioned in chapter 2 the methods used to 
obtain the key from a DES implementation and an RSA implementation differ slightly. 
As well as this, there are a number o f methods an attacker can use to break the RSA 
system.
The main conclusions from Gandolfi et a l’s paper show that in general EMA is as 
powerful (if not more so in some cases) than and ordinary power attack. It was pointed 
out also that a SEMA attack is generally not the same as an SPA attack and that an 
implementation protected against the latter may not be protected against the former. 
The localisation properties o f EMA was noted as an advantage over normal power 
analysis. Whereas power analysis shows the combination o f  all the different signals o f 
the system in one waveform, the electromagnetic sensor can be localised to a position 
where the signal is strongest thus filtering out any unwanted emissions.
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At about the same time, Josyula Rao and Pankagi Rohatgi produced a preliminary re­
port on the leakage o f compromising information through EM side channels [74]. Rao 
and Rohatgi discuss a number o f “bad” instructions that leak a lot more information 
in the EM side channel than through the power fluctuations which may be exploited 
to circumvent certain countermeasures to power analysis. It is stated in this paper that 
SEMA attacks can be successful against systems where SPA attacks fail. This confirms 
the results o f Gandolfi et al. in [28].
Rao and Rohatgi used some o f the information from the declassified TEMPEST doc­
uments found at [50, 52]. The main idea noted from these documents was that the 
information was not only available at the fundamental frequency o f the information 
being processed but was also available at each o f it’s harmonics. The harmonics, being 
higher frequencies radiate with a lot more efficiency than the fundamental and thus 
pose a greater threat. The signals captured at the different frequencies generally con­
tain different information and by using techniques from multivariate statistical analysis 
they can be combined in such a way that the information leaked is much greater than 
any one signal alone.
At CHES 2002 Dakshi Agrawal, Bruce Archambeault and Josyula R. Rao published 
extended results o f Rao’s preliminary results [32]. The full report o f [74] and [32] can 
be found at [75]. The ideas presented in this paper are similar to those found in the 
others however more details o f setup are given etc. It is interesting to note that this is 
the only paper that reports a successful attack on a cryptographic accelerator although 
no details o f the attack are given.
3.4 Summary
This chapter discussed the idea o f attacking electronic systems using the electromag­
netic radiation which they produce. It initially looked at some background theory on
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the causes o f the radiation and a number o f models were discussed which allow an 
approximation o f the level o f radiation emanating from a device. It was seen that there 
are two main forms o f radiation: differential mode and common mode radiation. The 
former is the easiest to protect against as it can be reduced greatly by proper layout 
and design. However the latter is more difficult to prevent but is really only a problem 
at lower frequencies due to it’s 20dB/decade roll off above the cutoff frequency.
Next the TEMPEST program was briefly discussed. It was seen that Government 
organisations have been aware o f the compromising radiated emissions for some time 
and at present are far more advanced than the current state o f the art in the public 
domain. Most o f the information found by Government organisations has been fully 
classified and as a result it is quite difficult to find any useful information.
The state o f the art in public domain research was then discussed and although still in 
it’s early stages, it has shown that a problem does exist. The research initially began by 
studying high voltage devices such as VDUs but was later extended to include ISDN 
lines and smartcards. Only one source o f research was found in which a cryptographic 
accelerator was attacked. Although it was claimed that this attack was successful, no 
details were given.
To determine whether or not the DUT was vulnerable to these attacks a number of 
experiments were setup. The next chapter discusses not only these experiments but 
also those used for the power attacks described in chapter 2. It will be seen that that 
although successful in simulated and emulated setups, the attacks against this particular 
DUT in fact failed to produce the desired results.
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Experimental Setup and Results
The last three chapters gave an introduction and a theoretical grounding for the side 
channel attacks studied in this thesis. The experimental setup used to carry out these 
attacks was based around this theory and is outlined in this chapter. The problems en­
countered will be discussed as will the solutions devised to overcome them. The results 
o f the experiments will be presented and it will be seen that not all were successful. In 
particular, the attacks against the DUT failed in all instances but were in fact success­
ful in simulations and in a microcontroller design that emulated the operations o f the 
DUT (thus proving that the fundamental techniques were correct). The microprocessor 
used was similar in structure to those found in most smartcards and therefore provided 
comparison with experimental results already reported. A number o f possible reasons 
for the failure o f the attacks against the DUT are suggested throughout the chapter and 
suggestions o f how an adversary may improve on the techniques are given1.
4.1 Initial Problems
On beginning this research, little or nothing was known about the techniques or theory 
involved. The whole area o f cryptography was new and it was clear that some basic 
understanding was needed before an experimental setup could be devised. Initially 
there was very little equipment available however there was a limited budget that was
JIt must be noted that failure is considered a positive result in this case as the aim of the experiments 
was to determine the level of vulnerability of the device, and within the limits of the experimental 
capabilities, it appeared to be secure.
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used for its purchase. Due to this limited budget, the equipment had to be chosen 
with care - this meant balancing performance with cost. In order to allow an effective 
balance, it was necessary have a comprehensive theoretical grounding in the relevant 
areas and to then do a full product review. It is generally the case that theoretical 
aspects are harder to grasp without having access to equipment to experiment with. 
This was especially true with this particular research where the element o f uncertainty 
was fairly large. It was very difficult to know exactly what type o f filters, amplifiers 
etc. were needed until some initial experiments were carried out. However, due to 
the limited budget these experiments could only be setup once a theoretical knowledge 
was gained so it was a sort o f “catch 22” situation.
Unfortunately, a prototype o f the DUT was not acquired for quite some time which 
greatly hindered the progress also and by the time it was received (and its functionality 
understood), a limited amount o f time was left. The cryptographic module itself was 
a very complex piece o f equipment and a full understanding o f it was not possible (or 
necessary) in this situation. When the board was initially received a brief explanation 
o f its operation was provided, however there was still quite a bit o f background theory 
that was required to understand this explanation. Despite this, experiments were begun 
as soon as the DUT was brought back to the laboratory. The experimental setup was 
without a doubt the most troublesome and difficult part o f this research.
Experiments began by considering the TEMPEST issue. This was chosen first because 
a relatively greater understanding o f communication theory and electromagnetics was 
possessed than that o f cryptography. In hindsight, this was a very naive attitude for two 
reasons. Firstly, both attacks (power analysis and electromagnetic analysis) required a 
firm understanding o f cryptography and secondly, TEMPEST techniques were nearly 
all classified and very little information (experimental or theoretical) could be found. 
On the other hand, power analysis was becoming a very popular area o f research and
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there was a great deal more information available which would have provided an es­
sential guide in those early stages. By choosing to deal initially with TEMPEST a lot 
o f time was wasted attempting to devise attacks that were in effect already published 
through power analysis.
4.2 Initial Setup
For the first set o f experiments, the equipment consisted o f the DUT, an EMC kit, a 
Tektronix TDS210 oscilloscope and a spectrum analyser. The DUT can be seen in 
figure 4.1. This board is the original design o f this particular model and as can be seen 
is fairly large and bulky. Although it is not made this way anymore, the operations on 
the newer versions are much the same.
The board was initially run at a clock speed o f 60MHz which caused a few problems 
as will be seen later. The main system clock is generated within the ASIC (which is 
under the ASIC fan shown in the diagram) and is not directly accessible to an attacker. 
As a result, it would be quite difficult to carry out a synchronous sampling DPA attack2 
which would decrease the time for a successful attack.
Unfortunately, throughout the experiment access to the parameters on the board (the 
key, plaintext and modulus) was quite limited. This was especially true in the early 
stages o f the experiment. Although the board was designed to be controlled by soft­
ware on a PC this facility wasn’t provided. Instead, the board was equipped with a pair 
o f removable flash PROMs that contained control software. These chips are shown in 
figures 4.1 and 4.2. The normal purpose o f the software on these chips was to ensure 
that the hardware was functioning correctly and was only run during idle periods3. It 
achieved this by calculating the value o f b m od m t where bt was a test base, et a test
2This is where the digital oscilloscope uses the DUT’s clock to synchronise the data samples of each 
waveform collected in a power analysis thereby reducing noise. More details can be found in [76].
3When the board wasn’t being used to encrypt user data.
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Figure 4.1: Device Under Test (DUT) - This is a prototype Encryption Board but is similar in 
operation to the marketed versions.
exponent and m t a test modulus and then testing the result against the actual solution. 
The actual solution was stored along with bt , et and m t on the flash PROMs. If  the 
hardware returned a different value than that stored on the chips the processor would 
notify the user that there was a problem. For this experiment however the PROMS 
were only used to instruct the board to perform an encryption.
Figure 4.2: The slots on the DUT where the flash chips are seated.
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Three sets o f flash chips were provided with the board initially, each programmed with 
a different value o f et . One value consisted o f all ones, a second of all zeros and a 
third of alternating ones and zeros. An experiment was setup to try to determine if  
it was possible to tell which exponent was being used. The initial idea was to anal­
yse the spectral content o f the radiated emissions from the board whilst operating on 
each exponent and to determine whether or not any differences existed between them. 
It wasn’t entirely clear how information was going to be extracted from these differ­
ences however their existence would have given some indication o f the possibility o f a 
successful attack.
A PCI backplane was provided to house and supply power to the board however there 
was no way o f transferring new data. Although not fully desirable, the backplane had 
three small advantages. It allowed ease o f access to the board during the measurements, 
it mostly eliminated the noise that would have been present from other components 
inside a normal PC (although its own power supply produced some fairly noisy signals) 
and it didn’t take up any valuable processor time from the PC (which was badly needed 
for the collection o f data at later stages of the experiment). The main disadvantage was 
that the board could not be controlled by the PC. This reduced the extent to which the 
experiment could be automated thus increasing the time for an attack. It also prevented 
testing the board against attacks that required random inputs.
To set up an initial experiment, it was necessary to obtain some sort o f antenna, ampli­
fier and a spectrum analyser. Fortunately an EMC kit was available that was designed 
especially for EMC testing. Its purpose was to allow companies to ensure compliance 
o f newly designed products with the European Union directives (governing radiated 
emissions) before sending them to an approved testing facility. The probability o f fail­
ure (and further testing at a later stage) would then be minimised and development 
costs would be reduced.
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The kit is shown in figure 4.3 and consists o f five antennas and a battery operated, 
shielded amplifier. A close up o f the antennas can be seen in figure 4.4. Three of 
the antennas are loop antennas which pick up magnetic fields while blocking electric 
fields. The other two antennas (the ball probe and the monopole) are used for picking 
up electric fields while blocking magnetic fields. The size o f the antenna determines 
its localisation properties. The smaller the antenna the more accurately the source of 
the radiated signal can be found. If  the source o f the compromising radiated emissions 
were to be localised to a specific area, then by using the smallest antenna at precisely 
that area, the time for an EMA attack would be reduced. This is due to the fact that the 
antenna itself would act as a filter o f the surrounding noise whilst passing the signal o f 
interest.
►
i
Figure 4.3: The EMC kit used to capture and amplify the radiated emissions emanating from 
the DUT.
The amplifier is shown in figure 4.5 and as mentioned was battery operated by design. 
The purpose o f this was two fold. Firstly, it eliminated power supply noise and other 
noise that would normally be picked up by the connecting wires. The second advan­
tage was that it allowed for mobility. Although elimination o f the noise was highly
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Figure 4.4: Five antennas lined side by side for comparison. The three loops pickup magnetic 
fields while blocking electric fields, while the ball and the monopole pick up electric fields 
while blocking magnetic fields. The different sizes allow for more (smaller) or less (larger) 
precise localisation of the offending emission.
desired, the batteries turned out to be more o f a hindrance than a help as they kept 
running out o f power during the acquisition o f data (which in most cases took more 
than 24 hours to complete). Even if  the batteries managed to retain their power to some 
extent, the amplification decreased slightly causing erroneous results. As a very crude 
solution, two pieces o f wire were soldered to the supply terminals for connection to a 
power supply. This allowed continuous acquisition o f data without fear o f the batteries 
running low.
The bandwidth o f the amplifier (and the antennas) was approximately 600MHz with 
its lower cutoff at around 300Hz. It was very desirable that the amplifier block the 
DC component without blocking any o f the lower frequency components because (as 
will be seen later) these components provided a lot o f information about the sequence 
o f events on the board. The gain of the amplifier was 20dB over the pass band which 
wasn’t ideal due the very low amplitudes o f the radiated signals. However at that stage 
no other amplifiers were present. No filters were used for this particular setup as it was
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Figure 4.5: 20dB shielded amplifier designed for EMC measurements, 
unclear where the signals o f interest were located.
The spectrum analyser used was an Anritsu 2661 A. This allowed inspection o f signals 
from 9kHz to 3GHz to be viewed with a maximum resolution o f 1kHz bandwidth. The 
emissions at different positions on the board were initially measured directly using 
the analyser along with the antennas and the amplifier. This was obviously not a very 
useful method and some way to automate the process was desired.
The spectrum analyser was capable o f being controlled remotely by a PC over a se­
rial/parallel connection or a General Purpose Interface Bus (GPIB). To this end it was 
supplied with a “programmers manual” that contained the commands used to control 
the analyser. This manual was studied initially with an attempt to control the analyser 
remotely. Some basic commands were sent through the serial connection in order to 
perform simple actions such as setting the frequency span or resolution bandwidth of 
the analyser. Although these commands worked as expected, an easier method o f ac­
complishing this was reviewed. After a discussion with a colleague, it was decided 
that the hitherto unheard o f program Labview seemed perfect for the job.
Labview is a graphical programming language developed by National Instruments
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[11]. It is a fairly user friendly package with all the capabilities needed to control 
the spectrum analyser and to analyse the data4. Programs in Labview are known as 
virtual instruments (vi’s) as they are built to resemble actual hardware such as an os­
cilloscope or spectrum analyser. A powerful capability in Labview is the ability to 
create “subvi’s”. These are also v i’s however they are used within a larger vi. This 
allows for a modular design o f large and complicated programs. There are two main 
sections to a vi - the Front Panel and the Block Diagram. The former is the user inter­
face and acts similar to a real control panel on an oscilloscope or spectrum analyser. 
The Block Diagram is the inner workings o f the program and would be analogous to 
the electronics within the oscilloscope or spectrum analyser.
After learning the basics o f Labview, a program was built to control the spectrum anal­
yser. Initially it was attempted to use Labview to send the commands to the spectrum 
analyser and a way was found to do this. However, a far easier solution was sim­
ply to download the Labview drivers for the analyser from the National Instruments 
website [77]. These were simply pre-packaged subvi’s containing the commands for 
controlling the analyser. From the users point o f view, they were a series o f “black 
boxes” which accepted the required configuration data (such as resolution bandwidth 
etc.).
The Front Panel o f the particular vi used for controlling the spectrum analyser was 
rather bare compared to most due to the fact that the initial parameters set had no need 
to be changed in future runs o f the program. As a result it is not shown here but a 
different example o f a Front Panel and its corresponding Block Diagram are given in 
section 4.3.2 (figures 4.19 and 4.18).
The final experimental setup for this particular part o f the research is shown in figure 
4.6. Each antenna was connected to the EMC amplifier using a 50 Q coaxial cable.
4However at the time a greater knowledge of the mathematical package Matlab was possessed and 
the data analysis was carried out using this.
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As the impedance o f both the antenna and the amplifier were both 50 Q, this allowed 
for maximum power transfer between the antenna and the amplifier. The output of 
the amplifier was also rated at 50 Q and was connected to the 50 Q impedance of 
the spectrum analyser through a coaxial cable so the complete system was matched. 
Although no filters were used at this stage the amplifier and antenna setup produced a 
bandlimited signal, however it was doubtful that much information was lost as a result.
Antenna (loop/monopolc)
Cryptographic Accelerator
Electromagnetic Field H g F  Captured signal
Coax
Amplification and 
Filtering Stage
m
»
PCI Backplan«;
CD >Ï30.^ 3
Anritsu 2661A 
Spectrum Analyser PC with Matiab and Lab view
Spectrum of Signal 
GPIB
Figure 4.6: The initial experimental setup. The antenna was used to pick the magnetic (loop) 
or electric (monopole/ball probe) field energy surrounding the board. This was then amplified 
and passed into the spectrum analyser. The analysers measurements were then sent over GPIB 
to a PC for analysis with MATLAB.
As shown, it was decided to connect the analyser to the PC using the IEEE-488 stan­
dard (also known as GPIB). This allowed for much faster transfer rates than either 
the serial or parallel connections. The GPIB standard was originally developed by 
Flewlett-Packard in the 1960’s and was known as HPIB. Using GPIB, the PC can con­
trol up to 15 instruments and the bus cable can be up to 20 meters long [78]. However 
for this particular setup it was only required that one instrument be controlled. The 
GPIB commands were contained within the drivers downloaded from the National In­
struments website which was very convenient.
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Under the control o f Labview, the spectrum analyser was instructed to sweep a portion 
o f its bandwidth and send the results to the PC for analysis. The total frequency range 
analysed was from DC to 1GHz. Although the spectrum analyser was rated from 9kHz 
to 3 GHz, the DC value was used for convenience and the maximum value o f 1GHz was 
used simply because the antennas and amplifier had a bandwidth o f only 600MHz (al­
though this was the 3dB bandwidth, components could still be identified far beyond 
this frequency however it was understood that these were not correct measurements). 
Setting the frequency span o f the spectrum analyser to 1GHz (beginning at DC and 
ending at 1GHz) would have been useless as in order to set a realistic sweep time5, the 
resolution bandwidth had to be set to about lOMhz. This meant that only components 
greater than 10MHz apart could be separately identified. To overcome this, the Lab­
view program was setup in a loop so that a reasonable span was swept in each loop. On 
each subsequent loop, the end frequency used for the previous span was set as the start 
frequency for the next. This allowed resolutions o f up to 1kHz to be used if desired. 
It was not necessary to have this high resolution and for the first few loops it was set 
to 3kHz. The resolution and the frequency span were then increased in steps as the 
frequency was increased.
The program was run a couple o f hundred times for each key and each set o f results 
averaged. The spectra captured whilst processing the key’s with all zeros and alternat­
ing ones and zeros were then subtracted from that captured whilst processing the key 
consisting o f all ones. The idea was that any spectral content present in one key that 
wasn’t present in the other keys would manifest itself in the difference trace. At the 
time this experiment was carried out, the idea o f power analysis had not been studied. 
It was only realised later that a similar idea was used in the time domain for power 
analysis.
5 The time it takes for the analyser to sweep from the start frequency to the stop frequency.
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Although the idea sounds simple enough, due to extensive frequency drifts, the differ­
ence spectrum contained values that were not zero when they should have been. This 
greatly affected the programs operation. It was decided then to plot the spectra on 
the same graph and to analyse the results manually to try to identify any differences 
in the spectral content. However, although a great deal o f time was put into this, no 
differences were found and all three signatures appeared to be the exact same. It is 
very likely that this wasn’t really the case, however due to the limits o f the equipment 
available no differences were observed.
As an example, figure 4.7 shows the fundamental clock frequency captured using all 
three keys. It can be seen here that the signal contains sidebands which may or may 
not be data modulated onto it and may in fact only be phase noise. A close up of 
the graph revealed the frequency content to be the exact same for each signal and this 
didn’t reveal much information due the missing phase information.
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Figure 4.7: This is the fundamental frequency of the 60MHz clock. There appears to be 
sidebands on either side of it which may have contained information.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the second and third harmonic o f the clock. It can be seen that 
the second harmonic is actually larger than the third which is not normally expected for
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a square wave and only odd harmonics should exist. One possible reason for this can 
be seen from equation 3.5 in chapter 3 where the duty cycle o f the signal determines 
the level o f the harmonics. If the duty cycle is not exactly 50% then the signal may 
contain even harmonics which may be larger than the odd harmonics. This can be seen 
in figure 3.4.
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Figure 4.8: The second harmonic of the 60MHz clock. This is actually larger than the third 
harmonic which suggested that the clock did not have a 50% duty cycle.
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Figure 4.9: The third harmonic of the 60MHz clock.
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Signals with sidebands were o f a particular interest as these may have been modulated 
with the key data. O f particular concern were harmonics o f the 60MHz clock fre­
quency. Although these were noticed, it was not clear whether or not these sidebands 
contained useful information. As will be seen an experiment was setup to determine 
this however no useful results were obtained.
4,3 Power analysis
Having failed the initial electromagnetic analysis it was decided to try to analyse the 
power being consumed by the board. A number o f problems needed to be resolved 
before this could be accomplished. The first problem was that o f accessing the power 
signal o f the board. As mentioned, the DUT was connected to a PCI backplane with 
no easy way o f connecting a small resistor in series with the ground connection (as is 
generally the procedure when attacking smartcards). At first it was considered building 
some form of extension that would allow a resistor to be placed in series with the 
ground line, however a commercial product was found that allowed measurement of 
this power without any resistor. The device can be seen in figure 4.10 and is known as 
a universal extender board. This board sits between the PCI backplane and the DUT 
as shown in figure 4.11 (this picture also shows the PCI backplane used to operate the 
DUT).
The extender board was purchased from Ultraview Corporation [79]. It is generally 
used for testing newly designed PCI boards as it allows (amongst other things) power 
consumption limits to be placed on the board under test thereby saving irreparable 
damage should a fault occur. It is referred to as a universal board simply because it 
caters for both 3.3V and 5V PCI environments as well as catering for 32 and 64 bit 
boards. It was purchased for this project as it also allows ease o f measurement o f the 
power consumed by DUT.
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Figure 4.10: Extender Board used to measure the power consumption. The DUT sits on 
top of this. The third slot in the top left hand comer allows observation of the 3.3V power 
consumption (which is of concern here) with respect to ground (the slot two to the right of it).
Figure 4.11: Side view of the PCI backplane holding the extender board and the cryptographic 
module.
With the problem o f accessing the power fluctuations solved, the next problem was 
the measurement o f these fluctuations. The oscilloscope that was initially available 
was a Tektronix TDS210. This had a bandwidth of 60MFIz and a maximum sample 
rate o f lG Ss-1 . The DUT was run while inserted in the extender board and the power
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drawn from the supply measured. Initially nothing was observed but a large DC signal, 
however once AC coupling on the scope was enforced, the power signal became clear.
It was desired (as before) to transfer the information to the PC for analysis. A program 
called Wavestar was supplied with the oscilloscope. This allowed the displayed trace 
to be transferred to a PC over a serial link or GPIB and was initially used to save the 
effort o f having to write a program in Labview to do the same thing.
It became clear almost straight away that the oscilloscope and the software were not 
good enough for the job at hand. Although the waveform was transferred to the PC, it 
was quite awkward to capture the actual data values into a file for processing by Matlab 
or Labview. It could be copied and pasted without a problem but this was o f no use for 
an automated setup. Another problem was the fact that the data only contained 2,500 
points. This was an extremely low number o f points and was absolutely no use in a 
power attack6. The sample rate o f the scope was determined by these data points using 
the following equation
/ .  =  —  (4.DJ 8 10 x  tb V
where tb is the timebase o f the oscilloscope measured in seconds/division. The 10 is 
derived from the fact that there are 10 divisions on the oscilloscope. As a result there 
was very little control over the sample rate and none over the amount o f points that 
were taken.
Using equation 4.1 it might be considered that the minimum time base setting would 
have been 250ns per division however the oscilloscope used an interpolation algorithm 
and could actually reduce the value o f tb to 5ns per division however the sample rate 
is still only lG Ss-1 . Aliasing is avoided due to the fact that the analog bandwidth is 
only 60MHz which is well below the theoretical maximum value o f 500MHz (half the 
maximum sampling rate).
’In fact, as will be seen later, the number of points captured in the final setup was 3,000,000!
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Even though a better oscilloscope was needed, a small amount o f information could be 
gained from the TD S210 by analysing the waveform displayed however a proper attack 
would never have been achievable. As well as the extremely poor 2,500 acquisition 
points its 60MHz bandwidth would have filtered out most o f the harmonics o f the 
DUT as its clock speed was also 60MHz as mentioned.
Although there were higher bandwidth oscilloscopes available, there was never the 
right combination o f features that would allow for a power analysis. It was decided 
that a new oscilloscope should be purchased. An initial search showed that the prices 
o f the scopes with the right specifications were beyond the budget that was available. 
Even at the these prices the specifications weren’t ideal. After some more searching, a 
company called Gage Applied Inc. was found that produced hardware digitisers [80]. 
These are basically oscilloscopes that fit into the PCI slot o f a PC. The specifications 
were excellent and almost perfect for this experiment, however it was still beyond the 
budget available. One o f the boards real time sample rates was 2GSs-1 and had an 
external clock input which would have allowed for a synchronous attack. Both of 
these specifications would have reduced the time for an attack immensely.
The main cost factor in high speed digitisers is the speed o f the memory. If  a board 
samples at 2GSs-1 then the memory has to have an access time o f at least l/2 G S s-1 =  
500ps. Memory o f this speed is extremely expensive and adds heavily to the cost 
of the digitiser (or oscilloscope). Luckily however, a way was found to sample at 
2GSs-1 without needing such high speed memory. After a review of some of the other 
products on the market, it was discovered that National Instruments also produced high 
speed digitisers. Unfortunately the specifications weren’t as advanced as some o f those 
from Gage Applied Inc., however a digitiser was found that was capable o f sampling 
at an effective maximum sample rate o f 2.5GSs-1 even though its Analog to Digital 
Converter (ADC) was only capable o f sampling at a maximum rate o f lOOMSs-1 .
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This was achieved using a technique known as Random Interleaved Sampling (RIS) 
which is a form of Equivalent Time Sampling (ETS) (see [81] for more information on 
ETS).
RIS allows for sampling rates o f up to 25 times the maximum sampling rate of the 
ADC. O f course this performance comes at a cost - the signal being sampled must be 
periodic. Initially it was considered that this would be useless as generally the key 
data being attacked was not periodic. However, if  the same values are calculated over 
and over then the waveform itself would be (in effect) periodic and RIS would work. 
The sample rates allowed using RIS were integer multiples o f the maximum real time 
sample rate1. These integer values were known as oversampling factors.
The specific digitiser used was the N I5112 and is shown in figures 4.12 and 4.14 along 
with a block diagram in figure 4.13. At the time of purchase, this was the highest 
quality high speed digitiser on offer by National Instruments. It had a resolution of 
eight bits which wasn’t ideal however to increase this value and keep all other aspects 
equal would have increased costs significantly.
One o f the advantages o f the N I5112 was that it had 16MB o f onboard memory. This 
allowed a record length o f 16 million samples and can be compared to the 2,500 of­
fered by the TDS210. As the waveforms collected from the digitiser were sampled at 
very high rates, it was necessary to have such deep onboard memory if any reasonable 
time slice was to be obtained. The digitisers vertical input range was adjustable from 
±25m V  to 25V. This allowed voltages as small as 50mV/28 «  200/¿V to be identified. 
According to Messerges et al. the average amplitude o f the bias spikes in the differen­
tial trace (for the particular setup reported in [24]) was 6.5mV. Although it was highly 
unlikely that the same value would be observed for the DUT, it was assumed that it 
wouldn’t have been much different. As a result, eight bit resolution should have been
7The real time sample rate was that of the ADC.
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Figure 4.12: Close up ofNI5112 digitiser. The three BNC connectors are channels 0, 1 and 
an external trigger. There is also and SMA connector.
sufficient (especially with some amplification).
The fact that the card was based on the PCI bus architecture was initially considered 
an advantage as it would have allowed much faster data transfer rates than the GPIB 
connection used previously. However, as will be seen later, the greatest hindrance to 
speed in this whole setup was the RIS mode and in some cases required up to four days 
to collect one portion o f data.
4.3.1 Initial SPA Setup
Having obtained the extender board and the N I5112 digitiser, a power analysis experi­
ment was setup. SPA was the obvious choice for a first attack and even though it was 
highly unlikely to reveal any secret information, some noticeable correlation between 
the power waveform and the theory o f operation was expected. The information gained 
would then assist in the experimental setup for a DPA attack.
Figure 4.15 shows the setup used for the attack. It can be seen that the DUT slots into 
the universal extender board which allows measurement o f the power consumption.
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Figure 4.13: Block diagram of inner workings of the NI5112. As can be seen there are two 
input channels as well as an external trigger channel. The input impedances are switchable 
between 50fi and lM il
Figure 4.14: All three PCI boards placed side by side for comparison. From left to right: 
DUT, Extender Board and NI5112 digitiser.
The measured signal is then passed to an amplifier and filter stage which is then passed 
to Labview for display. No mathematical analysis was performed (or required) at this 
stage as the appropriate software hadn’t been written.
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I Amplification and Filtering StageExtender Board Power Consumption Signal Amplified and Handlimiied Signal
N 15112 Digitiser
Coax Coax 5 § 1
PCI Backplane
Figure 4.15: Block Diagram o f DPA setup.
As mentioned in section 2.5 the board implemented a version of Montgomery’s algo-
was the left to right square and multiply and therefore the hardware operated on each 
bit individually, starting with the LSB. The multiplication operation (see table 2.7) was 
performed for every bit regardless o f its value8. If the value o f the bit was a 1 a reg­
ister update occurred, however this did not take up an extra clock cycle as might be 
expected. Due to this fact, it is unlikely that a timing attack (see [82]) would have been 
successful against this board as equal lengths o f time were required to operate on a 1 
and a 0. The performance o f the multiplication on every round and the fact that an 
extra clock cycle was not needed for the register update were both part o f the possible 
reasons that the attacks were unsuccessful.
8In smartcards this generally would not have been the case due to a lack of resources.
rithm for modular exponentiation. This basically meant that it calculated the value o f 
be mod m  without the need for division. The particular version o f the algorithm used
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The multiplication operation took exactly
N c =  2 x (N b +  2) +  1
(4.2)
=  2 x (2174 +  2) +  1 =  4353
clock cycles, where N c is the number o f clock cycles and JVb is the number o f bits in 
base (which was 2,174 in this case). The board was running at a speed o f 60MHz so 
this meant that the length o f time for one multiply was
4353 =  72.55/is.60 x 106
The number o f bits in the exponent was N e =  2,176 so the total time for one complete 
exponentiation was
72.55 x 2176 «  158ms
Having calculated this result, it was hoped that the power waveform would show some 
relationship to it. As mentioned, on the initial measurement any fluctuations were 
hidden amongst the relatively large DC component. Once this component was filtered 
out the waveform o f figure 4.16 was observed. From the figure it can be seen that 
the width o f the pulse was exactly as calculated. This proved beyond doubt that this 
waveform represented one complete encryption operation. Knowing the shape of the 
pulse and its duration, it was possible then to carry out an DPA attack, as the rising 
edge o f the pulse could be used as a trigger.
The pulse o f figure 4.16 was captured using a sample rate o f lM Ss-1 and exactly
250,000 sample points were collected9. This gave a time period o f 250ms. If  this same 
waveform had been captured with the maximum real time sampling rate o f the digitiser
9It was realised that aliasing would occur with this setup however the method was just to show that 
the pulse length was as calculated.
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Figure 4.16: This is a 158ms pulse in which one complete encryption is performed. The 
amount of memory needed to capture this entire waveform at lOOMSs-1 would have been 
impractical, so only sections of it were sampled for the attack.
(lOOMSs-1), the number o f points required would have been 25 million! The onboard 
memory o f the digitiser was 16MB so it would have been impossible to collect this 
number o f sample points. As a result it was realised that to carry out a DPA attack 
some sort o f “sliding window” method would need to be used.
It was interesting to note the time between encryptions and to see this a much greater 
number o f data points were collected. Figure 4.17 shows the results, where it can be 
seen that the time between the start o f one encryption and the start o f the next is 8 12ms. 
This is an extremely long length o f time for a cryptographic accelerator to have to wait 
between encryptions. However, as these particular operations were only run as tests, 
this didn’t affect the operation o f the board.
Another waveform was then collected at lOOMSs-1 . This time the number o f points 
was greatly reduced. Each operation on the exponent bit was visible to an extent, 
revealing information about the length o f time it takes to perform. The time between 
exponent operations was seen to be 72.55/xs as calculated above.
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Figure 4.17: Two encryption pulses showing the time difference between encryptions.
Although it was attempted to use RIS to capture some o f the waveform, the pulse edge 
wasn’t steady enough to allow a this to work. As a result the maximum sampling rate 
available was lOOMSs-1 . This was a problem as aliasing would occur if  the signal 
contained frequency components over 50MHz. To prevent this happening a 45MHz 
bandpass filter was used to block any signals above this frequency. It was realised that 
there was a good chance that a lot o f information would be filtered out however it was 
carried out for completeness.
4.3.2 Simulated setup
Before attempting a DPA attack, a new Labview program had to be written that would 
implement the analysis o f the data. Once the program was written it was necessary to 
test its functionality. To this end, another Labview program was written to simulate 
the waveforms produced by the DUT. It wasn’t necessary for the simulated waveforms 
to exactly model those produced by the DUT (which would have been extremely diffi­
cult), however they did have to have a number o f things in common as will be seen.
As discussed on a number o f occasions, a power attack generally involves sending a
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large number o f plaintext (or ciphertext) inputs to the cryptosystem being attacked and 
analysing the resulting power fluctuations. It was therefore necessary that the simu­
lation produced waveforms containing the same key information every time, however 
the noise had to be random.
The waveform was not only to include sources o f noise such as external and thermal 
noise, but it was also to include algorithmic noise10. This was noise caused by the 
manipulations o f the data received (i.e. the message to be encrypted) and would be 
different for different values o f the plaintext. If  the same plaintext were received on 
each run o f the algorithm this noise would be not be reduced by averaging.
Due to the register update o f the function exp_always_mul() in figure 2.7, theoretically 
there should have been a bias spike every time the exponent bit was 1. For the key 
containing all ones, pulses should have occurred every 72.55¡is whereas for the key 
containing alternating ones and zeros it should have occurred every 2 x 72.55fis =
145.10¡is. In the last key, containing all zeros, no power spikes should have been 
observed. This was all taken into account in the simulation.
Figure 4.18 shows the Front Panel o f the main program for producing and saving the 
simulated data. As can be seen, it had a number o f controls and indicators as any 
normal physical instrument would. There were no graphs built onto this Front Panel 
as they were not needed in this case. All that was required here was for this program 
to produce a user selectable number o f waveforms for one o f the three keys. The 
simulated waves, once produced, were then saved to three separate files.
Each o f the signals sought were produced without any noise (which was added later). 
For the exponent containing all ones, a pulse was produced every 72.55/is. The width
10Messerges describes five types of noise that can occur in power waveforms: external, intrinsic, 
quantisation, sampling and algorithmic [76]. Sampling and quantisation noise were not included in the 
simulation for simplicity, however this should not have affected the programs operation provided it was 
taken into account in the actual setup.
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Figure 4.18: The Front Panel of the main vi for simulating the power waveforms produced by 
the DUT.
Figure 4.19: This is one part of the Block Diagram of Labview program for producing the 
simulated power waveform.
o f this pulse was
1 1 16.7ns
f c 60 x 106
where f c is the clock frequency. It was not known whether or not this pulse width was 
accurate but it was assumed to be approximately this value due to the register update
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lasting only one clock cycle. The exponent consisting o f alternating ones and zeros 
contained a pulse every 145.10/xs as discussed above and that consisting o f all zeros 
contained no bias spikes. The pulse widths were the same for each case.
The simulated waveform for the exponent containing all ones is shown in figures 4.20 
and 4.21. The first graph is simply the power spikes produced without any noise present 
(“noise” being any signal other than the spikes themselves). The exact shape o f the real 
spikes was unknown and the likelihood was that they were not flat pulses. They would 
generally be different for different cryptographic modules and would be determined 
by such things as internal inductances and capacitances (both parasitic and designed). 
However, the pulse shape should not have affected the simulations purpose. Figure 
4.21 shows the same signal except that this time a lot o f noise has been added. The 
noise consisted o f a number o f random sources as well as a number o f periodic sources. 
The periodic sources simulated both internal and external periodic sources that might 
have been present in a real attack. The main difference being that most o f the internal 
periodic signals will have some sort o f phase relationship with the spikes of interest 
whereas the external periodic signals will not (an example being the 50Hz pickup from 
the power supply). The internal sources would therefore not have been reduced by 
averaging.
The number o f simulated waveforms produced in each exponent was one thousand. 
As there were three exponents, three thousand files were produced for on each run of 
the program. The results o f averaging over the thousand simulated waveforms for the 
exponent consisting o f all ones can be seen in 4.22. Comparing this to figure 4.21 it 
can be seen that the noise has been greatly reduced, however it still masks the bias 
signal due to the bias signals very low level.
Autocorrelation was also used to try to pick the signal o f interest out o f the noise. 
However, the other periodic signals present within the noise were picked up instead.
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Figure 4.20: The signal here is the simulated version of what might have been produced 
(without any noise) using a key with all ones. The spikes had an amplitude of 160mV and were 
offset by -80mV. They lasted for only 16ns which was a mark-space ratio of only .01 percent 
(as the period was 72.55fis).
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Figure 4.21: This graph shows the one in figure 4.20 with an excessive amount of noise added. 
This signal can be seen to exceed ±5 V at some points and completely masks the power signal 
sought after.
This is where the differential trace (equation 2.12) helps tremendously as it will get 
greatly reduce any periodic signals not correlated with the key.
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Figure 4.22: This graph shows the quality of the signal produced using the “All Ones” simu­
lated data after 1000 averages. The noise has been reduced significantly however it still com­
pletely masks the power signal sought after.
After 15,000 averages, the waveform shown in figure 4.23 was produced. There was an 
80kHz signal that was in synchronisation with the operations o f the board. As a result 
the averaging did not reduce this waveform and it still hid the bias spikes. On the 
other hand the sources o f random noise were reduced to an insignificant level and all 
that remained was to remove the unwanted periodic signal. To accomplish this it was 
necessary to obtain a differential trace. This was done by averaging 15,000 simulated 
waveforms using the key consisting o f all zeros and subtracting this from that shown 
in figure 4.23. The resulting trace can be seen in figure 4.24 where the key data is now 
clearly visible11.
It was realised that the simulated setup was an over simplified version o f the DPA 
attack and that it would be virtually impossible to tell the key by simply looking at the 
position o f the power spikes. However, the simulation showed that software written 
to carry out a DPA attack was functioning correctly and therefore fulfilled its purpose.
11 Similar results were also obtained using the key consisting alternating ones and zeros however they 
have been omitted for simplicity.
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Figure 4.23: This graph shows the quality of the signal produced using the “All Ones” sim­
ulated data after 15000 averages. The random noise has been reduced to insignificant levels 
however a large 80kHz wave can be seen that masks the bias spikes.
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Figure 4.24: This is the differential trace produced by subtracting the average of the waveform 
produced by the key with all zeros from that with all ones. The key is clearly visible thus 
verifying the integrity of the Labview program.
The next step was to attempt an actual attack.
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4.3.3 Initial DPA attack
Having tested and verified the programs functionality, it was time to attempt a real 
DPA attack. Three main problems still remained. The first was the fact that only 
changes that could be made to the parameters o f the system were through three sets o f 
flash PROMs. Increased access had been sought at this stage however it had not been 
received due to a number o f delays. The second problem was the fact that the RIS 
mode o f the digitiser required a steady trigger. This meant that the maximum sample 
rate was lOOMSs-1 which was clearly not enough for a signal that would contain 
harmonics well past 50MHz. The third problem was the fact that the board was run at 
60MHz and that the analog bandwidth was only 100MHz. If  there were harmonics of 
the clock signal that contained information these would be filtered out.
Despite these problems a power attack was attempted. The experiment was setup as in 
figure 4.15 and the Labview program run 10,000 times for each exponent. The falling 
edge o f the 158ms pulse shown in figure 4.16 was initially used as a trigger. It was 
important therefore that this was not filtered out. At one stage, two amplifiers were 
used in succession to try to improve the results however, the lower cutoff frequency of 
the second amplifier was about 100kHz which completely filtered out the rising and 
falling edges leaving nothing to trigger off. One o f the solutions attempted was to take 
another probe from the same 3.3V output and place it into the external trigger section 
of the oscilloscope. This should have allowed triggering however the two probes in 
parallel loaded the signal too much and it ended up being more o f a hindrance. As 
a result the only amplifier that was available to use at this stage was the EMC amp 
because its lower cut-off frequency was 300Hz.
The attack was unsuccessful which was expected due to the low sampling rate, low 
analog bandwidth o f the digitiser and other problems discussed so far. Figures 4.25 
shows the average o f the waveforms collected using the key consisting o f all ones. The
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intrinsic and external noise had been reduced to insignificant levels and it was possible 
to identify the exponent operation which occurred every 72.55¡is. There was a 90kHz 
signal that was not reduced by the averaging suggesting that it was dependent on the 
operations o f the board. However, as it had nothing to do with the information sought it 
was considered as noise. A similar situation arose in the simulation and was remedied 
by obtaining the differential trace however the differential trace in this case consisted 
of just noise and no information could be found.
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Figure 4.25: Average of the waveforms produced by the exponent with all ones. There is a 
signal of approximately 90kHz effecting the reading. Each exponent operation can be barely 
distinguished as the envelope of the 90kHz signal.
One o f the main problems was the very large trailing edge seen in figure 4.25. This 
meant that the vertical range had to be set larger than was necessary. As a result the 
quantisation noise was increased and it was very possible that the bias spikes would 
be lost altogether in the quantisation process. To remedy this, the results were then 
taken at the center o f the 158ms pulse, far from the rising and falling edge. This was 
accomplished by triggering off the rising edge o f the pulse and using the trigger delay 
option to capture the center o f the pulse.
The trigger delay function is an extremely valuable resource in a full power attack.
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When the digitiser receives a valid trigger, it waits a specific length o f time determined 
by the value o f the trigger delay. Once this time has elapsed it begins to sample the 
waveform at its input. This means that an attacker can attack each section o f the wave­
form at a time by setting different values for the trigger delay and it eliminates the 
need for large amounts o f memory and processing power. In this case, it was used 
to capture a section o f the waveform that was free from any transient voltages (such 
as the rising edge o f the signal). This way the vertical range wouldn’t have to be in­
creased to capture the whole signal and there was less chance o f quantisation errors 
being introduced.
Once this new signal was captured, it was passed through a highpass Butterworth dig­
ital filter with a lower cut-off o f 200kHz. The purpose o f this was to eliminate the 
90kHz signal shown in figure 4.25. The resulting signal is shown in figure 4.26. Each 
exponent operation is clearly visible this time and the time between crests is exactly as 
calculated theoretically - 72.55/is.
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Figure 4.26: Close up of the trace obtained using the all ones key. This particular waveform 
was collected at the center of the 158ms pulse and was passed through a Butterworth high pass 
filter with a lower cut-off of 200kHz. Each exponent operation is clearly visible however its 
value cannot be identified.
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Unfortunately these improvements still didn’t reveal the secret key and it was clear 
that some modifications o f either the DUT (decrease its clock speed for example) or 
the equipment was in order. Before doing this however it seemed prudent to check the 
complete setup with a microntroller designed to emulate the operations on the DUT.
4.3.4 Emulated Setup
The failure o f the initial DPA attack was not surprising due to the reasons stated above. 
Despite this, the exact reason for the failure wasn’t known and a number o f explana­
tions were possible. Although the simulation had proven that the software was imple­
mented correctly, this didn’t account for the rest o f the setup. To determine whether or 
not the entire setup was sound, a circuit was designed that emulated the operations of 
the DUT. This circuit was a lot less complicated than the DUT but was similar to that 
used by modem day smartcards. Its main function was to implement the algorithm of 
figure 2.712.
The circuit was based around the PIC16F877 microcontroller from Microchip Tech­
nology Inc. [83]. This is a 40 pin, 8 bit CMOS flash microcontroller that can be erased 
and reloaded with a new program as desired. The pin diagram o f this device is shown 
in figure 4.27 for reference. Presently there are quite a number o f Microchip’s PIC 
microntrollers on the market (as well as microcontrollers from other manufacturers) 
however the PIC16F877 was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, a flash programmer 
was available for this particular device which saved the expense o f ordering in a new 
one. Secondly (and equally as important), the chip contained 8k x 14 words o f flash 
memory for storing the software which was more than enough for the application at 
hand.
12 Although it was realised that the version of this algorithm was implemented quite differently on the 
DUT, this wasn’t a problem. The purpose of the emulating circuit was simply to prove that the methods 
and setup were correct.
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Figure 4.27: Pin diagram for the PIC16F877 microcontroller used to emulate the operations 
of the DUT. The chip can accept and number of inputs as well as produce a number of outputs 
(as implied by the two way arrows) which can be used to control the value of the data being 
operated upon (using a switch) as well as displaying the results (using an LCD display).
Initially, it was necessary to learn the basics o f programming the microcontroller. The 
data sheet was downloaded from M icrochip’s website to get some familiarity and un­
derstanding o f the device. A number o f simple programs were then written to improve 
this understanding. Once the basic commands were mastered it was possible to design 
a circuit to carry out Montgomery’s exponentiation.
The program could have been written in either assembly language or a higher level 
language such as “C”. C was chosen because, being a high level language, it required 
less development time than would have been necessary if  assembly code had been 
used. As well as this fact, a certain level o f efficiency in C was possessed which 
helped reduce this time even further. A special C compiler had to be obtained in order 
to compile the code. The compiler used was known as C2C. This was a fairly basic 
compiler in the sense that it could only handle integer type variables. Fortunately, 
this was not a problem as number types other than integers do not exist in modular 
arithmetic.
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What was desired from this circuit was proof that the existing experimental setup was 
sound and that the value o f the exponent could be determined by measuring the power 
fluctuations. The particular attack chosen was the MESD attack (described in section 
2.5.4.1) as it didn’t require inputing random data. Although C contains a function for 
producing pseudorandom numbers, this function is far from ideal and true randomness 
is very difficult to achieve. Also, the MESD attack was the attack o f choice against the 
DUT as it wasn’t possible to send random data to this device either.
The MESD attack was one o f the most powerful attacks against the modular exponen­
tiation scheme as reported in [27] so its failure against the microcontroller would have 
suggested that a problem existed. However, if  it succeeded in revealing the secret key 
o f the microcontroller but failed against the DUT (as was the case) this would increase 
the level o f confidence in the security o f the DUT13. It was unlikely that the other 
attacks described in [27] would have been successful had the MESD attack failed.
The attack was carried out one bit at a time. The bits before that being attacked were 
assumed to have been successfully compromised and the value o f the key up to that 
point was therefore known. Each attacked bit could take on two possible values and 
the values o f the bits after it were unknown and were set to some random value. In 
order to attack each bit, the PIC was loaded with the two possible values o f the key. 
The particular key used was determined by a switch connected to the microcontroller. 
For example, to use the key value where the guess o f the bit was a 0 the switch would 
have to have been in the “OFF” position whereas to use a guess value o f 1 it would 
have to have been in the “ON” position.
The PIC was run at a clock speed o f 4MHz using a quartz crystal for optimal stability. 
This frequency was chosen because it allowed the digitiser to collect enough sample 
points without having to use its RIS mode thereby decreasing the processing time
13 However it must be pointed out that the reduced clock speed of the PIC increased the possibility of 
a successful attack for this particular setup.
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from hours to minutes. Smartcards are generally run at approximately 3.57MHz so 
this allowed it to closely emulate a normal smartcard also.
It was desired that the result o f the modular exponentiation be displayed to verify the 
circuit was functioning correctly. This was achieved using a HD44780 based Liquid 
Crystal Display (LCD)14. This device proved quite difficult to program initially but 
worked as expected once the correct handshaking procedures had been setup between 
the PIC16F877 and the LCD (along with time delays to allow the LCD time to com­
plete one task before being sent a second). It was possible to send the LCD data either 
one byte at a time or in two four bit nibbles. The second option was chosen simply 
because it involved less connections and provided room for other external components 
if  needed.
Once the circuit was fully operational, an 18Q resistor15 was placed in series with the 
ground line to allow measurement o f the power fluctuations. It was possible to place 
this resistor in series with either the power or ground line but the latter was chosen 
because the digitiser (as with all oscilloscopes) measured the voltage at a particular 
node with respect to its own ground (which was connected to the true ground o f the 
circuit). Had the resistor been connected across the power supply, two probes would 
have been needed for the same measurement - one for each side o f the resistor. It 
would then have been necessary to calculate the difference between the two waveforms 
and although an option was available to allow this calculation, it would only have 
complicated the measurement and increased the processing time for an attack. It might 
be considered that the probe tip could have been connected to one side o f the resistor 
and the ground connection to the other side however this would only have shorted the 
supply as it would then have been effectively connected directly to ground.
With the resistor in place and the probe connected, the PIC was switched on and the
u The actual device used was a Powertip PC 1602-F available from Famell electronics [84].
15The small value was chosen so as not to adversely affect the circuit.
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Labview program run. The value o f the “secret” exponent was simply l l l l 16. The 
experiment began by attacking the third bit. It was assumed that previous attacks had 
been successful and that the key up to this point was known. At this stage therefore, the 
known key value was 11??. A guess was taken at the third bit and the last bit was set to 
a zero. Under normal circumstances the value o f the remaining bits o f the key would be 
set to a random value, however for this experiment it was desired that they be different 
from those o f the “secret” key. For ease o f operation, the PIC was programmed with 
both 1100 and 1110, the chosen value being determined by the position o f a switch 
as discussed above. The program was set to run in an infinite loop (once a key was 
chosen) with one o f the output pins (RAO, see figure 4.27) being set to go high at the 
beginning o f the modular exponentiation and low at the end. This allowed for a fairly 
steady trigger signal.
Initially the value 1100 (an incorrect guess) was tested. The results o f this MESD 
attack are given in figure 4.28 where it can be seen that their is no difference in the 
power fluctuations for the secret and guessed keys up to the unknown third bit. This is 
due to the fact that the bit was incorrectly guessed. Had this bit been correctly guessed, 
the power signals would have been the same up to the fourth bit showing a value of 
zero in the difference signal up to this point. The waveform for the correct guess is 
seen in figure 4.29. Both o f these signals can be compared to the results reported by 
Messerges et al. in [27]. The results o f the two differential waveforms from this paper 
are shown in figure 4.30 for reference.
An interesting point to note is that the waveforms o f figures 4.28 and 4.29 were taken 
with absolutely no amplification whatsoever. A standard coaxial probe (x  1) was used 
in the collection o f the signals. The number o f waveforms collected for each average 
was 2000 although this was far more than was necessary. Experiments showed that the
16Although this number is a lot smaller than that used in normal cryptographic systems, this didn’t 
matter as the same operations are simply repeated for every bit.
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Figure 4.28: The difference between the average power of the secret key and that of a key with 
an incorrectly guessed bit. The values up to the attacked bit had been successfully retrieved 
and the difference in power fluctuations tend to zero up to this point.
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Figure 4.29: The difference between the average power of the secret key and that of a key 
with a correctly guessed bit. It can be seen quite clearly from the differential trace that the 
waveforms are now the same up to the fourth bit.
difference between the two was noticeable after only 50 averages o f each waveform. 
This was even lower than the results reported by Messerges et al. in [27] where at least 
200 waveforms were needed for a successful attack.
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Figure 4.30: Results of the MESD attack reported by Messerges et al.. It can be seen that 
these waveforms are very similar to those shown in figures 4.28 and 4.29.
Closer examination o f the waveforms in figures 4.28 and 4.29 shows that the time it 
took to operate on a 1 was a lot less than that o f a 0. This was to do with the fact that 
the multiply operation was not performed if the value o f the bit was a 0. A magnified 
view o f the waveform taken for the exponent 1111 is shown in figure 4.31. It can 
be seen here that each 1 bit contained two distinct sections. The first section is the 
power fluctuations caused by a multiply operation whereas the second section is that 
caused by a squaring operation. In the case where the exponent was a 0, only the 
squaring operation was performed. There was a distinct difference in both time and 
power between these two sections o f the waveform. The time difference can be seen 
with the large spikes at the end o f each exponentiation. These spikes are the result of 
coupling from a separate pin which was set to go high at the end of each exponentiation. 
This difference in time would not only have left this particular implementation open 
to a power attack but also a timing attack. In this case the difference in the time it 
takes to perform a particular operation is used to learn details about that operation 
(see [22,85-87] for more details). A close up o f the multiply and square sections o f 
the waveform is given in figure 4.32 where the difference between the two sections is 
exemplified.
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Figure 4.31: A magnified view of the power waveform obtained with the exponent 1111. The 
differences between a square and a multiply operations are clearly visible.
Multiply
Figure 4.32: The power waveforms representing the square and the multiply operation. The 
two sections are clearly distinguishable. The multiply operation took slightly longer to com­
plete than the square operation.
As a preventative measure against these power attacks it was decided to perform the 
multiplication in every round and to only update the register if  the bit in the exponent 
was a one (see figure 2.7). The results are shown in figure 4.33 where it can be seen 
that the differential trace has been reduced in amplitude but is still clearly visible. The
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processing times for each bit are almost the same but there is still a slight difference. 
This can be seen by the near alignment o f the spikes at approximately 1.7ms and can 
be compared to that in figures 4.28 and 4.29 where the time for each encryption is quite 
different.
MESOA«#*
Figure 4.33: The power waveforms and differential trace when the multiplication operation is 
performed in every round. There is still a slight time difference and the difference waveform is 
still correlated to the key.
Another test was to insert a second “i f ’ statement into the program. This time however, 
the condition tested was a 0 and not a 1 (again see figure 2.7). The body of this if 
statement contained the exact same multiplication operation as the first one however 
the results were saved to a dummy register thus the final result was unaffected. It 
was hoped that the length o f time for each operation would now be identical and that 
the only chance o f the attack succeeding was if  the data dependent power fluctuations 
contained differences.
The result is shown in figure 4.34 where it can be seen the length o f time it takes 
to process each exponent is the same. The differential trace has reduced slightly in 
amplitude again however it is still visible.
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Figure 4.34: PIC run with two if statements. One for a 1 and the other for a 0. The difference 
is still distinguishable.
As a final attempt at a solution, it was decided to implement both o f the above oper­
ations and to see how the differential trace is effected. The meant that the multiply 
operation and a register update were performed every round, regardless o f the value 
o f the exponent. The results are shown in figure 4.35 where it can be seen that there 
is now even less difference in the timing o f the two waveforms. The differential trace 
has been reduced in amplitude from the previous cases however it is still visible. This 
shows the true power o f the MESD attack. It doesn’t rely on the observations o f single 
bias peak in a waveform but allows a much clearer view o f the information.
The graphs presented here show without a doubt that the experimental setup was sound 
within the limits o f the equipment. It also showed the power o f the MESD attack 
and the reason why it is suspected that the DUT may be secure from this attack with 
equipment used here but would not be secure with an improved digitiser and a better 
amplification and filtering stage.
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Figure 4.35: These are the power waveforms from a register update only but with an if state­
ment for both the zero case and one case.
4.3.5 Final Power Attack
Having verified the setup using both the simulation and the emulation it was now nec­
essary to return to the DUT and to attempt to improve the attacks. A number of things 
were done to accomplish this.
•  The clock frequency o f the DUT was reduced to 30MHz.
•  A steady trigger signal was extracted from the board (allowing the RIS mode to 
be used and thus increasing the effective sample rate).
•  A flash programmer was obtained that would allow the chips to be programmed 
with any value desired.
•  Two new high bandwidth (80kHz - 10GHz) amplifiers were obtained.
These adjustments were great improvements to the experimental setup and a more 
realistic DPA attack could now be attempted.
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4.3.5.1 SPA
With the clock rate reduced to 30MHz (a value that was more likely to produce results 
with the available equipment), the same setup as that shown in figure 4.15 was used to 
capture the new waveform. The result is shown in figure 4.36 where the length o f the 
pulse had now increased to
4353
30 x 106 x 2176 =  2 x 72.55 x 2176
316ms
and the time for each multiplication has increased to
4353 
30 x 106 =  2 x 72.55
=  145.10/xs.
The agreement between the updated equations and the updated measurements con­
firmed exactly what the waveform represented.
now*
Figure 4.36: This is the pulse representing one complete encryption. As the clock had been 
reduced to 30MHz, the operations took twice as long to complete and the pulse width was now 
twice that of figure 4.16.
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Along with the reduction in clock frequency a new trigger signal was obtained and 
is shown in figure 4.37. This signal was retrieved from the pin o f another chip on 
the board that was set to go high at the beginning of each encryption. As can be 
seen from the figure there are five pulses each o f a different duration. Because of 
this it was feared that the digitiser might trigger off a different pulse each time. As a 
preventative measure, the holdoff option on the N I5112 was used. This option ignored 
any signals (that might have been mistaken as a trigger) for a specified time period after 
the acquisition o f a valid trigger. The particular time period used was 1ms however any 
time greater than about 100/¿s would have sufficed as the pulses lasted for a duration o f
57.5 fis. The first trigger pulse coincided exactly with the beginning o f the encryption 
operation.
Figure 4.37: Trigger signal used to allow a steady capture of the power waveform. The 
encryption began at the beginning of the first pulse. It was necessary to set the “holdoff’ 
option on the digitiser to 1ms so as not to accidently trigger off the other four pulses.
Using the trigger signal, it was attempted again to use the RIS mode o f the digitiser. 
Unfortunately, even with the stable trigger it still wouldn’t work. National Instruments 
support were contacted where it was explained that the digitiser expected an analog 
signal as a trigger for RIS mode and that the fast rise time digital signals that were 
available wouldn’t suffice. This seemed rather strange and was extremely unfortunate 
as one o f the reasons this particular digitiser was purchased was because o f its RIS
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capabilities.
Some methods were initially devised to try to overcome this problem. It was decided 
to build a low pass filter that would smooth out the rise times o f the signal. This filter 
was designed in PSPICE and its output was initially thought to be adequate. However 
after re-examination o f the trigger signals, it was noticed that the widths o f each o f the 
pulses were not constant on every encryption. This caused the filtered signal to rise and 
fall in accordance with the pulse width. As a result, this signal wasn’t stable enough to 
trigger off.
The next idea was to use a signal generator to accept the pulses o f figure 4.37 as a 
trigger and produce a smooth output. This was more o f a success than the last method 
however it was still feared that the output wasn’t stable enough for an attack17. It was 
decided at this stage to try to have another look at the subvi that controlled the RIS 
trigger configuration. After some extensive analysis a problem was found at a fairly 
low level o f the program that was preventing the pulse waveform from being accepted 
as a valid signal. This problem was corrected and the waveform was accepted as a valid 
trigger. It was unfortunate that the trigger signal was initially considered unsuitable as 
this wasted quite a bit o f time in attempting to remedy it.
With RIS finally working, it was possible to effectively sample the waveforms at a 
maximum rate o f 2.5GSs_1. This was quite adequate for the application at hand and 
it eliminated the need for an antialiasing filter as the 100MHz analog bandwidth o f 
the digitiser prevented any signals above 1GHz (half the sampling frequency) from 
passing. Unfortunately RIS mode had two major shortcomings. The first was the 
length o f time it took to collect each waveform. This time increase was extremely 
prohibitive and caused the overall acquisition time to increase from hours to days18.
17 Although RIS worked with this signal its stability was paramount. If it wasn’t stable, the sample 
points would have been misaligned on each run of the algorithm producing erroneous results.
18RIS wasn’t the only reason for this increase in time. The higher sample rates meant that the number 
of points required needed to be increased from 150,000 to 3,000,000 just to collect 1.5ms of data.
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The second shortcoming was the fact that the trigger delay option was not available in 
RIS mode. This was quite a bit o f a problem as it meant that only the initial part of 
the waveform could be analysed. This section o f the waveform was corrupted slightly 
by the transient voltage that existed at the beginning o f each encryption (i.e. the rising 
edge o f figures 4.16 and 4.36).
Another major improvement to the setup was the provision o f a flash programmer. It 
was then possible to choose any value for the base, the modulus and the exponent19. As 
it was not possible to use the trigger delay option in RIS mode, it really wasn’t possible 
to do a full power attack as different sections of the waveform could not be attacked. 
However, i f  even one bit could have been revealed, then this would have shown that 
the board was vulnerable to a full attack with some slightly better equipment.
It was decided to reduce the exponent to a more manageable value o f 16 bits (the base 
and modulus were left at 2174 bits at that stage). The values used were
ei =  1111 1111 1111 1111
e2 =  1000 1010 0100 0111
The hardware was set to detect when the leading bits o f the exponent were all 0 thus 
signifying its end. It was necessary therefore to set the MSB of each exponent to 1 in 
order for the waveforms to be the same length. For example, assuming the MSB (left 
most bit) o f e\ was a 1 then the key would be 16 bits long and the time for a complete 
encryption would be
145.10 x 10~6 x 16 « 2 .3 m s .
However, if  the MSB o f e2 was set to 0 then the time for a complete encryption with
•’However it still wasn’t possible to automate this choice and therefore random values couldn’t be 
produced in any reasonable time frame.
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this key would be
145.10 x 10“ 6 x 12 «  1.7ms.
Had the MESD attack been carried out with these values it would have appeared to 
have been successful and the result would have looked similar to that o f figures 4.28 
and 4.29 however these results would have been erroneous.
Results were taken again using these new exponent values. Figure 4.38 shows two 
full encryptions. The waveform was captured using a x 10 probe and no amplifica­
tion. Comparing this with figure 4.17 it can be seen that there is quite a difference. As 
before, the time between two consecutive encryptions is 812.5ms however the pulse 
widths have changed dramatically. Each encryption takes about 2.5ms (the 2.3ms cal­
culated plus possibly some extra overhead for loading registers etc). Due the entire 
bandwidth o f the digitiser being used, there was an excessive amount o f noise. As a 
result the peak amplitude o f the pulses appeared as if  they are just over 80mV how­
ever they were closer to 45mV in reality. Figure 4.39 shows the same graph with the 
20MHz bandwidth limit on. It can be seen now that the pulses have reduced to about 
70mV.
The next step was to magnify each pulse to see what information could be retrieved. 
Figures 4.40 shows the pulse taken at the maximum realtime sampling rate o f lOOMSs-1 
The 20MHz bandwidth limit o f the N I5112 digitiser was turned on to prevent aliasing. 
It can be seen that the pulse was almost the same length as that calculated and that each 
individual operation was quite clearly visible (however it was still possible to mistake 
this for the surrounding noise). By increasing the sampling rate using RIS the signal 
became a lot clearer and each exponent operation could be identified with little ambi­
guity as can be seen from figure 4.41. It can also be seen that the trigger signal coupled 
over onto the pulse and was made visible by the higher sampling rate.
Having reduced the key and observed the reduction in the width o f the pulse, it was
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Figure 4.38: This graph shows two complete operations. Each operation lasts about 2.5ms 
compared with the 812.5ms between operations. The pulses representing the encryptions are 
at a level of just over 80mV due to the excessive noise.
Figure 4.39: This graph again shows two complete operations however this time the band­
width has been limited to 20MHz. The noise dropped quite substantially and the pulse appeared 
to be only 70mV in amplitude.
decided to reduce the base and modulus to see what effects they would have on the 
power trace. The first change was to make all the bits o f the modulus equal to 1, the 
base equal to one less than the modulus and the key equal to any odd value. Using
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Figure 4.40: One complete encryption. This was sampled at lOOMSs-1 and was limited to 
20MHz bandwidth to prevent aliasing. Each of the 16 exponent operations could be seen with 
some clarity however it was possible to mistake them as background noise.
Figure 4.41: This particular encryption was sampled at an effective rate of 2GSs 1 using RIS. 
The 16 exponent operations are a lot more distinguishable in this case.
these values and the following characteristic o f modular exponentiation, it was known
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that the result would equal to the base:
for e odd,
(4.3)
for e even.
As the modulus was one less than the base the result therefore contained all ones (ex­
cept for the LSB which was a 0). The power waveform was then captured and the 
result is shown in figure 4.42. As can be seen, the pulse waveform has completely 
disappeared. This initially appeared very strange but some extra experiments showed 
that in fact it was consistent with the theory described in chapter 2.
Figure 4.42: Waveform collected for a modulus of all ones and a base one less than the 
modulus. The key is some odd value.
The next change made was to the key which was set to an even value. This caused the 
result to equal 1 as determined by equation 4.3. The power waveform was identical 
to figure 4.42. Therefore it was seen that the waveform was the same for the result 
being all zeros and all ones (the LSB being a 1 would have had very little effect and 
was ignored). At this stage a pattern can be seen - if all the bits are the same very little 
power is used.
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The next thing that was tried was to change the last two bits o f the base to 1001 1001 
so equation 4.3 would no longer hold. This would mean that the base was practically 
all ones and the modulus all ones however the result would be some pseudorandom 
combinations o f ones and zeros. The power waveform that resulted is shown in figure 
4.43.It can be seen that the pulse has reappeared. Before attempting an explanation 
two final tests were carried out.
Figure 4.43: The two LSBs of the base are changed to 1001 1001 so the equation 4.3 doesn’t 
hold and the result appears random.
The base was set to alternating (1010 1010. ..1010) and the modulus set to the value 
of the base plus one. The key was set to an even value which produced a result o f prac­
tically all zeros (i.e. 0000 0000 . . .  0001). The resulting power waveform is shown in 
figure 4.44. This waveform was slightly unexpected. It had the largest amplitude out 
of all the values tested so far. Although a certain pattern was emerging, it wasn’t fully 
what was expected.
The key was then changed to an odd value. This caused the result to equal the base. The 
resulting power waveform is shown in figure 4.45. This was a rather strange result as it 
was expected that this value would be greater than the previous. However a hypothesis
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Figure 4.44: Base and modulus set to alternating ones and zeros and the result is 1. This 
waveform was the largest one obtained.
Figure 4.45: Base and modulus set to alternating ones and zeros and the result is equal to the 
base. The waveform has reduced in size.
could now be put forth.
From the theory in chapter 2, it was known that current was only drawn when the 
logic gates switched from one value to another (disregarding the leakage current). It 
was seen from the first two tests that when the base and the output were the same
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value (regardless o f whether they were l ’s or 0 ’s), no noticeable power fluctuations 
were present. However when the base consists o f alternating ones and zeros and the 
output was all zeros, the pulse had its maximum amplitude. Alternating ones and zero’s 
were chosen because this would cause all the transistors to switch thereby drawing the 
maximum amount o f current. However, when the result was set to alternating zeros 
the pulse amplitude was less. It was clear then that the result somehow counteracted 
the amount o f power drawn by the base which suggested that it reduced the number o f 
logic gates that were switched. Unfortunately not enough information was possessed 
about the board to confirm this hypothesis.
Although SPA provided a lot o f information, it did not reveal the secret key in any way. 
The next thing to try was a full DPA attack which had the promise o f success due to 
the upgraded setup. However as will be seen, this was not to be.
4.3.S.2 DPA
The setup o f figure 4.15 was once again used in the final DPA attack. Initially only 
the EMC amplifier was used so as not to filter out the lower frequency content. The 
key was set back to the values e\ and e2 given above, and the base and modulus set to 
some random values (but left constant throughout the experiment). It was necessary 
that the modulus be odd for reasons discussed in Appendix B. RIS was used and the 
digitiser was set to sample at 2GSs-1 . This value was a compromise between lengthy 
processing times and misalignment o f the sampled data20. To capture a 1ms portion of 
the power waveform the number o f points required was
2GSs_1 x 1 x 10"3 =  2 x 106
20 As discussed in [76] the lower the sample rate the more possibility of the sample points of an 
asynchronous attack being misaligned.
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sample points.
The portion of the waveform that was of interest was captured using the digitiser. 
Theoretically the time slice that was required was
145.10 x 10~ 6 x 4 =  580.4/is
due to the fact that the exponents differed after three bits. However, a value of 1ms was 
captured instead to ensure that the correct portion of the wave was being analysed.
The Labview program was run 1,000 times for each key. As mentioned the length 
of time to complete this was prohibitive and prevented a lot of different ideas being 
tested. It took exactly four days to collect the data for the two exponents and the 
samples took up about 22GB of hard drive space. When the 1,000 waveforms were 
averaged they were stored into a single file and the experiment run again. This allowed
1 ,0 0 0  averages to be taken at a time.
After eight thousand averages the results were processed to produce an average of 
two waveforms and a differential trace. The two averages can be seen in figure 4.46. 
The apparent difference in offset was manually put in to display the waveforms on the 
same graph and was not an effect of the different keys. The captured waveforms were 
amplified using the EMC amplifier which allowed the lower frequency components to 
be retained. It can be seen from this figure that the time difference between the crest 
of two waves is exactly 145.10/zs as calculated above.
Figure 4.47 shows a close up of the waveform of figure 4.46. The close up is around 
about the 322p,s area and is well before the waveforms should change. As can be 
seen, the waveforms are almost identical to each other. This would seem to show that 
the RIS was performing correctly as these two waveforms were taken at completely 
different times and only began to resemble each other in this manner after about 2 ,0 0 0
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Figure 4.46: Waveforms obtained using the key consisting of all ones (top) and key with half 
ones half zeros (bottom). These were amplified using the EMC amplifier and the low frequency 
components are present acting as a guide to the occurrences of each operation. It can be seen 
that time difference between the crest of each pulse is exactly 145.10/xs which is the time it 
took for each bit to be operated upon.
averages.
m«»&* m Jm u  v zm m  xelwxu m>wau m , mos» m ,m o» m m o »  m mim
Figure 4.47: This is a close up of the waveform shown in figure 4.46 before the keys begin 
to differ. The dotted line represents the waveform produced with the all ones key and the 
continuous line is that produced by the key with half one, half zeros. As would be expected the 
waveforms are almost identical.
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It was then expected that a close up of the waveforms after about 600fis would show 
the waveforms to be different. Figure 4.48 shows the result of this where the windowed 
area is around the 160fis point. Although the waveforms were still very similar, there 
was a slight offset between them however the reason for this was not clear. It may have 
been dependent on the value of the key however no information could be drawn from 
it. The fluctuations themselves were still the same for both waveforms.
Figure 4.48: This is a close up of the waveform shown in figure 4.46 after the keys have 
differed. It was expected that the two waveforms be quite different from each other due to 
algorithmic noise etc. however this appeared not to be the case. The main difference is a slight 
offset of the two waves however it is doubtful that this reveals any information.
A strange occurrence can be seen on zooming out of figure 4.48. At certain points on 
the waveform there appears to be 20MHz beating occurring (the frequency was verified 
through spectral analysis). This can be seen in figure 4.49. This signal may have been 
caused by the RIS sampling. If the input frequency is a subharmonic of the sampling 
frequency then it will not be sampled correctly as the samples which are supposed to be 
randomly distributed, will in fact be bunched together. It is clear that the 20MHz signal 
is 1/100th of the sampling frequency however as the board is running at 30MHz it is 
unclear where this signal came from. It is likely that it doesn’t represent the operations
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running on the DUT.
Figure 4.49: 20MHz beating, probably caused by the fact that the RIS was run at 100 times 
this value.
To get rid of any periodic signals that may not have been reduced by averaging (i.e. to 
“demodulate” the power waveform and recover the “baseband” or secret information), 
it was necessary to obtain a differential trace. This can be seen in 4.50. No difference 
is observed between the first and second halves of the waveform. It was expected that 
this waveform have a similar form as the differential traces shown in figures 4.28 and 
4.30 however this was not the case.
It was unclear why no difference could be observed and it was very possible that RIS 
was at fault but it may simply have been to do with the fact that not enough averages 
were taken. Unfortunately due to the length of time it took to collect the power wave­
forms it was not possible to increase the number from 8,000. Another possibility was 
the coaxial probe used to measure the signals. It was initially suspected that there may 
have been some form of filtering or resonance taking place that affected the results 
however a number of other probes were tested and similar graphs were obtained each 
time. If the probe wasn’t at fault there was also a possibility that the EMC amplifier
141
Chapter 4 Experimental Setup and Results
*€$DAOicfe
Figure 4.50: Differential trace of the two waveforms shown in figure 4.46. A difference 
should occur at about 580.40/zs however no difference is noticed.
wasn’t function correctly. It was desired to check the frequency and phase response 
of this amplifier however the frequency range of the network analysers available in 
laboratory was too high for this particular amplifier. A simple test of applying a range 
of frequencies from a signal generator to the input of the amplifier and measuring the 
amplitude of the output was carried out to give some indication of the amplifiers fi­
delity and no problems were observed. This method however wasn’t very precise, and 
it gave no idea of the amplifiers phase response.
To be entirely sure that the EMC amplifier wasn’t at fault, it was removed from the 
setup and two Picosecond 5840 broadband amplifiers were inserted instead. These 
offered a combined gain of 44dB well above the bandwidth of interest (up to about 
10GHz) however their lower cutoff was 80kHz which blocked out the lower frequency 
components seen in figure 4.46. The equivalent graph of figure 4.46 is shown in figure
4.51.
Figure 4.51 was collected using the key consisting of all ones however the other wave­
form was identical. It can be seen here that there are a series of spikes that appear to
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Figure 4.51: Power waveform collected over 8,000 averages. This particular waveform was 
passed through the two Picosecond 5840 amplifiers which filtered out the lower frequency 
components seen in figure 4.46.
convey secret information21. Unfortunately these spikes can’t be explained by the little 
theory known about the board. They are 78//s apart which works out at 2,340 clock 
cycles. As mentioned earlier, the number of clock cycles required for one multiply on 
this particular board is 4,353 so there is no relationship between the two figures. These 
spikes can in fact be seen in figure 4.46 also. A magnified view is shown in figure
4.52. These spikes are clearly related to the operations on the board as they appear not 
to be related to the encryption operation as they fall at different point on the “humps” 
of the waveform in figure 4.46. They also occur for both keys and are eliminated in the 
differential trace. They may have something to do with some parallel operation that is 
occurring on the board but of course that is pure conjecture.
A close up of figure 4.51 can be seen in figures 4.53 and 4.54. Although there is 
information here it does not appear to coincide with the known theory of the DUT and 
no conclusions can be drawn on it’s meaning. The DUT is such a complex piece of
2'T h e cluster o f  spikes at the beginning o f  the waveform is sim ply the trigger signal o f  figure 4.37 
coupling over onto the pow er waveform.
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Figure 4.52: Magnified view of figure 4.46 showing anomalous 78^s spikes.
equipment it would require a great deal of knowledge about the board to relate each 
of these fluctuations to data operations. The fluctuation were the exact same for both 
keys so it is likely they were not related to the exponent.
1
Figure 4.53: Magnified view of figure of three spikes. There is certainly a regularity amongst 
the fluctuation however they occur for both values of the exponent and appear not to be related 
to the exponent.
The final graph shown here is the one which would normally reveal the secrets to an
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Figure 4.54: Similar view to that of figure 4.48. The waveforms for each exponent are identi­
cal again.
attacker - the differential trace. This can be seen in figure 4.55. As can be seen it 
does not appear to reveal any information. The reasons for this may be similar to those 
stated above.
Figure 4.55: Differential trace revealing no information.
Having failed to retrieve the secret exponent using DPA it was then attempted to use 
EMA. The main difference here was that the antenna probes of figure 4.4 were used
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in collecting the data. The advantages of this should have been twofold. If the prob­
lem lay in the Ultraview board (i.e. if it prevented the signals of interest from being 
observed) then this should have manifested itself as the signals were now being picked 
up through other means. Also by taking measurements in the vicinity of the ASIC, 
this should have eliminated a lot of the noise that would have been picked up using the 
oscilloscope probe thereby leading to shorter times for an attack. Again, the attacks 
failed as will be seen.
4.4 Electromagnetic Analysis
For this particular section, the setup was similar to that of figure 4.15 however this time 
instead of using a coaxial cable to measure the signal a number of antennas were used 
as mentioned. The Ultraview board was not needed at this stage and was removed 
from the circuit. The EMC amplifier wasn’t used and the two broadband amplifiers 
were used instead.
4.4.1 Emulated Setup
Before attempting the actual attack it seemed prudent to run the micrcontroller system 
again and determine if it was possible to attack this using EMA. The results are shown 
in figures 4.56, 4.57 and 4.58 where it can be seen that successful results were again 
obtained. These results were quite significant as they showed the ease with which 
this data could be retrieved using and antenna and the MESD attack. Again, 2000 
waveforms were collected to ensure success.
Figure 4.56 shows the data collected using the medium sized loop antenna of figure 4.4 
place in a horizontal position over the center of the PIC. The data was passed through 
the two 5840 amplifiers to give a gain of 44dB. Two thousand averages were taken as 
in the power analysis section. It can be seen that the results are quite clear.
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Figure 4.56: Waveform captured using the medium sized loop antenna (see figure 4.4) placed 
in a horizontal position over center of PIC. A similar result was produced for the monopole 
antenna. The value of the bit guessed at was correct as was the case in figure 4.29.
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Figure 4.57: Waveform captured using medium sized loop antenna at top of PIC (near pin 1). 
The amplitude has dropped dramatically from that of figure 4.56 however it is still possible to 
determine the value of the exponent.
Figure 4.57 show the radiation captured using the same antenna however this time it 
was placed at the top of the PIC. The amplitude of the waveform has been reduced 
dramatically. The main reason for this is because the die itself is only about 5mm
cuso-
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square and is placed at the center of the PIC casing. Despite the reduction in amplitude 
figure 4.58 shows a magnified view of the differential trace which clearly allows a 
determination of the bit value.
Figure 4.58: Close up of the differential trace of figure 4.57. Even placed a distance away 
from the source, the MESD attack was still successful.
Again the emulation verified the integrity of the setup and the next step was to perform 
the same steps on the DUT.
4.4.2 Basic Setup
With the experimental setup verified the DUT was again attacked. The experiment 
was run and 8 ,0 0 0  waveforms were averaged for the ball probe antenna and the large 
loop antenna (as this offered the greatest sensitivity to the surrounding fluctuations). It 
would have been desirable to take more averages however, as mentioned, the length of 
time to do this was highly prohibitive. The antennas were placed as close to ASIC as 
possible for maximum reception of the signal. Orientation of each of the antennas was 
very important and different signals were received for different positions.
It was necessary to be aware that the loop antennas were designed to block electric
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fields an therefore only picked up the magnetic fields. The opposite was true for the 
monopole antenna.
Figures 4.59, 4.60 and 4.61 show the results of an EMA attack on the DUT using the 
ball probe antenna which picks up the electric field. Again the results are inconclusive 
and no secret data can be extracted from them. It can however be seen that the results 
for each exponent are very similar.
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Figure 4.59: This is the waveform that was collected using the exponent consisting of all ones. 
The 78¡is spikes can be seen as “humps” on the waveform. The waveform for the half ones, 
half zeros exponent is almost identical.
The differential trace for this waveform was similar to that of figure 4.55 and it revealed 
no information.
The next steps were to try the other antennas and to place them in different positions 
on the board. Each time the results were similar to that of the ball probe. The 5840 
amplifiers were used in almost every case however the EMC amplifier was used for 
comparison on one occasion. Little differences were notices other than the amplitude. 
Although the EMC amplifier had a lower cut-off than the 5840 pair, the low frequency 
components seen in figure 4.46 were not visible due to the antenna itself acting as a
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Figure 4.60: A close up of the graph of figure 4.59 is shown here. Again it can be seen that 
the two waveforms follow each other very closely.
Figure 4.61: An even closer view of figure 4.59 verifying the similarity between the fluctua­
tions. This was the case throughout the entire waveform.
filter. All in all the results proved inconclusive and the secret exponent was unable to 
be revealed.
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4.4.3 Alternative Setup
Due to the fact that it has been shown that the data signal sometimes modulates the 
clock it was attempted to try an capture a harmonic of the clock an see if any infor­
mation could be extracted. An 85Mhz filter and amplifier were available which was 
useful as the third harmonic of the clock (90MHz) fell within its bandpass. By placing 
these components after the 5840 amplifier stage all the other signals would have been 
filtered out and the hope was that only the 90MHz harmonic and it sidebands would be 
passed.
When using the 85MHz filter and amp, the spectrum analyser was initially used to de­
modulate the signal received. The sound was turned on to allow audio inspection of the 
resulting demodulated signal. As the antenna was brought closer to the cryptographic 
processor, the audio signal increased in amplitude suggesting that a modulated signal 
was present. Unfortunately the MESD attack again produced not results.
It was then attempted to bypass the spectrum analyser and take the signal directly from 
the 85MHz amplifier. Although the signal wasn’t demodulated this shouldn’t have 
really made a difference as the power attack has an inherent demodulation scheme 
built into it. As was now expected this produced not results.
As one final attempt at and attack, a yagi antenna was obtained. This would allow 
measurements of the radiated emissions in the far field (which are true radiated fields 
and not reactive fields). However it was realised that the most success would have 
been achieved if the higher harmonics were attacked. The problem was that only the 
85MHz amplifier and filter were available. To allow measurement of the higher har­
monics a mixer and signal generator were obtained which would down convert this 
signal to 85MHz. The setup was essentially a superheterodyne structure. Although 
this appeared to work well initially repeated attempts at extracting the secret exponent 
failed.
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A picture of the general setup used for these experiment is shown in figure 4.62. Al­
though it is not optimised for noise reduction this shouldn’t have caused too much of 
a problem. Of course to improve the attack certain noise reduction measures could be 
taken such as the use of a shielded enclosure.
Figure 4.62: A picture of the general setup for the DPA attacks outlined in this chapter. 
4.4.4 Other strategies attempted
As the MESD attack didn’t work against the DUT in it’s basic form, it was attempted 
to improve the analysis using some different methods described in the literature. One 
of these was similar to a total power analysis (discussed in the next chapter). This 
involves calculating the total power in a windowed section of the waveform. The idea 
was that if the register update caused an increase in supplied power then this would 
cause the total power of the particular windowed section of the waveform in which a 
1 is operated upon to be different from that in which a 0 is operated upon. The time 
window chosen was the length of time it took for one multiplication (i.e. 145.1 ¡is). 
The window was then “slid” across the waveform and the total power calculated at 
each point. A number of peaks and troughs were noticed in the resulting waveform but 
nothing of significance.
Cross-correlation was then used as a second attempt. This involved taking a portion of
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the wave which represented on multiply and cross-correlating this with the averaged 
waveforms for each key. It was hoped that the resulting waveforms would be different 
in some way however this was not the case and the two were identical.
A spectral analysis was performed on the two averaged waveforms for each attack 
attempted and the two spectra compared. Each time little or no differences could be 
noticed.
A higher order differential power attack was then attempted. This involved taking all 
the signals collected and performing a joint MESD attack on them. To accomplish 
this two sets were created. The first set contained the waveforms representing the key 
with all ones whereas the second set were those with half one half zeros. Each set was 
averaged and a differential trace obtained. Again the results were inconclusive.
4.4.5 Summary
This chapter looked at the actual experimental setup and results. It was seen that the 
attacks worked both in simulation and on a PIC microcontroller emulation however 
they failed in every respect on the DUT. This would suggest a level of security on the 
board. Some possible reasons for this failure were given. Due to the fact that one of 
these reasons was the equipment, it should be kept in mind that it may very well be 
possible for a better equipped attacker to break this device. Because of this possibility, 
and the fact that these attacks are clearly a real threat to other new designs, some 
potential countermeasure are given next.
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It was shown in the last chapter that numerous attempts at attacking the DUT failed 
even though success was achieved with a microcontroller running a similar algorithm. 
Despite this, it is not safe to draw the conclusion that the DUT is completely secure. 
It is generally accepted that no current, practical cryptographic algorithm (or system) 
is 10 0 % secure, and constant vigilance on the part of the designers of cryptographic 
systems is necessary.
Whether or not an algorithm or system is completely secure is not something that can 
easily be proven and in most cases never has been. The cryptographic community will 
tend to accept algorithms that withstand years of attacks (such as RSA) even though 
nobody has ever proven the security of these algorithms. However, unless a solid proof 
exists, it is never safe to say that an algorithm or system is 100% secure. It is therefore 
prudent to assume that an adversary with better funding and more advanced equipment 
would be able to successfully attack this board. Due to the high probability of this 
scenario, it is necessary to consider some of the potential countermeasures that have 
been proposed in the literature.
Although each countermeasure may offer a fairly substantial reduction in the com­
promising emissions, none are perfect and no one technique counteracts all possible 
attacks. However, a well thought out combination of these and other mitigation tech­
niques should provide an increased level of protection1.
1 O f course the cost o f  this should not exceed the value o f  the information being protected.
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Any design engineer will agree that an emission problem should be resolved before it 
appears - this is standard teaching in the field of EMC. It is a lot more costly to fix an 
emission problem at the end of the design stage than at the beginning. It is therefore 
imperative that emission control (be they power, time, radiated etc.) be made part of 
the overall design process2.
Although a lot of the approaches proposed to date have been aimed mainly at smart- 
cards, the same techniques can be applied to cryptographic accelerators. In fact, it 
should be considerably easier in some cases to implement the same (and even im­
proved) strategies on these devices as they have greater flexibility in their size, speed 
and memoiy capacity.
The following chapter is split into two main sections. The first section deals with power 
analysis countermeasures and the second deals with EMA countermeasures. Despite 
this fact, a lot of the countermeasure are effective against both attacks.
5.1 Countermeasures against Power Analysis
According to Messerges et al. [76], software countermeasures are among the more 
practical techniques used to protect systems. The reason is mainly due to it’s flexibility 
which ultimately leads to low cost. Software countermeasures are also proposed by 
Kuhn et al. [6 6 ] to protect against TEMPEST attacks on VDUs as will be seen. Despite 
this however, Clavier et al. state that in order to reduce the feasibility of side channel 
attacks both hardware and software countermeasures should be used together [8 8].
Chari et al. report that most of the attacks proposed were only ad-hoc and did not 
constitute secure countermeasures [89]. The approach taken here is more of a firm 
mathematical approach where a model of the cryptosystem and it’s side-channels is
2 It is clearly not possible to envisage every problem that may occur but at least if a thorough approach 
is taken at the design stage all subsequent problems should be minimised.
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produced and lower bounds are identified. The bounds show the minimum amount of 
samples that need to be taken in order for an attack to be successful.
5.1.1 Timing Randomisation
random time delays into the software so that a power analysis will not be possible. It 
was mentioned earlier that a steady trigger is vital if a power attack is to be successful. 
This is due to the fact that the sample points must line up with each other if averaging 
is to be effective. With random delays introduced, a steady trigger will not be sufficient 
to allow the averaging to work and will therefore act as a countermeasure. Each time 
window identifying the secret parameter is effectively shifted to different points on 
the power waveform for each trace wfjk, thus reducing the effect of averaging. If the 
number of possible delays is d and each delay is equally likely then the resulting bias 
signal will not have a size of e as before but will in fact only be e/d  and there will be d 
bias signals instead of one.
Methods exist that can defeat timing randomisation and still allow the power attacks 
to be successful. Some authors report that randomisation can be defeated by signal 
processing techniques [35,89] however Messerges claims that although this is likely 
to be the case, timing randomisation is a powerful tool and with the right development 
could probably withstand any signal processing techniques. Despite this, the present 
versions are “naive” implementations and can be defeated quite easily.
One attack on timing randomisation is proposed in [76] and is known as total power 
analysis which performs the following operation on the data:
One of the methods proposed is that of timing randomisation. This involves placing
w —l
(5.1)
j = 0
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where Ptotai is the total power of the window w and A dk is the kth sample of the 
differential power waveform. In the general case the waveform with the correct guess 
will show a greater total power to the one with incorrect guesses.
Another method of attacking this method is known as a correlation attack. In this 
attack a chosen template of the power signal is used to search through the randomised 
waveform and to pinpoint the locations of the sections of code that differ for each key. 
Once the locations are known, the waveform can be arranged so that similar sections 
align up together for correct averaging. More detail can be found in [76].
5.1.2 Random Process Interrupts
A similar idea to timing randomisation is that of Random Process Interrupts (RPIs). 
This basically consists of inserting “dummy instructions” between the actual instruc­
tions of the processor. As with timing randomisation this reduces the effect of averag­
ing due to the fact that the waveforms won’t be aligned correctly at all sample points. 
RPIs are a more general case of timing randomisation as the instruction can be an ac­
tive instruction and not just a delay. An active instruction will tend to have it’s own 
power fluctuations and will therefore introduce increased levels of noise.
The difference between RPIs and timing randomisation that Messerges describes is 
that the timing delay is performed every round with equal probability for 0 to d- 1
Performing a differential power attack on a device without any countermeasure should 
produce a spike with amplitude e (as discussed in chapter 2). In order for this spike to 
be visible it must be larger than the noise that surrounds it. Therefore,
where e is the mean value of the spike, a is the standard deviation of the noise and N
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is the number of power waveforms collected in the DPA attack.
Using RPIs on a particular algorithm will have the effect of spreading the bias signal 
over k clock cycles each one being some fraction of e and the worst case value for the 
largest spike being e/k. The value k is determined probabilistically. The occurrence 
of this spike is distributed normally over the waveform and can be characterised by a 
mean value /irpi and a standard deviation orpi. As the standard deviation is the “spread” 
about the mean this implies that the bias spikes will be spread over twice this value. 
Clavier et al. show that
(Tr p i ~  y / n P (5.3)
=> k =  2  crrpi «  2y/np
where k is the number of clock cycles the bias spike is spread over, n is the number of 
clock cycles after which it would have appeared if no RPIs had been included and p is 
the probability that an RPI occurs in any particular clock cycle.
As a result of the spreading, the bias spike will be reduced in size. In order to identify 
the largest spike, as before, the following should hold
6 O
7  >  - 7 =  (5.4)k vTv7
where N ' is the number of power waveforms taken in this case.
To keep the signal to noise ratios the same for both cases the number of waveforms 
needed are
e/k
a /V N  a /V W  
=*• N ’ = k2N
(5.5)
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In other words the attack will be just as successful if k2N  power signals are collected. 
However as Clavier et al. show it is not really feasible to collect these. Assuming that 
p = 12% and n = 1600 implies that k2 = 768. Assuming also a best case scenario 
of TV =  100 this implies that N ' = k2N  =  76,800 which make the attack a lot less 
feasible.
As with timing randomisation, the RPIs can sometimes be removed with signal pro­
cessing techniques which would reduce N ' down to a more reasonable value. Two 
methods which can be used to remove them are also shown in [8 8].
5.1.3 Internal power supplies
Power supply filtering would be another method that could be used to reduce the pos­
sibility of a power attack. For example, Adi Shamir proposes building a simple capac­
itance network into each smartcard to allow the fluctuations to be contained within the 
smartcard itself and thereby preventing power attacks [90]. The proposed architecture 
is shown in figure 5.1 were it can be seen that two capacitors and a four extra diodes are 
needed. The cost of each of these would only cost a few cents extra per smartcard ac­
cording to Shamir. The problem with this method is that although it would reduce the 
possibility of a power attack, an EMA attack would still be feasible as the fluctuations 
themselves haven’t been eliminated.
Rakers et al. describe a contactless smartcard which they claim is protected against 
DPA. This is due to the fact that it uses an isolation circuit that contains a current 
source with a value “completely independent of the activity or power requirements of 
the digital circuitry”. The circuit has a value of 6 6dB of isolation which increases the 
required time for a DPA attack by a factor of 222. This is a similar idea to Shamir’s 
although it is slightly more sophisticated. More information can be found in [91].
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Figure 5.1: Detached Power supply proposed by Shamir.
5.1.4 Data masking
One of the methods proposed in [89] and [76] consists of masking the intermediate data 
(i.e. mask the input data and key before executing the algorithm). This would make 
the power fluctuations independent of the actual data. Two types of masking include 
boolean masking and Arithmetic masking.
Boolean masking using the XOR operator to mask the intermediate data. For example, 
consider a word x  that is required to be masked. Using boolean masking and a random 
mask rx the masked value is
x' = x  0  r.x• (5.6)
Arithmetic masking on the other hand uses addition and subtraction modulo 2W where 
w is the word size being operated in. Using the same values as in the last example an 
arithmetic mask would be
x' = (x -  rx) mod 2W. (5.7)
Unfortunately however Coron and Goubin pointed out that although this method works
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well for the classical algorithms such as DES and RSA, the case is not so clear cut for 
algorithms that combine boolean and arithmetic functions. These algorithms need to 
use both boolean and arithmetic type masking and therefore require a method switch­
ing between the two types. The methods proposed by Messerges for doing this is 
apparently not sufficient to prevent a DPA attack. More details can be found in [92] 
and a secure approach can be found in [93].
5.1.5 Tamper Resistance
Tamper resistance was briefly discussed in chapter 1 and seems to be a viable counter­
measure. However, as mentioned previously, it is unlikely that tamper resistance would 
protect against an EMA attack due to the fact that it is almost impossible to detect an 
the attackers antenna3.
The perfect tamper resistant device seems like an elusive goal as a cunning attacker 
will always find a new and better way to surpass the tamper resistance mechanism. 
Anderson et al. give a cautionary note in [16].
5.1.6 Fail Counters
A differential power analysis attack requires the attacker to obtain a significant number 
of power waveforms. In order to do this the attacker must have the ability to run quite a 
few encryptions on the system under attack. If the number of encryptions were limited 
to a certain number then the attacks would become increasingly difficult.
This solution may have it’s own problems also as it might be necessary to perform quite 
a few encryptions legitimately. Also if the attacker can manage to reduce noise to a 
very low level then the number of waveforms required may be reduced below the fail
3 If  the antenna were to m easure the radiation in the near field then it m ight be feasible to detect its 
presence however this could sim ply be the chassis o f  the host system absorbing some o f  the electrom ag­
netic energy.
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count number. One way of significantly reducing the number of waveforms required 
is to use synchronous sampling as described in [76],
5.1.7 Removal of conditional elements
One of the main features used to attack the square and multiply algorithm is the fact the 
it has a conditional multiplication that depends on the value of the exponent bit being 
operated upon. One suggested countermeasure is to implement this multiplication in 
every round (regardless of the value of the bit) and to only do a register update when 
the bit is a 1. Unfortunately as was seen in section 4.3.4 the MESD attack doesn’t 
rely solely on the conditional multiplication. However it does increase the number of 
waveforms required for an attack.
An improved approach was also tested in which the multiplication was performed ev­
ery round along with two register updates - one being a dummy register. This increased 
the number of waveforms required even more than simply performing the multiplica­
tion on every round.
5.2 Countermeasures against EMA attacks
The Idea of EMC is of a similar nature to the TEMPEST problem and a lot of use­
ful information can be taken from the studies of EMC. It is highly recommended that 
designers wishing to develop a device secure from the threat of electromagnetic eaves­
dropping be fully familiar with the techniques used in EMC. However, it must also be 
stated that a device which is fully compliant with EMC standards will generally still 
emit enough emissions to allow adversaries to reconstruct secret information. In [60] 
it is shown that even though the VDUs all complied with the CISPR standard, it was 
still possible to pick up and reconstruct the video signal.
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5.2.1 Asynchronism
Asynchronism seems to be a viable method of mitigation. As mentioned in the exper­
imental section one of the problems that was encountered was the inability to trigger 
off the waveform at the same point in time for every acquisition. This reduced the ef­
fectiveness of the averaging. Once a valid trigger was established however the results 
improved dramatically.
Not only would asynchronism stop the attacker from gaining a valuable trigger, it 
would also eliminate the need for the clock. As discussed in chapter 3, due to its high 
frequency components, the clock is the cause of some of the strongest radiated signals 
in digital systems4. If the clock gets modulated by the information being processed, 
then this data can be effectively radiated from the board - some interesting results to 
this effect are given in [32].
By eliminating the clock altogether not only does it eliminate any triggering informa­
tion but it also eliminates any potential carriers the secret data may try to “piggyback” 
off. As discussed in [72], synchronism causes the operations to occur at the same 
time which increases the radiated emissions. However if the operations occur asyn- 
chronously to each other, then the radiated emissions can be almost 30dB down from 
those radiating from a synchronised device.
Incidentally, another method of reducing the radiated level of the clock is to apply 
a technique known as spread-spectrum modulation. Spread-spectrum modulation is 
a modulation technique generally used to increase the security of a communication 
system. The transmitted data is “spread” over a bandwidth that is in excess of the min­
imum bandwidth needed to send it. This is accomplished using a code to modulate 
the original data. The receiver needs to have the same code to “despread” the received
4However the switching current of each of the transistors would still exist and this would produce 
high frequency radiating components. However in this case the spectral content would be spread over a 
larger bandwidth decreasing it’s effectiveness.
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signal. Using this technique on the clock signal of a system, the power of the radi­
ated signal is spread over a larger bandwidth resulting in a reduced emission at any 
particular frequency. This is described in more detail in [94].
5.2.2 Shielding
In order to protect a device from external sources of radiation, and to stop radiation 
from leaving a particular area, the device needs to be shielded. Shielding is one of 
the universally accepted ways of reducing unwanted radiated emissions and basically 
involves placing a sheet of conductive material around the device to block the radiation. 
This idea is by no means a new one and is an obvious method to look at in order to stop 
sensitive information being compromised. In military situations where a system is not 
processing “classified” information, the level of shielding need only be good enough 
for EMC (Electromagnetic Compatibility) standards, however “TEMPEST shielding” 
is required if classified information is being processed and is naturally more complex 
than that used for EMC purposes [95,96].
Shielding that blocks electric fields does not necessarily block magnetic fields. It may 
therefore be required that ferromagnetic material (such as mu metal) be used in con­
junction with the other type. However, as stated in [72], different information is con­
tained in each field5 so testing should show which is more vulnerable to attack and 
then shielding can be applied more heavily for that case.
Shielding is considered more of a remedy than a cure and should really only be relied 
upon in the case where redesign is a costly operation. As stated on a number of oc­
casions, it is better to minimise the radiated emissions during the design stage rather 
than relying on methods such a shielding to contain the radiated emissions. However, 
it will sometimes be the case that not every problem will be foreseen so early in the
5This only applies in the near field of course as the only difference between the electric and magnetic 
field in the far field is a factor of 1207T.
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development cycle.
Although it is not a requirement for TEMPEST approved equipment to suppress radi­
ated emissions of non-sensitive signals, it is recommended in [59] that all emissions be 
reduced as much as possible. The main reason for this is the cost of testing. Although 
the signals may very well not contain sensitive information, they must be tested against 
and as a result the time and cost of the testing increases.
The first and most obvious method for counteracting TEMPEST attacks is to provide 
adequate shielding. All of the attacks outlined above are clearly undesirable and if a 
cryptosystem is to survive in the marketplace it must be able to withstand these attacks. 
The methods used at present in commercially available sources more than likely do 
not fully protect against all of these attacks and there needs to be some new protections 
devised. Some of the features of a popular commercially available device are discussed 
in the next chapter and these should be a starting place of the development of these 
mitigation techniques. However, to begin with, it will prove informative to discuss 
some of the techniques described in the different papers and documents referred to 
in the bibliography. For TEMPEST emissions it is clearly necessary that efficient 
shielding is in place to block the radiation containing the sensitive information. For 
power analysis, timing attacks and fault induction attacks other techniques will need 
to be used also.
Although it is shown in [60] that it is possible to reconstruct signals at a distance of 50 
metres from and unshielded VDU, this value is dropped to only 10m with the shield in 
place. This is still a significant distance in terms of security.
With adequate shielding in place a low pass filter should then be placed at the power 
line in order to stop any high frequency coupled information from passing outside the 
module. It will be seen in the next section that this is the method the IBM4758 (the
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first cryptographic processor to gain FIPS 140-1 level 4 security rating) uses.
5.2.3 Balancing
A lot of the techniques proposed here are a lot more feasible on cryptographic systems 
(such as the one under test here) than on smartcard systems because of the extra space 
available. Balancing is one such technique. This involves negating the effects of one 
set of events by performing a complementary set [97]. This technique is unfortunately 
very difficult to implement correctly.
5.2.4 Red/Black Separation
It is important not only to minimise radiated emissions from a device but also to min­
imise conducted emissions. If a section of a system is adequately protected against ra­
diated emissions, then it will not be possible for an attacker to receive information with 
an antenna placed in that area. However if the attacker moves the antenna to another 
location (over the power line entering the system for example), then it is very possible 
that the protected signals will be coupled onto the power line and transferred outside 
the system. The power line being a fairly large cable will act as an efficient radiator 
of electromagnetic energy and may cause even more of a problem than the original 
radiated signal. So it is necessary to consider conducted emissions also. However, if 
subsystems are separated from each other using the RED/BLACK guideline described 
in [51] then this may not be as much of a problem. This guideline basically states that 
systems operating on sensitive data (RED systems) should be physically isolated form 
those operating on non-sensitive data (BLACK systems). As well as this, this every 
system should be carefully designed so as reduce emissions and some techniques for 
doing this can be found in [98].
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5.2.5 Provably secure Countermeasures
Most of the countermeasures proposed to date will only work under certain conditions. 
For example it might be assumed that the attacker can only collect a certain number 
of waveforms or that access to a certain piece of equipment will not be available. In 
general it is dangerous to make such assumptions and a worst case scenario should be 
considered for maximum security. This of course is not always economically feasible 
and a balance should be met.
Generally it will not be known for certain whether or not the device is completely se­
cure. However an ideal situation might be to develop a mathematical model of a system 
and use this model to design provably secure countermeasures. This was proposed by 
Chari et al. in [89] where it states
“A scientific approach is to create a model for the physical character­
istics of the device, and then design implementations provably secure in 
that model, i.e., they resist generic attacks with an a priori bound on the 
number of experiments.”
The model would of course have to be simplified greatly which in itself would increase 
the possibility of failure in the countermeasures. This is seen in [97] where Quisquater 
shows that Chari et al.’s first approximation which ignores the coupling effects between 
systems in close proximity to one another, will not work. This is due to the fact that 
EMA wasn’t known at the time [89] was written. Despite this, a provably secure 
countermeasure is a very desirable result.
5.2.6 Summary
This chapter looked at some of the mechanisms by which the attacks discussed in this 
thesis may be protected against. Unfortunately no one technique will suffice and a well
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thought out combination of them will generally be needed. Some of the countermea­
sures overlap for the two attacks discussed. For example, masking the intermediate 
data operations will not only reduce the possibility of a power attack but will reduce 
the possibility of an EMA attack also.
The techniques used to protect cryptographic systems from these attacks should not 
cost more than the information being protected. A balance between the level of security 
and it’s cost should therefore be found. To decrease the costs, all problems should be 
tested for at the design stage when it is a lot less easier to eliminate them.
There are other proposed techniques available that haven’t been described here and 
which can be found in [99-107].
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Conclusions
Side channel attacks have been shown to be successful in compromising the secret in­
formation on smartcard implementations of cryptographic systems. These attacks take 
advantage of some characteristic of the physical implementation of a cryptographic al­
gorithm and are not only a threat to smartcards but also to more complex cryptographic 
systems.
This thesis attempted to determine the level of vulnerability of a recently developed 
high speed cryptographic accelerator to these side channel attacks. Using the obtained 
results, the designers will be able to determine with increased confidence, the extent 
to which the device conforms to cryptographic standards that require mitigation tech­
niques.
Although a number of side channels exist, only two were examined and implemented. 
This was due to the fact that they posed the greatest threat to the particular system under 
review. The two attacks are known as power analysis and electromagnetic analysis.
Power analysis allows the attacker to gain a knowledge of the secret parameters resid­
ing on a cryptosystem. It accomplishes this by measuring the fluctuations in the power 
the systems draws from its supply. In a similar manner, electromagnetic analysis al­
lows acquisition of this knowledge by capturing and analysing the electromagnetic 
radiation emanating from the system. The US government has been aware of these 
attacks for quite some time and has set up a classified program known as TEMPEST to
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protect against them. Although TEMPEST is thought mainly to deal with electromag­
netic emissions, it is likely that it deals with other forms of compromising emissions 
also, including power attacks.
Power analysis was studied first as there is a firmer understanding of this attack in the 
public domain. It was seen that the power drawn by cryptographic systems is data de­
pendent. The power drawn when a 1  is being manipulated is slightly different from that 
required when a 0 is being manipulated. By using statistical techniques, it is sometimes 
possible to tell the values of individual bits. Averaging was seen to be the main cause 
of success for power analysis. By running the algorithm thousands of times the noise is 
reduced to an insignificant level, however the fluctuations caused by the operations on 
the board remain. The specific values of certain bits can be determined by calculating 
the differential trace which essentially “demodulates” the required information from 
useless periodic information not eliminated by the averaging.
A logical progression from power analysis is Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA). The 
main difference between the two is the method used for collection of the signals, how­
ever there are subtle differences such as modulation effects and localisation properties 
of EMA that are not of concern in power analysis. These effects can, in some instances, 
make EMA a more powerful attack than power analysis. The theoretical chapter on 
EMA presented a number of models that can be used to predict the radiation for elec­
tronic circuits. This then led to a discussion of the TEMPEST program however due 
to it’s classified nature, little practical insight was gained. Finally, a literary review 
was given and it was learned that the realisation that electromagnetic radiation could 
be used to compromise electronic systems is fairly new. Researchers have discovered 
that indeed the attacks are a real threat.
Following the theory, the next chapter presented the experimental results and proce­
dures. Experimental techniques were set up to attack the DUT. The techniques were
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tested with both a simulation and a microprocessor emulation and then used to attack 
the DUT. The following results were observed:
• The simulation produced waveforms that resembled those of a cryptographic 
processor and included simulated bias spikes and noise (both periodic and ran­
dom). These waveforms were then “attacked” using the Labview programs writ­
ten for the main attack. The attacks were successful and the bias spikes were 
revealed.
• As a more realistic test (and one which tested the whole setup as opposed to just 
the software), a microcontroller circuit was designed and built. This circuit emu­
lated the operations of the DUT by performing encryption using Montgomery’s 
method for modular exponentiation. The technique was different from that used 
by the DUT but was sufficient to test the setup. The attack was done using both 
an ordinary MESD attack and an EMA attack. The attack was successful in 
both cases and revealed the value of the secret exponent. Some countermeasures 
were attempted in this case and were found to be helpful in increasing the level 
of difficulty of the attack. It was quite a significant result that the microcontroller 
circuit was compromised with ease using the MESD attack and an antenna, as it 
would be very difficult to detect this form of attack. It thus poses a significant 
risk and it is necessary that action be taken when designing new systems.
• With verification that the entire setup was sound and that a real threat existed, 
an attack was attempted against the DUT. A spectrum analysis was performed 
using a spectrum analyser, and Matlab software was used to analyse the results. 
No information about the exponent was revealed. A power analysis was then 
attempted using a number of different probes. Although the operations of the 
board were clear, no information about the secret exponent was revealed.
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• Finally an electromagnetic analysis was attempted with a number of different 
antennas at a number of different frequencies. A super-heterodyne architecture 
was used to down-convert the higher frequencies to the intermediate frequency 
of the available amplifier. Although these attacks were successful against the 
microcontroller circuit they failed to produce results against the DUT. This only 
served to increase the level of confidence in its ability to withstand these attacks.
In all cases the attacks against the DUT failed. These included
• The initial comparison of the spectrum for each of the key,
•  The powerful MESD attack using measuring probes which had been successful 
in the simulation and the emulation,
• The EMA attack using the magnetic field antennas, the electric field antennas 
and the Yagi antenna,
• Some additional techniques such as total power analysis, cross-correlation and 
high-order differential power analysis.
There are a number of possibilities for the failure of the attacks to reveal the exponent 
of the DUT. Some of these include
• The sampling rate of the digitiser was very prohibitive. A maximum real time 
sample rate of lOOMSs- 1  was very prohibitive for a system that runs at 60MHz 
(and even 30MHz).
• The analog bandwidth was only 100MHz. This would have filtered out many of 
the higher harmonics.
• The resolution of the board may have been a problem. The bias spikes may have 
been lost in the quantisation noise caused by the 8 bit resolution.
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• The Ultraview board may have been filtering the signal of interest at the mea­
surement points. However, the DUT itself must have been receiving the correct 
power otherwise it would have failed to operate. The fact that EMA failed also 
seems to suggest that the Ultraview board was not the problem as it wasn’t used 
in these later attacks.
• The design of the DUT itself may very well have been the cause for failure. 
The fact that the multiplication of the square and multiply algorithm was done 
every round would certainly increase the number of waveforms required for an 
attack. This was one of the countermeasures suggested in the literature and may 
have made the 8,000 waveforms insufficient to reveal the secret key. Also, the 
parallelism of the board may have been a major contributor. The board has 
10 ALUs all running parallel to each other. This would certainly be a major 
contributor to the failure of the attack.
Despite the fact the DUT passed all the tests it is not safe to draw the conclusion that it 
is secure. It is very possible that the equipment was the problem and this must be kept 
in mind. The MESD attack was shown to be a very powerful attack and this is a reason 
why the DUT is considered vulnerable to an adversary with improved resources.
It was seen that although the ultimate goal of the attacks failed, a lot of information 
about the device was learned in the process. This can also hold serious consequences 
as it may indirectly lead to knowledge about the secret key. Reduction of events that 
lead to any information must therefore be a major consideration in the design of new 
systems.
Although the main attacks failed, it is clear that a problem does exist. This was not 
only shown by referring to numerous published papers on the subject but also by exper­
imental results. Designers of cryptosystems need to keep this in mind. By following
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the methods of this thesis it will be possible for an engineer who is completely new 
to this area to devise tests for a cryptographic device. Other side channel attacks must 
also be kept in mind. These include timing attacks, fault induction attacks and optical 
TEMPEST [108,109].
Some improvements for future testing and research might include the following:
• Acquisition of a high quality digitiser. This would preferably mean one that 
samples at a minimum real time sample rate of 20 - 30 times the clock speed 
of the board under test. Its analog bandwidth should be about 10 times1 this 
clock rate to ensure signal integrity. The digitiser should also have a resolution 
of at least 12 bits. Unfortunately, the higher the clock rate of the board the 
more expensive the required digitiser becomes, however for the 60MHz DUT, a 
suitable digitiser is available from Gage Applied inc. [80].
• For power analysis, measuring the power on the power pin of the ASIC would 
be highly advantageous as it would eliminate a lot of noise. Although this might 
be more difficult for an attacker than a designer (due to possible tamper resistant 
measures and the fact that the pin would have to be temporarily disconnected 
from the PCB board to take the measurement), it should not be dismissed as a 
possible point of attack.
• Obtain active2, high frequency measuring probes and high quality, low noise 
amplifiers and filters of the appropriate bandwidth.
•  For an EMA attack, a high quality, broadband receiver that allows measurement 
of the demodulated signal would be an advantage. This would replace the “home 
made” superheterodyne receiver used here.
1 It is possible that a lower bandwidth will still produce positive results also.
2 As opposed to the passive probes used for m easurem ent here.
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• High quality receiving antennas of the appropriate bandwidth would also im­
prove results. An array of coil antennas (such as the one described in chapter 
3) could be used and placed strategically over the entire area of the ASIC. This 
would increase the possibility of locating the desired signal.
• Increase the number of waveforms collected. The number collected for this ex­
periment was 8,000 for each section. If this was increased to about twice this 
number then there is a greater chance of the attack being successful.
The improvements given here are of course only a few possible suggestions and there 
are many other things that can be done to increase the possibility of a successful attack. 
It is necessary for a designer to try to anticipate every possible way an attacker can 
improve these results if a secure cryptosystem is to be obtained.
Finally, it is clear that this research is only a small part in the ongoing struggle to obtain 
the perfect cryptosystem. However, by learning from the problems encountered in this 
thesis and the solutions to resolve these problems, designers can be that bit closer to 
its implementation.
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APPENDIX A 
The Data Encryption Standard
This appendix discusses the DES algorithm. A number of permutations, substitutions 
and lookup boxes used in the description require tables to represent their operation, 
however they will not be given here. Any modem book on cryptography will describe 
them in detail (see [2,7] for example). The standard describing the DES algorithm is 
FIPS PUB 46-3 [110]. DES (and most of the other major symmetric ciphers) is based 
on a cipher known as the Feistel block cipher.
As with most encryption schemes, DES expects two inputs - the plaintext to be en­
crypted and the secret key. The manner in which the plaintext is accepted, and the key 
arrangement used for encryption and decryption, both determine the type of cipher it 
is. DES is therefore a symmetric, 64 bit block cipher3 as it uses the same key for both 
encryption and decryption and only operates on 64 bit blocks of data at a time4 (be they 
plaintext or ciphertext). The key size used is 56 bits, however a 64 bit (or eight-byte) 
key is actually input. The least significant bit of each byte is either used for parity (odd 
for DES) or set arbitrarily and does not increase the security in any way. All blocks are 
numbered from left to right which makes the left most bit the LSB.
3This contrasts with a stream  cipher in which each data elem ent (such as a bit or byte) is encrypted 
one at a time.
4This is a typical block size used in com puter algorithm s today as it m akes attacks difficult to imple­
m ent but is small enough for efficient manipulation.
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Once a plain-text message is received to be encrypted, it is arranged into 64 bit blocks 
required for input. If the number of bits in the message is not evenly divisible by 64, 
then the last block will be padded. Multiple permutations and substitutions are incor­
porated throughout in order to increase the difficulty of performing a cryptanalysis on 
the cipher [7]. However, it has been stated in [2] that the initial and final permuta­
tions offer little or no contribution to the security of DES and in fact some software 
implementations omit them (although strictly speaking these are not DES as they do 
not adhere to the standard).
Figure 6.1 shows the sequence of events that occur during an encryption operation 
(adapted from [7]). DES performs an initial permutation on the entire 64 bit block of 
data. It is then split into 2, 32 bit sub-blocks, Li and Ri which are then passed into 
what is known as a round (see figure 6.2), of which there are 16. Each of the rounds are 
identical and the effects of increasing their number is twofold - the algorithms security 
is increased and its temporal efficiency decreased. Clearly these are two conflicting 
outcomes and a compromise must be made. For DES the number chosen was 16, 
probably to guarantee the elimination of any correlation between the ciphertext and 
either the plaintext or key5. At the end of the 16th round, the 32 bit Li and Ri output 
quantities are swapped to create what is known as the pre-output. This [Rw, Lie] 
concatenation is permuted using a function which is the exact inverse of the initial 
permutation. The output of this final permutation is the 64 bit ciphertext.
As figure 6.1 shows, the inputs to each round consist of the L i, Ri pair and a 48 bit 
subkey which is a shifted and contracted version of the original 56 bit key. Details of 
an individual round can be seen in figure 6.2. The main operations on the data are 
encompassed into what is referred to as the cipher function and is labeled / .  This func­
tion accepts two different length inputs of 32 bits and 48 bits and outputs a single 32
5No reason was given in the design specification as to why 16 rounds were chosen.
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32 bits
Figure 6 .1: Flow Diagram of DES algorithm for encrypting data.
bit number. Both the data and key are operated on in parallel, however the operations
are quite different. The 56 bit key is split into two 28 bit halves Ci and D{ (C and D
being chosen so as not to be confused with L and R). The value of the key used in 
any round is simply a left cyclic shift and a permuted contraction of that used in the 
previous round. Mathematically, this can be written as
C, =  LcSi(Ci-i), Di = LcSi(Di-i) (6.1)
K i = P C (C i,D i) (6.2)
where Lcsi is the left cyclic shift for round i, C* and Dt are the outputs after the shifts, 
PC (.) is a function which permutes and compresses a 56 bit number into a 48 bit 
number and Ki is the actual key used in round i. The number of shifts is either one
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Operations on Data Operations on Key
— 32 bits— — 32 bits — —28 bits— - 2 8  bits —
Figure 6.2: Details of a single DES round.
or two and is determined by the round number i. For i =  {1,2,9,16} the number of 
shifts is one and for every other round it is two.
The common formulas used to describe the relationships between the input to one 
round and its output (or the input to the next round) are:
U  = R i-i  (6.3)
Ri = L i. l ® f ( R i_u K i) (6.4)
where L and R have their usual meaning and/( .)  is the cipher function. This function 
/  is the main part of every round and consists of four separate stages:
1. The E-box expansion permutation - here the 32-bit input data from Ri_i is ex­
panded and permuted to give the 48 bits necessary for combination with the 48
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bit key. The E-box expansion permutation delivers a larger output by splitting 
its input into 8 , 4-bit blocks and copying every first and fourth bit in each block 
into the output in a defined manner. The security offered by this operation comes 
from one bit affecting two substitutions in the S-boxes. This causes the depen­
dency of the output bits on the input bits to spread faster, and is known as the 
avalanche affect [2 ].
2. The bit by bit addition modulo 2 (or exclusive OR) of the E-box output and 48 
bit subkey K i9
3. The S-box substitution - this is a highly important substitution which accepts a 
48-bit input and outputs a 32-bit number. Figure 6.3 shows the S-box substitu­
tion. The S-boxes are the only non-linear operation in DES and are therefore the 
most important part of its security. They were very carefully designed although 
the conditions they were designed under has been under intense scrutiny since 
DES was released. The reason was because IBM had already designed a set of 
S-boxes which were completely changed by the NSA with no explanation why6.
The input to the S-boxes is 48 bits long arranged into 8 , 6 bit blocks (&i, b2, ■.., b6), 
There are 8 S-boxes (Si, S2> • • •» Sg) each of which accept a 6 bit blocks of data. 
The output of each S-box is a four bit number. Each of the S-boxes can be 
thought of as a 4 x 16 matrix. Each cell of the matrix is identified by a coordi­
nate pair (i, j), where 0 < i < 3 and 0 <  j  < 15. The value of i is taken as 
the decimal representation of the first and last bits of the input to each S-box, 
i.e. Dec(b\be) =  i and the value of j is take from the decimal representation 
of the inner four bits that remain, i.e D ecfahb^bs) =  j .  Each cell within the 
S-box matrices contains a 4-bit number which is output once that particular cell
6L ater they claim ed that there were certain attacks that they knew a b o u t, e.g differential cryptanal­
ysis, which would have been revealed to the public if  the design criteria had been exposed.
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is selected by the input.
4. The P-box permutation - This simply permutes the output of the S-box without 
changing the size of the data. It is simply a permutation and nothing else. It has 
a one to one mapping of its input to its output giving a 32 bit output from a 32 
bit input.
48 bits
32 bits
Figure 6.3: Diagram of S-box substitution.
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Overview of Number Theory
As it’s name suggests, number theory deals with the theory of numbers and is probably 
one of the oldest branches of mathematics. It is divided into several areas including 
elementary, analytic and algebraic number theory. These are distinguished more by 
the methods used in each than the type of problems posed. To understand some of 
the topics discussed in this thesis, a number of elements from these different areas 
are needed. The relevant ideas are discussed here and include prime numbers, the 
greatest common divisor, the modulus operator, the modular inverse, Euler’s Theorem 
and Fermat’s little Theorem. A rigorous approach is purposely avoided but can be 
found in [8] if so desired.
Prime Numbers
A prime number p is simply an integer greater than 1 with only two positive divisors, 1 
and itself. This means that it’s entire set of divisors (i.e. its factors) consist only of four 
integers ±1 and ±p. It is therefore seen that 1 is not a prime number (some reasons 
for this can be seen at [111]). Prime numbers are of the utmost importance to certain 
public key algorithms and most of the techniques used will not work without them.
An interesting point to note is that any positive integer I  > 2 is either a prime or can
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be expressed as the product of primes7 :
I  =  P t f  x x , . . . ,  X P ? , PN > P*_! > . . .  > Pi (6.5) 
or another way of looking at this would be:
i  =  I l Pnn’ <6-6>
where S is the set of all prime numbers8.
As a result of equations 6.5 or 6 .6 , any integer > 1 that is not a prime is known as a 
composite number. It can be seen from this and the definition of a prime number above, 
that 1 is neither prime nor composite. As an example, the first ten prime numbers are: 
2 ,3 ,5 ,7 ,11,13,17,19 and 23.
Division
Any integer can be expressed as n =  q x m  +  r, where n, </, and r are integers, m  
is a positive integer and 0 < r < m. An important point to note is that the remainder 
(also known as residue) r, must be nonnegative (i.e. either positive or 0). This is seen
'. For example, 24 10 is 2 withby two restrictions: 0 <  r < m  and q x m  = 
a remainder of 4 however, — 24 10 is —3 with a remainder of 6 and not —2 with a
remainder of —4 as might be expected. If r  =  0 then n  is said to be a multiple of m. 
This is also the same as saying that m  divides n, is a divisor of n or is a factor of n  and 
the notation used to express this is m\n.
The greatest common divisor, m maZi of two integers a and b is the largest positive 
integer that will divide both a and b without a remainder. Therefore, mmaa:|a, m max\b
7This is known as the fundam ental theorem  o f  arithmetic.
8Clearly in this case however, m ost o f the exponents en will be 0.
9The notation [x j is known as the floor o f  the integer x  and is the greatest integer <  x. Similarly, 
the notation [af| is the ceiling o f  the integer x  and is the least integer >  x.
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and m n\mmax for any divisor m n of a and b. The notation generally used to represent 
this is gcd(a, b) = m max.
If gcd(a, b) =  1, this means that a and b have no common factors other than 1. Such 
pairs of integers are known as relatively prime or co-prime. Along with prime num­
bers, numbers that are relatively prime have considerable importance in public key 
cryptography as can be seen in appendix C.
The greatest common divisor of two positive integers a and b (gcd(a, &)), can be de­
termined by a procedure known as Euclid’s Algorithm. It is based on the theorem that 
gcd(a, b) = gcd(b, a mod b) a proof of which can be seen in [7,8]. It is a fairly simple 
procedure however as it is not required for and understanding of this thesis, it will not 
be discussed further here. It is sufficient to know that it exists.
Modular Arithmetic
Modular arithmetic is a form of arithmetic that will generally have been encountered 
before but may not have been recognised as such. An example given regularly is that 
of a 12 hour clock, where it is recognised that 3 hours after 11 o’clock it will be 2 
o’clock (and not 14 o’clock). Modular arithmetic may seem a little confusing when 
first encountered but in fact has many parallels with ordinary arithmetic. The symbol 
used (=) is known as the congruence symbol and was invented by the German mathe­
matician Karl Friedrich Gauss around the beginning of the 19th century. It resembles 
the equality symbol (=) quite closely as was likely to be Gauss’s intention.
Modular relationships are of the form n = R  (mod m) (spoken as “n is congruent to R 
mod m”) where n and R  are integers and m  is a positive integer known as the modulus. 
If this congruence relationship holds, then it is said that n  is congruent to R  modulo 
m. The modulus operator (mod) produces the remainder when the integer on it’s left is 
divided by the modulus. Thus, the term (R  mod m) is equal to the remainder, r, when 
R  is divided by m.
193
Appendix B Overview o f Number Theory
If two remainders are equal then it can be written that (n mod m) = (R  mod m) - 
a standard equality. However, if the modulus is equal on both sides of the equation, 
then the mod m  term can be removed from the left hand side and the equality symbol 
replaced with a congruence symbol (along with a slight rearrangement of the brackets). 
Assuming n ^  r, it would be incorrect10 to say n =  (R mod m) however it is correct 
to say that n = R (mod m) and this basically states that the same remainder (in this 
case r) results when both n and R are divided by m.
As was mentioned briefly above, the remainder r is also known as a residue. If R  = r 
(i.e. 0 <  R  < m) then R  is known as a least residue. The set of numbers congruent 
to some value a (mod m) is known as a residue class (also known as a congruence 
class). As 0 <  r < m, this means there are m possible values of r and hence there are 
m  possible residue classes.
The congruence relationship n = R  (mod m) is only true if m\ (n — R ). To understand 
why, it must be remembered that the integers n and R  can be expressed as q{n,R) x m  +  
where the subscript {n, R}  represents the fact that q and r will generally take on 
different values for n and R. Only if rn = tr will m \(n — R) because in this case the 
two remainders cancel each other in the (n -  R) term: (qn 'xm  + rn - q R X m  + rR) =  
(qn'Xm — qRX m). Because m\(qn x m) and m\(qr x m )  => m\(qn x m  ~  qR x  m). If 
n — R  is not divisible by m  then the notation used to represent this is /  and therefore, 
m / ( n  — R). In this case n ^  R  (mod m).
Modular Inverse
The idea of an inverse is important both in ordinary arithmetic and modular arithmetic. 
In any set of numbers, the inverse of a number contained in that set is another number 
which when combined with the first under a particular operation will give the Identity
,0Som e texts don’t use the congruence symbol but instead write n = R  (m od m)  where the brackets 
are placed only around the m odulus operator and the modulus to identify congruency. This approach 
will not be used here however.
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element1 1 for that operation. Two examples of inverses are the additive inverse and a 
multiplicative inverse.
It must be noted that the Identity element under different operations will be different. 
For example, under addition it is 0, as any number added to 0 will remain unchanged. 
However, under multiplication the Identity element is 1 and any number multiplied by 
1 will remain unchanged.
In ordinary arithmetic if the number is x  then the additive inverse is — x  and multiplica­
tive inverse is The idea is the same in modular arithmetic however if x  is an integer 
then its multiplicative inverse would not be ^ as there is no such thing as a fraction 
in modular arithmetic. In this case it would be a number which, when multiplied by 
the original number, would give a result that is congruent 1 modulo m (again, m  is the 
modulus).
A number can only have a multiplicative inverse if it is relatively prime to the modulus 
(i.e., gcd(x, m) =  1). This can be seen as one of the reasons why RSA requires its 
public (e) and private keys (d) to be relatively prime to the modulus as it requires:
e • d =  1  (mod m)
When one number is operated on modulo some other number, it is said that the first 
number has been reduced modulo the second and the operation is called a modular 
reduction.
Euler’s Theorem
Euler’s Theorem which will be stated here without proof (see [8] and [7] for a proof) 
can be stated mathematically as
a4>{m) —  ^ (mo(i gcd(a,m) — 1 (6.7)
11 This is a num ber that will leave the original num ber unchanged under that operation.
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where a is any integer and m  is the modulus (which, again, is restricted to being a 
positive integer) The symbol <j>(m) is known as Euler’s phi (or totient) function and is 
the number of positive integers < m  and relatively prime to it
A few points should be noted about <j>(m)
•  The value o f <p(l) is defined as being equal to 1
• If p is some pnme, then <j>(p) = p — 1  as there are p — 1 positive integers < p 
and relatively prime to it
• If p and q are prime numbers and n  =  pq, then 0(n) =  0(p)0(g) =  (p — l)(g -  
1) The reason for this is that the integers not relatively prime to p and q are 
{0, p, 2p, , (q — l)p} and {Q,q,2q, , (p — l)g} respectively The number of 
integers relatively prime to n is then pq — (q — p -  1 ), where the 1 is subtracted 
so as not to include 0 twice
As an example take 412 =  16,777,216 =  1 (mod 7) because 7x2,396,745+1 =  412 
Fermat’s Little Theorem
Fermat’s Little Theorem is really a specific case of Euler’s theorem where m  is pnme12 
It can be stated as follows
am-i ^  j  (mod m), where m is a pnme and m  / a  (6  8)
If Euler’s theorem is taken to be true, then this can also be seen to work because of the 
fact that (p{m) ~  m  — 1 for a prime number as mentioned above Again, for a more 
ngorous proof, see [7,8]
1 h is to r ic a l ly  though, Ferm at’s little theorem  was discovered long before Euler s Theorem
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RSA Algorithm
The RSA algorithm is discussed here All of the required number theory concepts are 
explained in appendix B The characters used to represent the values are in keeping 
with most explanations of RSA so although generally m  was used throughout this 
thesis to represent the modulus, n  is used here instead
1 Two extremely large, equal length, random prime numbers, p  and q, are chosen 
carefully
2 The number n  is found such that n = p x  q
3 The Euler phi (totient) function is found from n  using the property <j>(n) =
<t>{pq) =  ( p - 1)(? - 1)
4 The value e is chosen at random such that 0 < e < <fi(n) and gcd(e, <t>(n)) =  1
5 The value d is computed usmg the congruence relation de = 1  (mod </>(n)) (1 e 
d is the multiplicative inverse of e modulo m)
The ciphertext is then produced by
C  =  M e mod n  (6 9)
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where C is the ciphertext, M is the plaintext and the set {e, n} constitute the public 
key.
The original plaintext can then be reconstructed by
M  = C d mod n  (6.10)
where the set {d, n} constitute the private key and the other variables are as before. 
Equation 6 .10 uses the fact that
de =  1 (mod </>(ri)) (6.11)
and that
(j<t>{n) =   ^ (mod n), where gcd(C,n) = 1 (6.12)
which is Euler’s theorem from equation 6.7 in appendix B.
This can be seen as
C d mod n = (M e mod n)d mod n  =  M ed mod n (6.13)
From equation 6.11 it is clear that
de = (p(n)q+ 1 (6.14)
for some integer q.
Equation 6.13 can then be written as
Appendix C RSA
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Cd mod n = Med mod n = M ^(n)9+1 mod n 
which then becomes
M ^ n)qM  mod n
which by Euler’s theorem can be seen to be equal to
M  mod n
(6.15)
(6.16)
(6.17)
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Montgomery’s method for modular 
exponentiation
Practical implementations of theoretical ideas are invariably more difficult to realise 
than they first appear; this entire thesis is based around this fact. Certain characteristics 
have to be considered in practice that need not have been considered in theory. Time 
and space are two major examples as they are both limited resources. The time it 
takes to run a specific algorithm needs to be optimised as much as possible, as well 
as the space required to store data values and opcode etc. In 1983, Peter Montgomery 
proposed a method which optimises the process of modular exponentiation. His paper 
was published in 1985 [39] and some of the ideas are explained here.
Modular Exponentiation
The process of modular exponentiation is extremely important in public-key cryptog­
raphy due to it’s use in some of the most popular cryptographic algorithms13. The 
general form of such an operation is be mod m, where b is the base, e is the exponent 
and m  is the modulus. The result of this operation is simply the remainder left when 
bi x &2 x , • • •, x&e is divided by ra. As discussed in appendix B, this value will always 
be in the range 0 <  r < m.
13 Including RSA, Diffie-Hellman key agreem ent and ElGamal.
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The obvious method for carrying out b e mod m  is to calculate b e , divide the result 
by m  and then take the remainder. However, it is quite clear that the value of b e can 
quickly become very large as e increases - this is the case even for small values of b  
and m. It must be remembered that if two numbers with s digits in each are multiplied 
together, the answer will be no more than 2s digits long. Similarly, if an s digit number 
is raised to the power of a t digit number, then the answer will be no more than st digits 
long. If the values used in RSA are considered (i.e. numbers containing 512, 1024, 
2048 etc. bits), then the value of b e can end up being so big, that it would exceed the 
value of the estimated number of atoms in the universe! Clearly, no system can store 
a number of this magnitude, so it would be impossible to work out b e mod m  by the 
method described here.
Luckily, due to the rules of modular arithmetic, it is possible to start with b  mod m  
instead of 6, multiply this value by itself and reduce the result mod m. This new value 
can be then multiplied by b  mod m  again, and the result reduced mod m .  Continuing 
in this way for e multiplications, the final value may be obtained without having to deal 
with numbers larger than twice the number of digits in the modulus (after the initial 
b  mod m  has been calculated).
For example, consider operating on 1293 mod 7. As this isn’t too large it can be 
worked out on a calculator to be 2146689 mod 7 =  6 mod 7. However, using the 
technique described, this could be done as (((129 mod 7 x 129 mod 7) mod 7) x 
129 mod 7) mod 7 =  (((3 x 3) mod 7) x 3) mod 7 =  (2 x 3) mod 7 =  6 mod 7. 
This would keep the number of digits down to a size that could be handled quite easily. 
However, as always seems to be the case, in alleviating one problem a new problem is 
created - there are now far too many divisions.
Division is probably the most computationally expensive mathematical operation and 
must therefore be avoided as much as possible. In order to obtain the remainder using
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the method above, e divisions must be carried out. For most values of m  encountered 
this will be highly inefficient; there is one major exception however.
If m  happens to be some power of the radix (or base) of the system being worked 
in (e.g. 10  in decimal and 2  in binary) then all that is required for a division is a 
simple right shift of the digits. So, in the decimal system, if the divisor is 125,000, 
then to divide by 1 0 3 say, all that is needed is three right shifts (dropping the zeros 
of course14). Now, computer systems work in binary, and it would not be so easy to 
divide 125,000 by 10. However, if m  turns out to be some power of 2, then a number 
of right shifts will suffice (the number being determined by the power). For example, 
to divide I I I I I I 2 by 2 3 simply involves three shifts to the right (this time the shifted 
digits are not dropped but are kept as the remainder, i.e. 1 1 1 2).
Clearly then, it is desirable to have a way of computing be mod m  by simply right 
shifting for each division. But how can this be done if the modulus is not a power of 
the radix? One very popular solution is discussed next.
Montgomery Reduction
Peter L. Montgomery found a way to implement modular division by using powers of 
the radix of the system, without the need for the modulus to be a power of it. The 
technique he developed is now known as Montgomery reduction and is described in 
[39,112] and outlined here for reference.
Basically, given a number X  and a modulus m, it is desirable to compute X  mod m  
without having to divide by m. Montgomery reduction is the process of computing 
the value of X R ~ l mod m  without having to divide by m. The value R ~l is the 
multiplicative inverse, modulo m, of a chosen integer R. Using this fact, the required 
value X  mod m  can easily be calculated by X R R ~ l mod m.
14If  the num ber is not an integer multiple o f the base system, then simply dropping the shifted digits 
will produce incorrect results. However, provided some way is devised to store the shifted digits, a right 
shift will still produce the correct results.
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The value X R  1 mod m  can be calculated using the following algorithm:
Montgomery_Reduction(X, R, ra, m!)
{
U = Xnn! mod R; 
X r e d  = (x +  Um)/R;  
if (X reci ra),
{
Figure 6.4: This algorithm computes the value of X R  1 mod m  without having to divide by
m.
Here, m is the modulus (a positive integer), X  and R  some integers such that 0 < 
X  < m R , R  > m  and gcd(m , R) =  1 , m! =  —m ~l mod R  (i.e. m! satisfies the 
equation R R ~ l — m m ' = 1 and is therefore congruent to - 1  mod R) and X red is the 
reduced value of X .  The value of m! can be calculated using the Extended Euclidean 
Algorithm [7,8].
This technique works because it turns out that
(X  -h U m )/R  = X R  1 (mod m) (6.18)
if the above rules are adhered to.
To see this, note that
X  + Um = X  (mod m) (6.19)
because U is an integer. Multiplying both sides of this by the multiplicative inverse of 
R  gives
(X  +  U m)R~x = X R - 1 (mod m). (6.20)
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Now,
(X  +  U m ) / R = ( X  + U m )R - 1 (mod m)
(6.21)
=  X R ~ l (mod m)
R \{X  + Um), (6 .2 2 )
i.e. iff (X  +  U m )/R  is an integer15. This can be seen to be the case because
U = Xrri  mod R  
=> Um = X m m !  mod R  (6.23)
=> Um = —X  (mod R) = sR  +  f*
where s is some integer, f x  = R  — rx ,  and rx  is the remainder when X  is divided by 
Now, for some integer t
X  = tR  + rx  (6.24)
and it follows that (X + Um)/R is an integer.
Because ( X + U m )/R  is an integer, the congruency relationship of equation 6 .2 1  holds 
and it is clear that
( X + Um)/R^= X R ~ l mod m  + nm, (6.25)
for some integer n.
This implies that
(X  +  U m )/R  < (n +  1 )m. (6.26)
15 It was discussed in appendix B that fractions do not exist in m odular arithm etic, so, i f  R j[(X+ U m ) 
then it can’t be congruent to (X  +  U m )R ~ 1 m od  m  (which is always an integer).
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However, due to the restriction X  < m R , and the fact that U < R  (it is the remainder 
when X m !  is divided by R ), this then implies that
(X  +  U m )/R  < (m R  +  m R ) /R  = 2m. (6.27)
Therefore, either
(X  +  Urn)/R = X R - 1 mod m  (6.28)
in which case n = 0 , or
(X  +  U m )/R  = X R -1 mod m  + m  (6-29)
in which case n = 1. The latter case can easily be tested for and if true, the value 
(X  + U m )/R  — m  returned (this is the purpose of the conditional if statement in figure 
6.4).
The above operation will be efficient provided an appropriate value of R  is chosen. 
This should be a power of the radix of the number system being used. For computer 
systems, it is therefore prudent to choose 2N (for some N )  as the value for R. In order 
for this value to work, the conditions discussed above must be met (i.e. gcd(R, m) = 1  
and R  > m). For practical systems (such as RSA) the modulus is odd and therefore 
gcd(R, m) = gcd( 2, m) =  1 . The condition R >  m  will be satisfied if N  is chosen to 
be equal to the number of bits in the modulus, m.
In summary then, the Montgomery reduction of some number X  can be stated as
x  reduction ^ - 1  ^  m  (6.30)
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Montgomery Multiplication
Now, as discussed above, the whole point of Montgomery’s method is to make modular 
exponentiation as efficient as possible. Using Montgomery reduction, a special type of 
multiplication known as Montgomery multiplication can be defined. This can be used 
to allow exponentiation over R  using the famous square and multiply algorithm (see 
figure 2.7 in chapter 2).
The Montgomery multiplication of two numbers P and Q is simply:
Mont -P  x Q = P x Q x R  mod m  (6.31)
Montwhere x denotes Montgomery multiplication16. It can be seen that this is simply a 
Montgomery reduction of P  x Q.  Therefore, figure 6.4 can be modified to allow this 
multiplication as follows:
Montgomery _Multiplication(P, Q, R,  m , m')
{X  = P x Q;
U =  Xnn! mod R;
X r e d  =  (x +  U m )/R ; 
if (X red > m);
{ Xred — Xred 771,
}
Return X red\
Figure 6.5: This algorithm computes the value of PQR  1 mod m  without having to divide 
by m.
all values are as before except X , which is now replaced with P  and Q. It must be 
remembered that 0 <  X  < m R  which means that 0 <  P  x Q < mR. This will be
16Another way o f  denoting this might be: Montgomery _Multiplication(P, Q, m, m!, R ) - the name
. . M o nto f the function in figure 6.5. However, it is easier to use the symbol x  with the understanding that 
the num bers m , m' and R  are passed in as param eters also.
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satisfied if P,Q < m  because then P  x Q < m 2 < m R  ( R >  m).
Now, consider two numbers A and B which are to be multiplied mod m. Before carry­
ing out Montgomery’s multiplication, both operands need to be transformed into their 
“Montgomery representation” known as a Montgomery residue. This basically consists 
of performing a Montgomery multiply on each operand with the factor R 2 mod m. 
Taking A as the operand to be transformed gives
Mont 9A x R  mod m  = A x  R  mod m x R  mod m  =  A R  mod m  (6.32)
where A R  mod m  is known as the Montgomery residue of A.
As with Montgomery reduction, the transformation of A and B to their Montgomery 
residues can be represented as follows:
A re^ e AR  mod m = P (6.33)
and
B  residue B R  m Q (i m  =  q  (6  3 4 )
Once the transformations are performed, the Montgomery multiplication of the two 
numbers can take place:
Mont 0 _  1AR  mod m x BR  mod m =  ABR R mod m
(6.35)
=  ABR  mod m
which equals the Montgomery residue of the product AB.
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The fact that the result of equation 6.35 is the Montgomery residue of the product AB 
is extremely important and is the reason why repeated Montgomery multiplications 
can be used for exponentiation. The result ABR  mod m can be used in further Mont­
gomery multiplications until the exponentiation is complete (of course, A =  B in this 
case). If the inputs were not transformed into their respective residues, then the out­
put would be in a different form than the inputs, and repeated multiplication wouldn’t 
work.
Once the calculation is complete, the answer will be of the form Y R  mod m, and this 
must be converted back to the original domain. Performing a Montgomery reduction 
on this will give the desired result
Y R mod m re(^ X on y RR~X mod m = Y  mod m. (6.36)
Of course a Montgomery reduction is simply a Montgomery multiplication with Q = 1 
(or P = 1). This process is very similar to computing the Montgomery residue of the 
original numbers with the only change being that a 1  is input instead of R2 mod m.
Mont ,YR  mod m x 1 = Y R x  R  mod m = Y  mod rri. (6.37)
If only two integers were to be operated upon using Montgomery’s method, then it 
would actually be uneconomical as the operation takes longer than simply multiplying 
the two integers mod the modulus. However, the advantage becomes apparent for 
exponentiation, as the intermediate divisions (which are computationally expensive) 
are not required.
So, to summarise. Montgomery’s method is used for an efficient implementation of
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modular exponentiation It does this by allowing the value be mod m  to be calculated
over some value R  which is computationally efficient to divide with The followingi
steps are taken to do this
*
1 Compute the Montgomery residue of b b r? i ^ e bR mod m,
2 Use this value as an input to the square and multiply algorithm (in which Mont­
gomery multiplications are used),
3 Perform a Montgomery reduction on the result (Y R  mod m) of step 2 Y R  mod
m  reÌ ^ l on Y R R ~ l mod m  = Y  mod m
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